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THREE STRIKES: CAN WE RETURN
TO RATIONALITY?
MICHAEL VrTELLO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

California's widely publicized "Three Strikes"' legislation was the
2
culmination of over a decade of "get tough on crime" legislation.
The story surrounding Three Strikes is symptomatic of the excesses of
our nation's crime prevention policy during the 198 0 s and 1990s.
Despite a threefold increase in the nation's prison population between 1980 and 1994,s most Americans felt more vulnerable to violent
crime than they did a decade earlier. 4 At a time when crime rates
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law; BA., Swarthmore College, 1969; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1974. I wish to extend special thanks to Dean

Gerald Caplan for the generous support for this article. I am also appreciative of helpful
comments from Professors Michael Berch and Joshua Dressler on an earlier draft of this
article and for the excellent research assistance provided by McGeorge students Damon M.
Thurston, A. James Kachmar, and Timothy M. Harris. I want to single out for special
thanks R. Thaddeus Behrens and Helen E. Quinn for their truly outstanding research
assistance.
1 "Three Strikes" is used in this article to describe both the statute adopted by the
legislature, 1994 Cal. Stat. Ch. 12, sec. 1 (AB971) (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 667), and
the initiative, Proposition 184. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 8,

1994).
There is some debate about whether the two provisions are identical. For example, at
least one court found significance in minor variation in the language of the two laws. People v. Reese, No. 94-0714-7 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, Dec. 21, 1994).
2 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE

REPORT OF THE

NATIONAL

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE COM-

14-16 (Steven R.Donziger ed., 1996) (listing significant anti-crime legislation of
the last two decades: 1984 anti-crime legislation increasing penalties for drug offenses;
1986 bill mandating sentences for possession of crack cocaine; 1988 bill increasing funding
for federal drug control; 1994 federal crime bill, the most expensive ever, allocating over
$29 billion for law enforcement and crime prevention programs); FRANKUN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, INcAPAcrrATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 1415 (1995) (discussing the appeal of incapacitation as ajustification for imprisonment in a
post-rehabilitative political era). For a discussion of earlier enhanced sentencing provisions in California, see Markus Dubber, Note, The UnprincipledPunishment of Repeat Offenders:
A Critiqueof Cafornia'sHabitual CriminalStatute, 43 STAN. L. REv. 193 (1990).
3 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supranote 2, at 15.
4 One argument says the media, government, politicians, special interest groups and
private industry have artificially inflated fear of crime. Id. at 68-69. See Steven R.Donziger,
The PrIson-IndustrialComplex; What's Really Drivingthe Rush to Lock 'em. Up, WASH. POST, Mar.
MISSION
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were declining modestly,5 politicians in several states seized on the
fear of crime as a powerful political issue. For example, in a close
gubernatorial race, Governor Pete Wilson's support of Three Strikes
provides a case study of sound-bite electioneering substituting for
careful analysis of frustratingly complex social and penological
problems. 6
Two years of experience with Three Strikes in California has not
quieted debate about the efficacy of the law. Proponents claim victory
based on lower crime rates since its passage 7 while opponents point to
widely reported cases, involving minor third strikes, leading to grossly
disproportionate prison terms.8
While a number of jurisdictions have recently adopted multiple
17, 1996, at C3 (arguing that "[i]t is fear of crime, rather than crime itself, that is now
driving criminal justice policy in the United States").
5 For example, a 1994 public opinion poll found that 73% of the American people
believed that the national crime rate had increased even though the crime rate had decreased by three percentage points. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supranote 2, at 65 (citing
a N.Y. Times/CBS News poll conducted Jan. 15-17, 1994).
6 See discussion infra notes 77-152 and accompanying text.
7 In the city of Los Angeles, crime dropped 14.2% in 1994 and 6.6% in 1995 (even
though the average time served on a year sentence is 71 days due to the early release of
inmates to accommodate the influx of Three Strikes defendants). SeeAndy Furillo, Future
of "Three Strikes" Hinges on Issue of Deterrence, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al, AS. In
response to these statistics, Attorney General Dan Lungren stated that "[i]f more [offenders] are being pushed out in the street and the crime rate is going down, it's difficult not to
say some are being deterred from committing other crime." Id.
8 Perhaps the most noted case is that of Jerry Dewayne Williams-"the pizza thief."
Williams, at the age of 27, was sentenced to prison for 25-years-to-life for stealing a slice of
pepperoni pizza. Although he was found guilty of a standard misdemeanor, petty theft, his
prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and
possession of a controlled substance bumped the misdemeanor conviction up to a felony,
which served as his final strike under California's Three Strikes law. Eric Salter, Pizza Thief
Receives Sentence of 25 Years to Life in Prison, LA TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 9B.
There also is the case of Duane Silva, a 23-year-old who suffers from manic depression
and has an IQ of 70. With previous convictions for setting fire to trash barrels and the glove
compartment of a car, Silva's final strike, stealing a video recorder and a coin collection
from his neighbors, landed him a 30 years to life sentence. Id.
Stealing a drill from a garage was Ricky Valadez's final strike. With two prior residential burglaries to serve as prior strikes, including one that dated back to the late 1970s,
Valadez was sentenced to 25 years to life. Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, '3 Strikes'Law Causes
JurorUnease in O.C., LA. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al.
Kevin Weber, 35 years old with two previous burglary convictions, was sentenced to life
imprisonment with a minimum of 26 years to be served for entering a closed restaurant
from the roof and stuffing four cookies into his pockets. Crumby Ciime: Life Sentence for
Cookie Thief 82 A.BAJ. 12 (1996).
A recent study addressing the effects of California's Three Strikes law reported that in
the two years since its enactment, the law has led to life imprisonment for 192 marijuana
users while only 40 convicted murderers, 25 rapists and 24 kidnappers have been sentenced to life. CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, IMPACT OF "THREE STRIKES" LAW ON THE CALIFORN A DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Chart 6a (Feb. 1996).
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offender statutes, California's is the most draconian. 9 Section II of
this article examines the key elements of California's Three Strikes
legislation and the events that led to its adoption.' 0 Section III then
considers a significant and rapid change in penological theory that
has taken place in less than a decade. During the 1960s through the
mid-1980s, legislatures, judges and commentators abandoned the rehabilitative ideal of the criminal justice system. A broad political coalition oversaw a return to retribution as the justification for
punishment." Renewed interest in multiple offender statutes like the
Three Strikes legislation signals another dramatic shift from retribution to incapacitation and, to a lesser degree, deterrence as the pri2
mary justifications for punishment.'
Incapacitation and deterrence are supported by utilitarian arguments; as such, they rest on factual premises. Utilitarian justifications
for punishment rest on the premise that the pain inflicted by punishment is justified only if greater good results from its imposition.' 3 For
utilitarians, punishment should not, therefore, be imposed if it will
not lead to a net benefit.
Proponents in California and elsewhere have justified the massive
4
increase in prison construction by reference to cost benefit analyses.'
9 See Appendix A for a comparison of habitual offender statutes.
10 See discussion infra notes 25-152 and accompanying text.
11 See discussion infra notes 153-76 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 178-216 and accompanying text.
13 Jeremy Bentham wrote the following in this regard:
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment
the total happiness of the community;, and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as
far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract from that happiness: in other words, to
exclude mischief. But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.
Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation, in SAORD H.
KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
110 (6th ed. 1995).

rrs

PRocEmSEs: CASES AND MATERIAtS

14 One study concluded that the cost to society of not incarcerating a career criminal is
approximately $430,000 per year-based on annual cost of $25,000 per year for incarceration of a convicted felon, the study surmised that society pays $405,000 more than the cost
of imprisonment. See Phil Wyman &John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out (It's About

Time), 26 U. WEsr L.A. L. REv. 249, 258 (1995) (citing WILUAMJ. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF
IEAING CuURA. INDICATORS 2 (1993)). See generalyNAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, V1arIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A Nmv LOOK (Feb. 1996) (analyzing the cost of
crime to victims including medical expenses, property losses, reduced productivity and
pain and suffering). See also NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T oFJUSTICE, RESEARCH PREviEv: THE EXTENT AND COST OF CRIME VICTIMIZATION 1-2 (Jan. 1996) (advocating that stud-

ies concerning the costs and benefits of incapacitation should include the social costs to
victims in the calculus [e.g., the tangible cost of a rape-property losses, productivity losses
and medical bills-is approximately $5,100; however, the intangible cost-pain and suffering, emotional trauma and risk of death from victimization-is about $81,400] because
early release of an offender to avoid the high cost of incarceration shifts the cost to the
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Section III examines whether Three Strikes can deliver on its promised benefits.' 5 Careful review of the claimed benefits of incapacitation suggests that those benefits have been exaggerated.' 6 Franklin
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins' serious study of widespread incapacitation during the 1980s casts doubt on whether Three Strikes produced
a concomitant reduction in crime.' 7 Their conclusions should cause
hesitation in wholesale adoption of legislation like Three Strikes.
Even if Three Strikes has led to a reduction in crime, we are paying far
too much for those benefits.' 8
A great deal has already been written about Three Strikes, most
of it negative and much of it forecasting doom.' 9 Critics of Three
victims by forcing them to internalize the tangible and intangible costs of crime).
Based on similar reasoning, Mike Reynolds published a statement in which he concluded that the implementation of Three Strikes had saved Californians over $1.6 billion
dollars in crime victim costs in 1994. See Lowering The Cost of Vitimization: Multi-BillionDollar
Savings Achieved Under 3 Strikes and You're Out:Joint Hearingof the CaL Senate Comm. On
Judiciary, Crim. Proc. and Budget and FiscalReview on The Impact of The "Three Strikes" Law on
The Civil and CriminalJustice System in California,Feb. 20, 1996 (statement of Mike Reynolds) (calculating savings to society by multiplying losses per victimization by the decreased
number of crimes since the passage of Three Strikes [e.g., from 1993 to 1994, the homicide rate decreased by 9.7%, or 396 fewer homicides, and the estimated cost of homicide,
including tangible and intangible costs, is $2,940,000. $1.16 billion dollars in savings was
reached by multiplying 396 fewer homicides by $2,940,000 in savings). See THE EXTENT
AND COST OF CRIME VICTIMIZATION, supra, at 14.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF POL'Y Dry., THE CASE FOR MORE INCARCERA-

TION 14-19 (1992) (arguing that a costs and benefits evaluation for increasing prison space
must include the cost of crime averted by incapacitation of offenders). But see THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 75-76 (scrutinizing the statistics used in The Casefor More
Incarcerationstudy and concluding that the study is "a classic example of how crime data
can be misused").
15 See discussion infra notes 217-45 and accompanying text.
16 See id.
17 ZIMRING & HAWKINS supra note 2. Their study on imprisonment and crime in Califor-

nia concluded that additional restraint of offenders is an equivocal explanation for California's reduction in crime. Id. at 126. For an historical evaluation of the studies conducted
regarding the effects of incapacitation upon crime rates, see id. at 25-38.
18 See infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
19 In response to the manner in which the Three Strikes law was "rammed through the
legislature despite warning of drafting errors and unworkable provisions," one commentator wrote:
The result is a law whose scatter-gun shot-in-the-dark approach is the statutory
equivalent of the $500 hammer. Just as the wide availability of ten-dollar hammers
makes it outrageous to spend nearly $500 of taxpayers' hard-earned money on
equivalent hammers, the cost and inefficiency, and even counter-efficiency, of three
strikes is also outrageous when compared to what California could have had.
Victor Sze, Comment, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over Substance As Our BumperSticker Mentality Comes Home To Roost, 28 LoYoLA L.A. L. REv. 1047, 1049-50 (1995).
See also William M. Thornbury, What is the Meaning of Three Strikes and You Are Out
Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.. L. REv. 303-04 (1995) (stating that the poor draftsmanship of
AB 971 and Proposition 184 has created confusion and uncertainty in application of the
law, and identifying some of the many adverse effects of Three Strikes [e.g. overcrowding
of jails and prisons, incarceration of offenders for periods extending well beyond an age
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Strikes rightly point to some potentially disastrous effects. Three
Strikes has already exacerbated the racially discriminatory effects of
sentencing policy.20 Moreover, the projected costs for prison construction and operation are staggering,2 1 and absent other ready revenue sources the legislature may be forced to shift funds from
22
education to corrections.
Section IV discusses a number of events that may signal rational
reform of Three Strikes.23 Rational debate was largely muted during
passage of Three Strikes. If we listen carefully, we can begin to hear
voices of reason. In light of that fact, section IV closes with some proposed legislative reforms that may curb some of the excesses of the
24
penological reform of the past decade.
when they would no longer be a threat to society, and enormous increases in the cost of
the criminal justice system as a result of a Three Strikes criminal proceedings influx which
drastically reduces the availability of court time for civil jury trials and compromises the
integrity of the entire civil jury system]); see generallyJeff Brown, Why California's "Three
Strikes Law" is TerribleLegislation,26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 269 (1995) (discussing the lack of
intelligent debate preceding the enactment of AB 971, the severe disparity in sentencing
borne by third time non-violent felony offenders, and the alarming increase in criminal
justice expenditures); AlbertJ. Menaster, Eighteen Ways to Avoid Three Strikes, 26 U. WEST
LA L. REv. 283 (1995) (confirming that Three Strikes Law can be subverted and its austere provisions avoided).
But see generally Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out, 26 U. WEsr LA L. Rxv. 243
(1995) (arguing adamantly that by incapacitating career criminals, Three Strikes will produce annual society savings of approximately $14.102 billion by the year 2000 and also help
restore California's economy and quality of life); Wyman & Schmidt, supranote 14, at 249
(advocating vehemently that Three Strikes is good public policy, and declaring that "[t]his
new statute reintroduces the now alien principle to the criminal justice system that if you
commit a serious or violent crime, you should be punished for it, and if you do not toe the
line, you should be removed from society").
20 African-Americans make up only 7% of the state's population but account for 23% of
all felony arrests; see CHRISTOPHER DAVIS Er AL, CENTER ONJUV. AND uIM.JuSTI cE, "THREE
STRIKES": THE NErW APARTHEID 2 (1996). More significant, African-Americans account for
38% of all second and third strike felony convictions. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENr OF CoRREc.
TIONS, supra note 8, at 5.
21 The estimated increase in prison operating costs per year when the statute has maximum effect will be $5.7 billion and the total prison construction costs will be $21.3 billion.
See Richard S. Welch, Memorandum to the Directorof Corrections:Estimate of the 'Three Strikes'
Initiativ%; Feb. 28, 1994 (on file with author) [hereinafter Estimate of the Three Strikes'Initiative]. While reduction of violent crime might outweigh costs, 85% of those charged under
Three Strikes have not committed a violent or serious felony as a third strike. DAvis ET AtL,
supra note 20, at 1.
22 See PETER W. GREENwOOD Er At-, RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE Our. EsriMATED BENEFITS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY SENTENCING LAw 34 (1994) (stating that
the budget realities will force the corrections budget to take additional funds from the
higher education budget); Vincent Schiraldi, CorrectionsandHigherEd Competefor California
Dollars, Corrections Winnin& OVERCROWDED TIMES, June 7, 1994, at 7 (illustrating the sharp
rise in budget allocations for prisons while no rise for the state's higher education budget).
23 See infra notes 320-60 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 361-83 and accompanying text.
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THREE STRIKES COMES TO CALIFORNIA

HOW THE "STRIKE ZONE" MAY VARY

Multiple offender statutes, imposing stepped up sentences for
"incorrigible" offenders, have a long history in the United States. 25
But during the 1990s, several states have enacted multiple offender
26
statutes in reaction to public alarm with violent crime.
Popularized by the "Three Strikes" slogan, multiple offender statutes vary in a number of significant ways. For example, some statutes
give judges and/or prosecutors discretion whether to invoke the enhanced sentencing power. 27 Statutes nationwide vary in the number
of prior felonies that trigger the sentence enhancement 28 They also
vary in what qualifies as a prior "strike;" for example, at least 22 states
limit prior felonies to violent felonies. 2 9 A third variable is what qualifies as the felony that triggers the sentence enhancement. Several
states require the applicable felony to be one from among an enumerated list of violent felonies.3 0 Statutes also vary on whether the age of
the prior felony conviction is relevant. Some statutes include a "wash
out" period; in other words, if the prior conviction is sufficiently stale,
3
it cannot be used to invoke enhancement provisions. '
25 American legislatures have enacted statutes enhancing punishment for repeat offenders since 1796. Dubber, supra note 2, at 195.
26 See Appendix A.
27 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40(f) (West 1994) (stating that sentencing of
an habitual offender is mandatory only if the court is of the opinion that the defendant's
history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct indicate
that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (providing that where a defendant has a current conviction of a serious offense and two prior convictions of a most serious
or serious offense, the decision to invoke the sentencing provisions of the habitual offender statute is in the discretion of the prosecutor).
28 In 1979, 45 states and the District of Columbia had enacted some form of an habitual
offender statute, with the required prior convictions ranging anywhere from 2 to 4. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 Appendix (Official Draft 1985). Today, every state except Minnesota has a recidivist criminal statute, see Appendix A, Chart 1, and approximately 22
states have enacted more stringent statutes as a reaction to "get tough on crime" campaigns of the early 1990s. See Appendix A. The 1993 enactment of Washington's initiative
measure 593, "The Persistent Offender Accountability Act," served as the catalyst for enactment of recidivist legislation across the states.
29 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A for the definition of a "violent" felony in the individual states.
30 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A.
31 California's Three Strikes law specifically rejects "wash-out" provisions. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(c) (3) (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that the length of time between a prior

1997]

THREE STRIKES: RETURN TO RATIONALITY?

401

Another variable is the sentence imposed upon the multiple offender. In some instances, the increased punishment relates to the
available sentence for the substantive offense.3 2 For example, if a
thief is subject to a term of five years in prison, the multiple offending
thief may be subject to a term of ten years in prison. 3 More common
are statutes which impose long terms of imprisonment without regard
to the underlying felony. 34 Frequently, the sentence will be an indeterminate sentence of life in prison with a stated minimum term.3 5 In
some instances, the term of imprisonment is life without benefit of
parole.3 6
felony conviction and a current felony conviction shall not affect imposition of sentence);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (3) (West Supp. 1996) (same). But see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:43-7.1b(2) (c) (West 1995) (setting forth that in order for a felony conviction to count
as a prior strike, the current crime must have been committed either within ten years of
the date of the defendant's last release from confinement for commission of any crime, or
within ten years of the date of the commission of the most recent of the crimes for which
the defendant has a prior conviction).
32 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-18-101(2) (West Supp. 1996) (determining that every
person who has three separate prior felony convictions, except as specified in the three
strikes provision [see Appendix A], and is subsequently convicted of another felony will be
adjudged an habitual offender and will be punished for a term four times the maximum
range for the class of felony for which the offender was convicted); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-107(a) (Harrison 1994) (requiring that any person with a prior felony conviction who subsequenty commits another felony that is punishable by confinement in a penal institution
shall be sentenced to the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the
subsequent offense of which the defendant stands convicted).
33 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A) (1) (a) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that any
person convicted of a second felony, where had it been a first conviction the offender
would be punished by imprisonment for any term less than natural life, may be sentenced
for a term of up to twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction).
By comparison to the Three Strikes aspect of California's statute (any felony may trigger a term of life imprisonment), California's two strike provision (a sentence shall be
twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction) is tied
to the penalty provision of the substantive offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (1) (West
Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
34 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2221(1) (1995) (providing that a defendant with two
prior convictions for any crime resulting in a prison sentence of not less than one year,
who is subsequently convicted of any felony, shall be imprisoned for 10 to 60 years); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West Supp. 1996) (stating in part that every person convicted
of any felony who has one prior felony conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in a
state correctional facility for not less than ten years, and every person convicted of any
felony who has two prior felony convictions shall be punished by imprisonment in a state
correctional facility for life).
35 See, e.g., ARm. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(c) (1) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring that a defendant who is convicted of a serious felony involving violence and who has one or more
previous serious felony convictions shall be sentenced to imprisonment, without eligibility
of parole, for either a term of 40 to 80 years, or a term of life); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(d) (West 1994) (mandating that a defendant who has two separate prior felony
convictions, and is subsequently convicted of another felony, shall be punished by imprisonment for life, or for any term of 25 to 99 years).
86 See, e.g., DE. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4214(a) (1995) (asserting that the court may, in its
discretion, impose up to a life sentence to any person who has three prior felony convic-
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These differences are no minor matter because they may have an
enormous impact on a state's prison population. Most felony prosecutions are for non-violent crimes. 37 Inclusion of non-violent felonies,
either as prior strikes or as a third (or final) strike, may overwhelm a
prison system.38 If a prosecutor or judge has discretion whether to
invoke the enhancement penalties, limited use of the statutory provisions may prevent bloating state prison populations.
California's Three Strikes legislation took the most extreme position on almost all of the variables discussed above. AB 971 amended
California Penal Code section 667 by adding new subsections (b)
through (j).3 9 The law keeps intact section 667(a) (1), a harsh sentence enhancement law enacted as part of an earlier wave of "get
tough on crime" legislation. 40 Subsection (a) (1) applies to any detions, other than those enumerated in § 4214(b), see Appendix A, and is thereafter convicted of another felony. The life sentence shall not be subject to suspension by the court
and shall be served in its entirety without benefit of probation or parole [applicable only
for class A felonies, e.g., murder in the first degree or unlawful sexual intercourse in the
first degree]); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (1994) (indicating that every person convicted
of a felony who has two prior separate felony convictions and has served one or more years
for each prior conviction, with any one of such felony convictions being for a crime of
violence, shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole).
37 Nonviolent offenders account for 84% of the increase in state and federal prison
admissions since 1980. THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 16 (citing BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1993 13, tbl.18 (June 1994)). Currently, 58% of California's prisoners are incarcerated for nonviolent crimes. Too Closefor
Comfort: California's Prisons,ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 24 (citing a study conducted by the
Legislative Analyst's Office).
38 During the first eight months of the California Three Strikes law, approximately 70%
of all second and third strike defendants had been convicted of nonviolent and nonserious
offenses. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE Out" LAw-A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 8 (Jan. 6, 1995). The number of third strike offenders convicted
for non-violent offenses soared to 85% after two years of implementation of the law. DAvis
ET AL., supra note 20, at 1. Ironically, in the two years since the Three Strikes law soared
through the legislature as a response to public fear and anger over violent crime, the law
has led to life imprisonment for 192 marijuana users who previously would have served
little or no time, while only 40 convicted murderers, 25 rapists, and 24 kidnappers have
been sentenced to life. See Giles Whittel, Small-Time Drug Crooks Clog CaliforniaPrisons,THE
TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 9, 1996 (Overseas's News) (citing figures released by the California
Dept. of Corrections). As of January 1996, out of the 14,497 convicted second strike offenders, approximately 80% were committed to prison for a non-violent offense; furthermore, of the 1,342 convicted third strike offenders, approximately 62% were committed to
prison for a non-violent offense. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF THE
"THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAW ON CALIFORNIA'S JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (Feb. 20, 1996)
[hereinafter LEGISLATrVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, IMPACT]. In Los Angeles County, where ap-

proximately 70% of the jail population consists of three strike defendants, the Sheriff's
department is forced to release already-sentenced inmates to accommodate the influx of
offenders. See Furillo, supra note 7, at A8.
39 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996).
40 Encompassed within a criminal justice reform initiative known as "The Victim's Bill
of Rights," section 667(a) (1) of the Cal. Penal Code was introduced in 1982 when voters
passed California's Proposition 8. The initiative, prompted by public frustration with a
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fendant convicted of a "serious felony" who is currently charged with
another serious felony. 4 1 That provision already provided for a sentence enhancement of five years for each of the defendant's prior serious felony convictions. The enhancement runs consecutively to the
term of imprisonment for the current offense.4 2 The effect of retainseemingly ineffective criminal justice system and the California Supreme Court's disinclination to compromise the rights of criminal defendants for greater public safety, not only
included victims' rights provisions but also introduced provisions to establish harsher penalties for repeat offenders. See Dubber, supra note 2, at 197-98.
41 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (a) (1) (West Supp. 1996). Section 667(a) (4) defines "serious
felony" as "a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667(a) (4) (West Supp. 1996); Section 1192.7(c) provides:
As used in this section, "serious felony" means any of the following: (1) Murder or
voluntary manslaughter;, (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress,
menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
on the victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person; (6) lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14
years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life;
(8) any other felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on
any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder;, (10) assault with intent to commit rape or
robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer;, (12)
assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an
inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to
injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury
or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder; (18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the
Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building; (19) robbery or bank robbery; (20) kidnapping (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state
prison; (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling furnishing, administering, giving, or offering to
sell, furnish administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP),
or any methamphetamine-related drug, as described in paragraph (2) of subdivision
(d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code, or any of the precursors of
methamphetamine, as described in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of subdivision
(f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section 11100 of the Health and Safety
Code; (25) any violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289 when the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26) grand theft
involving a firearm; (27) carjacking any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault; and (28) any conspiracy to commit an offense described
in paragraph (24) as it applies to Section 11370.4 of the Health and Safety Code
where the defendant conspirator was substantially involved in the planning, direction,
or financing of the underlying offense.
Not all of the felonies in section 1192.7 qualify as strike priors. Carjacking, for example, is
inapplicable because Three Strikes only counts felonies that were on the serious felony list
on June 30, 1993. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(h) (West Supp. 1996).
42 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (1) (West Supp. 1996). That section provides:
In compliance with subdivision (b) of Section 1385, any person convicted of a serious
felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any
offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any
serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the
present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges
brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each enhancement
shall run consecutively.

MTCHAEL VITFLO

[Vol. 87

ing section 667(a) is to make its enhancement provision applicable
4
over and above the new enhancement provisions in section 667. 3
Section 667(b) states the legislative intent to "ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment" for those who have committed prior felonies.4 The law does so in a number of ways. For
example, the law eliminates limitations on aggregate terms of imprisonment. 45 Amended section 667 prohibits probation for second or
third time felons within its provisions;46 it also withdraws discretion to
commit offenders covered by its provisions to diversion programs or
to the California Rehabilitation Center. 47 It reduces the amount of
good time credits that may be awarded. 48 The law requires courts to
sentence certain defendants to consecutive, rather than concurrent,
terms of imprisonment. 49
Subsection 667(c) (3) also provides that "[t]he length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current felony conviction
shall not affect the imposition of sentence." 50 Section 667(c) (3) is intended to apply the new stepped up sentences for all multiple offendId. The former subsections (b) through (e) have been renumbered as sections 667(a) (2)
through (5). CompareCAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)
(West Supp. 1996).
43 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDING JUDGES AND SOLEJUDGES OF
THE TRIAL CouRTs 3 (Mar. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
44 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1996).
45 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (1)
(West Supp. 1996).
46 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (2) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (2)
(West Supp. 1996).
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (4) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (4)
(West Supp. 1996). Since section 667(c) (4) prohibits commitment to any facility other
than state prison, it appears to preclude commitment to the California Youth Authority. A
defendant under the age of eighteen who is convicted of a felony with a prior "serious" or
"violent" felony apparently must be sent to state prison rather than the Youth Authority.
48 While prior law permitted good time credits up to one-half of the total sentence,
section 667(c)(5) permits good time credits only up to one-fifth of the sentence. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(c) (5) (West Supp. 1996); CAL PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (5) (West Supp.
1996). Furthermore, the subdivision provides that the credits "shall not accrue until the
defendant is physically placed in the state prison." Id. The "shall not accrue" language is
problematic. It may mean that a defendant may not earn any credits until he reaches state

prison. Alternatively, the language may mean that the defendant may earn credits for time
served prior to being placed in state prison, but the credits do not vest until he is placed in
state prison. Under the latter interpretation, uncertainty arises as to whether the preprison credits are subject to the one-fifth limitation or are governed by other provisions.
The Judicial Council Report states that the statute's failure to mention section 4019(b)-(c)
of the Cal. Penal Code, which governs credits in county facilities, means that § 4019 credits
remain intact after § 667 was amended. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 43, at 5.
49 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(6)-(8) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(a) (6)-(8) (West Supp. 1996) (identical voter initiative provision).
50 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(3) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (3)
(West Supp. 1996).
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ers even though a defendant may not have had a felony conviction for
a number of years. 5 ' Thus, the law recognizes no "wash out" period.
Sections 667(d), (e) and (f) include the key provisions of the
Three Strikes legislation. Subsection (d)identifies what is colloquially
called a "strike."5 2 Specifically, section 667(d) (1) states that any offense listed in Penal Code sections 667.5(c) or 1192.7(c) is "a prior
conviction of a felony" for purposes of amended section 667, 53 i.e.,
one that will serve to trigger the law's enhancement provisions. Section 667.5(c) lists what are considered "violent" felonies and section
1192.7(c) lists "serious" felonies. 54 Subsection 667(d) (3) lists certain
51 CAL. PENAL CODE
52 CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 667(c) (3).
§ 667(d) (West Supp. 1996); CAL.

PENAL CODE §

1170.12(b) (West

Supp. 1996).
53 CAL.PENAL CODE § 667(d) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b) (1)
(West Supp. 1996).
54 See the text of CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1996) (defining "serious"
felonies), supra note 41. "Violent" felonies are enumerated in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c)
(West Supp. 1996). That provision provides:
For the purpose of this section, "violent felony" shall mean any of the following.
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter.
(2) Mayhem.
(3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 or
paragraph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.
(4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(6) Lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288.
(7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.
(8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person
other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in
Section 12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to July 1,
1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5 or,
12022.55.
(9) Any robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined in
Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for
habitation, an inhabited floating home as defined in subdivision (d) of Section
18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, an inhabited trailer coach, as defined in the
Vehicle Code, or in the inhabited portion of any other building, wherein it is charged
and proved that the defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 12022, in the commission of that robbery.
(10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451.
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(12) Attempted murder.
(13) A violation of Section 12308.
(14) Kidnapping, in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 207.
(15) Kidnapping, as punished in subdivision (b) of Section 208.
(16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5.
(17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215, if it is charged and
proved that the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon as provided
in subdivision (b) of Section 12022 in the commission of the carjacking.
The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes merit special con-
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juvenile offenses that may be used as prior "strikes" for the purpose of
55
sentence enhancement.
Section 667(e) enhances punishment for the offender on his second strike.5 6 Under subsection (e) (1), for an offender with a prior
"serious" or "violent" felony conviction who has a current felony conviction-which need not be serious or violent-the term of imprisonment "shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for
the current felony conviction. 5 7 The doubled term of imprisonment
sideration when imposing a sentence to display society's condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.
Id.
Subdivision (d) (1) of section 667 states that "the determination of whether a prior
conviction is a [strike] shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction ...." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1996). The intent of the drafters was to prevent situations where a defendant was
convicted of a felony which would be a strike, but due to factors following the conviction,
such as the suspension of his sentence, the defendant tries to argue that the prior should
not be a strike. However, read literally, only convictions taking place after the amendment
of section 667 could count as strikes.
Subdivision (d) (2) of § 667 also counts a felony conviction in anotherjurisdiction as a
strike if that felony includes the elements of a particular felony defined in § 1192.7(c)
(serious felonies) or § 667.5(c) (violent felonies). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (2) (West
Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
55 CAL.PENAL CODE § 667(d) (3) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b) (3)
(West Supp. 1996). While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article, there is a
significant concern raised with counting juvenile adjudications as "prior felony convictions." Juveniles are not provided with the full scope of due process rights when they are
tried. For instance, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial. If juvenile adjudications
are to count as "convictions" for the purposes of sentence enhancement, it is likely that
juveniles could demand jury trials. Of course, this would accentuate the hardship on the
judicial system already presented by the increased demand for jury trials by Three Strikes
defendants. See generally L.A. SUPER. CT., THE IMPACT OF "THREE STRIKES" LAW ON THE LOS
ANGELES JUSTICE SYSTEM (Feb. 1996) (on file with author) (assessing the immense impact
Three Strikes has had on the judicial system, and reporting that there are more than 2,300
second strike cases and approximately 1,600 third strike cases pending jury trial in Los
Angeles superior court, with Three Strikes cases comprising over half of all cases awaiting
trial).
56 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (1)
(West Supp. 1996).
57 CAL.PENAL CODE § 667(e) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (c) (1)
(West Supp. 1996). Appellate courts have uniformly held that a defendant with one prior
serious or violent felony conviction shall be sentenced to double the "base term" (the punishment for the current offense) in addition to a five-year enhancement under CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(a) if the prior conviction was a serious felony. See People v. Ramirez, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 374, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1995); People v. Anderson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474,
477-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995); People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 358-59
(Cal. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 1995).
If a defendant with a prior strike is convicted of multiple current felonies not committed on the same occasion and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the sentencing calculation under such circumstances is as follows:
Where there is a conviction for more than one felony, and therefore more than one
determinate term, the greatest determinate term is selected as the principal term; any
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is "in addition to any other [applicable] enhancement provisions."5 8
Subsection 667(e) (2) (A) is the "three strikes" provision of the
law. 59 It provides that if a defendant has two or more prior "serious"
or "violent" felony convictions, the term of imprisonment for the current felony conviction "shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment."60 The minimum sentence shall be the greater of three times
the term of imprisonment provided foreach current felony, twentyfive years or the term of imprisonment determined by application of
section 1170 plus other enhancement provisions. 61 Under this provision, read in conjunction with section 667(c) (5), the best that a three
strikes defendant can hope for is a real term of twenty years in prison.
Section 667(f) is especially important in light of the realities of
the criminal justice system. Typically, serious charges and sentencing
provisions may be nullified by plea bargaining. Prosecutors also have
vast discretion in decisions relating to criminal charges. 6 2 Our criminal justice system ordinarily grants judges wide sentencing discretion
as well. 63 Amended § 667 limits the normal prosecutorial and judicial
other consecutive term is a subordinate term. For non-violent felonies, the
subordinate term is one-third the midterm. For violent felonies, the subordinate term
is one-third the midterm plus one-third the mid-term of any applicable enhancements.
CAL.. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(a) (West Supp. 1996); see People v. McDaniel, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The calculation is, therefore, reduced to the addition of double
the principal term, and double each subordinate term (adjusted according to
§ 1170.1(a)). Accordingly, if a defendant's principal term was robbery in the first-degree
with a base term of nine years, and the subordinate term was first-degree burglary with a
base term of 16 months (the midterm for burglary is four years-one-third the midterm
would reduce four years to 16 months), the mandatory minimum sentence would be 18
years (principal term [nine years] multiplied by two) plus two years and eight months
(subordinate term [16 months] multiplied by two), for a grand total of 20 years and eight
months to be served by the defendant. See People v. Dominguez, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 162
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
58 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (1)
(West Supp. 1996). See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLmr, at 86 (confirming that only the base
term shall be doubled and explaining that "[a] second felony conviction, with one prior
serious/violent felony doubles the base sentence for the conviction. Any additional enhancements under existing law, including those for prior convictions, are then added.").
59 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
60 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
61 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1996).
62 See WAYNE LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 623-24 (2d ed. 1992).

63 That discretion has been narrowed in jurisdictions, like the federal system, that have
adopted sentencing guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 8621-25, 3742 (1994). For instance, a judge must remain within the sentencing- guidelines unless the court finds that
there is an aggravating or mitigating factor which had not been adequately considered by
the Sentencing Commission in determining the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Further,
the judge may venture below the guideline's minimum sentence only upon motion by the
government and provided that the defendant has rendered substantial assistance in the
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discretion. 64
Subsection 667(f) (1) states that the key provisions of the law
"shall be applied in every case" involving defendants with two or three
strikes.6 5 A prosecutor must "plead and prove each prior felony." 66
Thus, section 667(f) (1) limits the authority of a prosecutor to bargain
in a case within the provisions of the law.67 It recognizes prosecutorial
discretion, but that discretion is limited.
Subsection 667(f) (2) provides that the prosecutor "may move to
dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385, or if there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction." 68 The role of the judge's
discretion is limited to cases in which "there is insufficient evidence to
69
prove the prior felony conviction."
Section 667(h) states that references to existing statutes in other
provisions of the amended law "are to statutes as they existed on June
30, 1993."1'7 That has the effect of freezing applicable "strikes." If the
71
legislature adds new offenses to the list of serious or violent felonies,
investigation or prosecution of another offender. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Finally, any sentence which falls outside the guidelines is subject to appellate review on the motion of
either the defendant or the government. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b). See also 28 U.S.CA
§§ 991-998 (West 1993 & 1995) (creating the United States Sentencing Commission and
setting forth its powers and duties).
64 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(1)-(2),(g) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(d)(1)-(2),(e) (West Supp. 1996).
65 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (d)(1)
(West Supp. 1996).
66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (d) (1)
(West Supp. 1996).
67 Whatever doubt that remained regarding plea bargaining is resolved in § 667(g),
which reads:
Prior felony convictions shall not be used in plea bargaining as defined in subdivision
(b) of Section 1192.7. The prosecution shall plead and prove all known prior felony
convictions and shall not enter into any agreement to strike or seek dismissal of any
prior felony conviction allegation except as provided in paragraph (2) of subdivision

(f).

§ 667(g) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(e) (West Supp.
1996) (identical language in voter initiative version).
68 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (2) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d) (2)
(West Supp. 1996).
69 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (2) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1996). The California Supreme Court recently read this provision to the contrary. In People v. Romero, the court held that the intent of the legislation was not to withdraw judicial discretion to "strike" prior felonies in the interest ofjustice. People v. Super.
CL (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 637 (Cal. 1996). Six justices agreed that, were the intent to
withdraw discretion, the statute would violate the state constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 635.
70 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(h) (West Supp. 1996).
71 See, e.g., ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1985, at 2 (May 29, 1996) (submitting that "Three Strikes" be expanded by including various vehicular manslaughter offenses as prior "serious" felonies [strikes]).
CAL. PENAL CODE
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those offenses do not automatically become "strikes" within section
667(e). The legislature would have to make specific provision for that
to take effect.72 The intent of section 667(h) is to prevent a later legislature from removing an offense from the list of "serious" or "violent"
felonies while retaining the offense as a felony. For example, critics
have commonly mentioned residential burglary as a poor choice as a
strike for purposes of severe sentence enhancement.7" Subsection (h)
prevents reform by prohibiting deletions from the list of serious or
violent felonies.
Section 667 thus achieves a number of goals. Defendants convicted under the Three Strikes legislation will serve dramatically
stepped up sentences.7 4 They will serve a greater percentage of their
sentence than other offenders. 75 Judges and prosecutors will have less
discretion in dealing with defendants within the law's provisions. 76
B.

THREE STRIKES: THE EARLY STAGES

In 1991, Time magazine ran a cover story announcing California's
decline as a trendsetter. 77 For better or worse, California has regained
its position as a trendsetter with its multiple offender statute. In virtu72 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6670) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a two-thirds vote for any
amendment to § 667). In proposed bills creating new felonies, Democrats have been placing provisions that prevent the new felony from counting as a third strike. See, e.g., AssEMBLY COMMITrEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1502, at 1 (Apr. 1,
1996) (amending the existing misdemeanor statute for illegally knowingly obtaining a state
income tax refund to a "wobbler," and exempting the offense from Three Strikes); SENATE
COMMrrrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1511 at 1 (May 29, 1996) (increasing the penalty for reckless driving while evading a peace officer from a "wobbler" to a
straight felony, and exempting the new felony from Three Strikes); SENATE COMMITTEE ON
JUDICLARY, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 871, at I (Jun. 25, 1996) (proposing that the misdemeanor/felony ["wobbler"] offense of distributing sexual depictions of minors to adults
shall be exempted from Three Strikes); SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrTTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 2111 at 2 (Jun. 18, 19961 (creating a new crime of "aggravated disorderly
conduct" for persons who loiter on, or peep into, private property in order to photograph
others without their consent, and exempting the new felony from Three Strikes).
7- See Schiraldi, supranote 22, at 7 (asserting that elimination of residential burglary as
a strike would diminish the costs of Three Strikes by 75%). The provision is unfortunate.
It reflects Mike Reynolds' deep distrust of the legislature, but it also limits the legislation's
ability to correct the law's excesses given that amendments must be supported by a twothirds vote of each house. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West Supp. 1996).
74 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1996) (indicating the legislative intent to
provide increased prison sentences for habitual offenders).
75 See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 667(c) (5) (West Supp. 1996) (reducing the available "good
time" credits for defendants sentenced under this provision from one-half to one-fifth of
the total sentence); CGa. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (5) (West Supp. 1996).
76 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f),(g) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d),(e)

(West Supp. 1996). It is unclear how the court's recent decision in People v. SuperiorCt. will
affect what would appear to be the drafters' original goal in limiting judicial discretion.
77 Californi TME, Nov. 18, 1991, at 32.

410

0MCHAEL VITIELL

[0
[Vol.
87

ally every area mentioned above, California, unlike any of the other
states that recently enacted multiple offender statutes, took the most
draconian position when it enacted its "Three Strikes" legislation. 78
79
As argued below, its extremism creates serious risks for the state.
During the enactment of the legislation, the Governor and legislators
were aware of the flaws of the law and had alternative legislation available. 80 As observed by Professor Zimring, Three Strikes nonetheless
sailed through the legislature untouched by human hands.8 '
As developed in this section, Three Strikes passed without serious
rational discourse or legislative compromise because of public panic,
its chief proponent's distrust of politicians, judges and lawyers, and
politicians' manipulation of public fear. 82 Understanding those influences is relevant to how California may emerge from the excesses created by Three Strikes.
On June 29, 1992, a career criminal murdered Kimber Reynolds
during a failed robbery attempt. 83 Shortly after the murder, the victim's father, Mike Reynolds, solicited the assistance of James Ardaiz,
the presiding justice for the Fifth District Court of Appeals, in drafting
84
the original Three Strikes legislation.
78 For a comparison of habitual offender statutes across the states, see infraAppendix
A.
79 See infra notes 216-301 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 99-152 and accompanying text.

81 Franklin E. Zimring, Populism,Democratic Government, and the Declineof Expert Authority:
Some Reflections On "Three Strikes" in California1-2 (Apr. 8, 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (forthcoming in 28 PAC. LJ. 243 (1996)).
82 See infra notes 83-152 and accompanying text.
83 George Skelton, CapitolJournaL"A Father'sBittersweet Crusade,LA TImES, Dec. 9, 1993,
at A3. Convicted felon Joe Davis attempted to take Kimber Reynolds' purse. Upon her
resistance, Davis shot and killed Kimber in front of at least twenty-four witnesses. Mike
Reynolds, Kimber's father, met with Governor Pete 'Wilson shortly after her death. He told
the governor, "I'm going after these guys in a big way, the kind of people who would
murder little girls in this way." Dan Morain, A Father'sBittersweet Crusade,LA TIMES, Mar.
7, 1994, at Al.
84 Dan Morain, Judge Admits His Role in '3 Strikes' Law, LA TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3.
Two other Fresno Municipal Court judges cooperated with Judge Ardaiz in drafting an
initial outline of the Three Strikes measure. While it would appear that Mike Reynolds
would have used judicial authorship as a selling point, he didn't reveal the authors until
October, 1994. During a debate in San Francisco in October, 1994, Reynolds was challenged to reveal the identity of the authors of Three Strikes. Vincent Schiraldi, the Director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice in San Francisco and outspoken critic of
Three Strikes, made an unfounded accusation that the National Rifle Association had authored the bill. In response, Reynolds said, "I'm going to tell you who was responsible for
this... They were judges that did the actual pen to paper, the initial draft." Dan Morain,
CaliforniaElections/Proposition1984: Sponsor SaysJudge Helped Write '3 Strikes, LA TIMES, OCt.
19, 1994, atA3. Reynolds also said that the measure was then circulated among deputies in
the state attorney general's office. Reynolds then refused to name the judges, and stated
that the judges had requested anonymity. The reason they wanted to remain anonymous,
according to Reynolds, was because "they may need to rule on a 'three strikes' case and
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In 1993, Reynolds prevailed on Bill Jones, then a Republican Assemblyman from the Fresno area, to sponsor Assembly Bill 971.85
Reynolds and four bus-loads of supporters showed up for the first
hearing on the bill before the Assembly Public Safety Committee on
April 20, 1993.86 After Reynolds' impassioned plea for stiffer sanctions for habitual offenders, the committee soundly defeated the bill.
The Assembly's inaction forced Reynolds to use the initiative process
87
to bypass the legislature.
Despite financial backing from the National Rifle Association and
the California Corrections and Peace Officers Association,8 8 Reynolds'
reform efforts may not have succeeded but for Polly Klaas' kidnapping
on October 1, 1993. Unlike the case of over 50,000 other missing children, Polly's plight galvanized people all over the country because of
her family's efforts to locate her before her death was discovered. 89
The public was outraged when the police arrested her admitted
killer, Richard Allen Davis-a repeat offender.9 0 Davis became a glarthey didn't want to [be] placed in a position of partiality." Id.
85 Morain, supra note 83, at Al.
86

Id.

Id. Reynolds was justifiably angered by the committee's response. In disgust, Reynolds stated, "They figured they'd listen to me, pat me on the head, say I'm sorry about your
daughter, and send me home." Id.
88 Outrage Drives Move to Tighten Sentendng Laws, PLAIN DEmJLR (Cleveland), Dec. 9,
1993, at 2A. In order to compile the daunting 385,000 required signatures to place an
initiative on the ballot, Reynolds needed tremendous financial support. The California
Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) and the National Rifle Association
(NRA) provided the early financial help. The NRA donated $40,000 to the effort and the
CCPOA made a $51,000 contribution. In addition, Mike Reynolds reportedly placed his
"whole life savings" of $60,000 into the "Three Strikes and You're Out Kitty." Id.
In addition to significant donations from the CCPOA and the NRA, Reynolds also
drew substantial financial support from the California Gun Owner's Association, the Republican Party, and the campaign committees of Governor Wilson and Republican senatorial candidate and business tycoon, Michael Huffington. These sources were able to
stockpile $880,000 for the Three Strikes and You're Out Committee. Dana Wilkie, Prop
184:3 Strikes Already on Books, Foes Say its PassageOnly Bolsters a Bad Law, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Oct. 12, 1994, at Al.
89 Polly's parents responded immediately after her abduction by getting a videotape of
Polly into the public spotlight. Polly was not just another girl on a milk carton. The Polly
Klaas Foundation was formed with the express purpose of keeping Polly in the public eye.
Their strategy for bringing her home safely was to saturate our living rooms with Polly's
youthful charm. The volunteer efforts of the Foundation were successful by all accounts,
except in the final result. John Carman, Why Polly Was So Speial, ORLANDO SENrINEL, Dec.
9, 1993, at A19.
90 Richard Allen Davis had a rap sheet that was eleven pages long, including two prior
kidnapping convictions. In his most recent stay in prison-a 16-year sentence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary-he had served only half of his sentence before early release for
good behavior. Davis would have still been injail on the day Polly Klaas was abducted if he
had served his entire sentence. Richard Price, Cruel Lesson/Why Polly Died/Town Angy at a
System that Failed,USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at IA.
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ing symbol of the failure of the criminal justice system and Polly's
death became a compelling moment for Reynolds' efforts to push for
passage of Three Strikes. 9 1
Shortly after Polly's murder was discovered, Reynolds secured
Polly's father's (Marc Klaas) signature on his petition to place the initiative on the ballot. 92 Prior to news of Polly's death, Reynolds had
collected only about 20,000 signatures. 93 Within days of the reports of
her murder, Three Strikes had gathered 50,000 signatures and was
well on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in
94
California history.
c.

REYNOLDS' SWAY WrITH THE LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR

After Polly Klaas' death, Reynolds returned to the legislature.
The Klaas murder and public perception that crime was on the rise
created overwhelming popular support for tough anti-crime legislation.9 5 Reynolds approached the legislature with a choice: pass AB
91 If there was any doubt about how intense the anger at Davis was, Governor Wilson's
loss of control during an interview with a reporter was telling. Wilson said, "I mean, when I
think of that son of a bitch, you cannot help but be angered. Did you see the picture of
him on the front page of the [San Francisco] Chronicle? Smirking? Jesus, boy. I wanted to
just belt him right across the mouth." George Skelton, CapitolJournaL Wilson Seize the Day
AJer Polly'sMurder,LA TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, atA3. After the arrest, politicians scurried to
find an avenue to respond to the fears of their constituencies. Mike Reynolds' initiative
was the perfect answer. His initiative, had it been prior law, would have kept Richard Allen
Davis in prison. The name "Three Strikes and You're Out" was the perfect soundbite for
legislators anxious to capitalize on the publicized murder of Polly Klaas.
92 Shortly after the announcement of Polly's death, Reynolds showed up at the Polly
Klaas Foundation in Petaluma with a car full of petitions. He introduced himself to Klaas
as "the father of a murdered daughter." Peter Hecht, Two GrievingFathersPart Ways on '3
Strikes' Crusade, SACRAMENTo BEE, July 10, 1994, at Al (reporting Polly's grandfather Joe
Klaas' account of the meeting between Mike Reynolds and Marc Klaas). Marc Klaas immediately signed the petition and joined Reynolds in his campaign to place Three Strikes on
the ballot. Reynolds told Klaas, "Together you and I are great pillars for this cause and it
would be very difficult to defeat us when we stand side by side." Id. However, Marc Klaas
later withdrew his support of the Reynold's initiative. Id. See also infra note 342 and accompanying text.
93 Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating With a Vengeance, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 26, 1995, at 27.
94 Id.
95 The coordination of Reynolds' efforts and Polly Klaas' death led to a decidedly different tone from the politicians who had only months before rejected AB 971. Bruce Cain,
a U.C. Berkeley professor who specializes in California politics described the upturn for
Three Strikes: "A dramatic event has to coincide with a huge consensus out there. There
was a big consensus. Remember, we're in an election year. That is going to quicken the
pace of any idea. It's a matter of timing." Morain, supranote 83, at Al. The mixture of
Polly Klaas's murder, public perception that crime was on the rise, and election year rhetoric was a potion that Mike Reynolds and his backers used to put the legislature under a
spell. Mike Reynolds harnessed the fears and frustration of an electorate ready for a widespread overhaul of politics as usual, and at once became California's new guru of criminal
justice policy.
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971 or the voters will do it for you. In an election year, Reynolds had
the legislature's attention. 96
Prior to passage of AB 971, a variety of observers with widely different political agendas highlighted the bill's drafting flaws. Reynolds
refused to allow any amendments to the bill.9 7 Further, Reynolds'
sway with the legislature was almost unprecedented. Reynolds was adept in using the press to intimidate those who raised questions about
the legislation. Reynolds' judgment that a politician was soft on crime
promised to be devastating.9 8
A number of legislators presented alternative proposals to AB
971. 9 9 Reynolds' own advisers suggested revisions of AB 971 that
would have narrowed the legislation to target violent offenders. Law
enforcement officials gave Reynolds a list of what they considered
flaws in the proposed initiative. 0 0 Reynolds was unrelenting. Even
96 See, e.g., Dan Walters, PoliticosFailtoDo It Right, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 13, 1994, atA3
(stating that legislators were in a "panicky rush to do exactly what Reynolds wanted."). See
also Morain, supra note 83, at Al.
97 Despite knowledge that the Jones/Costa bill contained flaws that minimally could be
considered as only embarrassing drafting errors, Reynolds refused to allow any amendments whatsoever to AB 971. Reynolds stated, "We are not going to allow politicians to
take this life-and-death issue and turn it into a political football just because it is an election
year and they want to get re-elected." Ken Calves, Victims'Kin Rally At Capitol, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 5, 1994, at Al. Reynolds gave the legislature until March 7, 1994, to pass a law
that mirrored the Three Strikes initiative. If the legislature failed to do so, Reynolds would
place his initiative on the ballot. Dan Morain, Three Strikes Clears State Legislature L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
98 Evidence of Reynolds' power was seen at the final Senate committee hearing before
the passage of AB 971. After state fiscal analysts had projected the billions of dollars AB
971 would cost California, an amendment was successfully added to spend some of the
money on crime prevention. Reynolds arose from the audience and said, "When we start
adding amendments, it's going to open a Pandora's box .... It will demonstrate to me at
the least the inability of the Legislature to act in a responsible way." Morain, supra note 97,
at Al. Then he reminded the committee of the upcoming elections. One senator objected to what he termed as a "threat," but minutes later the amendment was repealed. Id.
Senator Quentin Kopp remarked on the failure of his colleagues to exercise their power
despite Reynolds' objections: "They feel threatened in an election year and they're afraid
of being denounced as trying to subvert his initiative." Hecht, supranote 92, at Al.
99 They were AB 9x (Johnson), AB 167 (Umberg), AB 1568 (Rainey), and AB 2429
(Johnson). In the wake of tragedies like that of Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds, revision
of current sentencing laws seemed reasonable. However, most of the legislators who proposed Three Strikes legislation had an added incentive because of the upcoming election.
BillJones was poised to become the state's next Secretary of State. Jim Costa was preparing
to exit the Assembly for a state senatorship. Tom Umberg was preparing to run for the
Attorney General against Dan Lungren. Notably, Richard Rainey, the Republican former
Sheriff, was not aspiring to a higher office at the time. See Dana Wilkie, Is It Fame? With
Three Strikes at Issue, Two Key Dads Are on the Outs, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRiB.,June 13, 1994, at
A3.
100 James Richardson, Three Strikes SupportersDivided,SAcRAMENTo BEE, Feb. 12, 1994, at
A4 (reporting law enforcement's concern that Three Strikes didn't contain a life without
parole provision and that possibly Three Strikes "superseded the death penalty"). See also
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after the legislature passed the bill, he feared that lawmakers would
undermine the bill. As a result, he reneged on an earlier promise to
abandon the initiative process if AB 971 became law.101
Reynolds was not the only person unwilling to compromise on
Three Strikes-Governor Pete Wilson used the occasion of Polly
Klaas' funeral to make a political speech, announcing his support for
Three Strikes. 10 2 Later, even after flaws in the Three Strikes laws became apparent, Wilson resisted compromise in order to preserve his
10 3
position as the toughest candidate on the crime issue.
Passage of AB 971 is striking for a number of reasons. Various
legislative committees were aware of the bill's excesses. Individual legislators had doubts about the efficacy of the law; 10 4 some legislators
proposed more modest legislation that would have avoided many of
AB 971's excesses. 10 5 The RAND Corporation published a report critical of the law. 10 6 The legislature nonetheless passed AB 971 by an
overwhelming majority without any change in the original draft of the
7
bill.' 0
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, among other committees, was aware of AB 971's excesses. It prepared an analysis demonstrating some of its serious flaws. 108 Legislators also had available
1568, at 3 (Jan. 6,
1994) (indicating that the California District Attorney's Association supported an alternative to Three Strikes); SENATE COMMiTrEE ONJUDICARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971, at
8 (Feb. 17, 1994) (indicating the concern of critics that Three Strikes poses a cruel and
unusual punishment problem); Bill Ainsworth, Why D.A. 'sDon't Like 'Three Strikes,'THE RECORDER, Jan. 18, 1994, at 1 (indicating that some critics perceived an equal protection
problem in Three Strikes).
101 Morain, supranote 97, at Al. Even after the Legislature passed AB 971 and Governor Wilson signed it into law, Reynolds was distrustful of the politicians who had made
Three Strikes the law. Reynolds feared that lawmakers would undermine the Jones/Costa
version of Three Strikes. Reynolds stated that the legislators had held the four alternative
bills "like a trump card. They've forced our hand." Id. Because of his fear, he rescinded
his promise to abandon the initiative process. He wanted to put the nail in the coffin for
any challenger bill. He remarked that his victory was a "house of straw, easily changed or
dismantled." Id. He wanted to send a message to lawmakers that attempts to change his
bill would be political suicide. See Wilkie, supra note 88, at Al.
102 See Hecht, supra note 92, at Al.
103 Id.
104 For example, both Senator Leroy Greene and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown expressed doubts about the wisdom of the law, but refused to come out against the bill. See
infta note 113.
105 They were AB 9x (Johnson), AB 167 (Umberg), AB 1568 (Rainey), and AB 2429
(Johnson).
106 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 22.
107 AB 971 passed through four committees and two floor votes in 59 days. Jones, supra
note 19, at 244. The bill passed the Assembly on a vote of 63 to 9 and passed the Senate on
a vote of 29 to 7. ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1993-94 Cal. Reg. Sess., 260 (Oct. 6, 1994).
108 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMirrEE ANALYsIS OF AR 971, at 4-11 (Feb. 17,
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
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detailed reports of the comparative merits of various competing three
strikes measures. 0 9 The Judiciary Committee knew that Three Strikes
might require imposition of a sentence of twenty five years to life in
prison on a repeat felon who had never committed a violent felony. 1 0
Elsewhere in the legislature, the Assembly demonstrated a settled
unwillingness to tackle the difficult financial problems posed by AB
971. In late January, 1994, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee
approved all of the "three strikes" bills, despite the Committee's failure to procure any reports outlining the cost of the legislation. It did
have a preliminary report from the Legislative Analyst's Office, estimating the cost in the billions."' Nevertheless, the Assembly approved all five three strikes bills and sent them to the Senate without a
112

fiscal analysis.
With alternative bills before the legislature, legislators had the opportunity to evaluate the economic impact of the three strikes proposals. Despite what they learned, no influential politician took a
1994).
109 For example, the Rainey Bill (AB 1568) mandated a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for defendants with a present conviction for a "serious" felony
and two prior convictions for "violent" felonies, or for defendants with a present conviction
for a violent felony and two prior convictions for any combination of serious or violent
felonies. An indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 25 years was reserved for defendants convicted of a third serious felony or defendants convicted of a serious or violent
felony with one prior violent conviction. AB 1568, 1993-1994 Cal. Reg. Sess. (1994). See
generally SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMITTEE, CoMMrrrEE ANALysIs OF AB 971 (Feb. 17, 1994);
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971 (Jan. 6, 1994).
110 The judiciary Committee's report specifically stated that AB 971 "would make no
distinction in severity of sentencing between different felonies." SENATEJUDICIARY CoMMrrTEE, ComMrrr-E ANALYSIS of AB 971, at 4 (Feb. 17, 1994). To further demonstrate consciousness of the harsh effects AB 971 would have upon non-violent or no longer violent
offenders, the Committee provided the following examples:
(1) A person who was convicted of breaking into a neighbor's attached garage on
two occasions in order to steal a bicycl.e.. would have two prior offenses. Any third
felony, such as theft of$400 worth ofpropertywould result in a life term... regardless
of whether or not he or she had ever acted violently or dangerously.
(2) ... forgery of a $10 check, petty theft with a prior, or possession of a stolen
radio with two prior serious felonies would result in a life sentence.
Id. See alsoJones, supranote 19, at 245 (stating "[opponents] are correct that this law will
cast a broad net, but that is certainly not an unintended provision. 'Three Strikes' is an
anti-crime law, not just an anti-violent law.").
In addition, the SenateJudiciary Committee also highlighted some of the ambiguity in
the statute and raised concerns about the constitutionality of the statute as written. SENATE
COMMrrIEE ONJUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971, at 8 (Feb. 17, 1994) (noting that
"this bill appears to be constitutionally infirm in that it would require cruel and unusual
punishment in some cases, with no option for a lesser sentence in the interest ofjustice").
III Dan Morain, Assembly Panel OKs Five '3 Stries'Bills, LA TIMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at A3.
See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrirEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971, at 2 (Jan. 27, 1994) (acknowledging
the Legislative Analyst's Office cost projections).
112 See Morain, supra note 111, at A3; see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 971, at 2 (Jan. 27, 1994) (failing to provide a fiscal analysis and passing the measure).
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leadership role that might have produced a more measured bill than
Three Strikes." 3
On January 26, 1994, prior to passage of AB 971, the RAND Corporation challenged the use of its earlier study to estimate the savings
generated by incarcerating large numbers of criminals." 4 Three
Strikes proponents had used the earlier RAND study to estimate the
average number of offenses committed by each repeat offender, estimates greatly distorting the benefits gained by incarcerating each new
(marginal) repeat offender." 5
Typical of the unwillingness of the legislature to deal with the
economic realities of AB 971 was the way in which the Senate Committee on Appropriations dealt with the various bills. A month after the
Ways and Means' committee analysis was available, the senate committee convened to discuss the fiscal impact of the various three strikes
measures."16 The committee had available the fiscal analysis of AB
971; it did not have similar projections for Rainey's or Umberg's bills.
Despite that, members of the committee recognized that residential
113 Senator Leroy Greene and then Assembly Speaker Willie Brown failed to advocate
for a better measure despite their opposition to AB 971. Greene, after objecting to the bill
as providing "a blank check," ended up reluctantly supporting the measure. He said, "I'm
going to vote for these turkeys [the five three strikes measures] because my constituents
want me to." Morain, supra note 97, at Al. When asked whether he could have used his
power to create rational debate, Brown responded, "I got out of the way of this train because I am a realist." Jerry Gillarn, LegislatorsFear Public on "3 Strikes," Brown Says, LA
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at A3. Brown also distanced himself from all of the measures saying,
"Put everything on the governor's desk and let him deal with it... [a]nd that's a pure,
unadulterated, practical political approach." Richardson, supra note 100, at A4.
114 ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON WAYS AND

MEANS,

COMMrIEE ANALYSIS OF AR

971, at 2 (Jan.

26, 1994). In response to numerous studies citing that the average repeat offender commits between 187 and 278 crimes per year at an average cost of $430,000, the RAND Corporation provided a correction to what it termed "the erroneous references to RAND data
and findings related to the three-strikes debate." Id. In rebuttal to the cost of crime,
RAND stated: "There is, as yet, no commonly accepted framework for estimating such costs
....

RAND's studies contained no cost figures whatsoever." Id.

115 In response to proponents' use of the RAND study to estimate that the average repeat offender commits 187 to 278 crimes per year, RAND stated that "[t]his figure was
skewed by the fact that 10 percent of the group was extremely active, committing more
than 600 crimes apiece. The typical inmate-the median in the distribution-reports having committed 15 crimes per year." Id. at 2. It is reasonable to assume that high rate
offenders are more likely to be arrested. Hence, dramatic increases in incarceration rates
are likely to lead to incarceration of lower rate offenders. Therefore, the effect of the crime
rate will not be constant. As low rate offenders are incarcerated, there will be less effect on
overall crime rates.
116 See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AR 971
(Feb. 28, 1994); SENATE COMMrrTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2429
(Feb. 28, 1994); SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AR 9x
(Feb. 28, 1994); SENATE COMMrIrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AR 1568

(Feb. 28, 1994); SENATE
(Feb. 28, 1994).

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AR

167
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burglary was not a strike under those measures and knew that those
bills would offer significant savings over AB 971.117 The committee
approved all of the measures despite the daunting cost of AB 971.118
Even though AB 971 had very strong political support, most importantly from Governor Wilson,' 1 9 its passage and the failure of more
carefully drafted alternatives is surprising. Especially since various law
enforcement groups, immune from claims of being soft on crime,
brought political pressure against AB 971 in favor of alternatives such
120
as the Rainey bill.
The Rainey measure offered even tougher sentences for some of
the worst offenders and would have been less expensive than Three
Strikes. 12 1 It should have been easy to back AB 1568 instead of AB 971
by arguing that it was tougher on crime and more fiscally responsible,
two issues that predominated the politics of 1994.122 That did not
happen for a number of reasons dealing largely with election year
politics. Wilson was outspoken in his support of Reynolds. Wilson
117 See SENATE COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 167 (Feb. 28,
1994) (citing the Department of Corrections' estimate of the cost of incarceration under
the "Three Strikes Initiative," and stating that excluding burglay as a strikewould cost "$22
million in 1993-94, increasing annually to the year 2003-04 and $1.6 billion annually thereafter," compared to "$75 million in 1995-96, increasing annually with a full-year fiscal impact in 2027-28 at $5.7 billion" when burglary is included as a prior strike).
118 SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971 (Feb. 28,
1994) (Policy Vote: 8-3); SENATE COMMrrrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, CoMirITEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 2429 (Feb. 28, 1994) (Policy Vote: 10-0); SENATE COMMrrIE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OF AB 9x (Feb. 28, 1994) (Policy Vote: 9-0); SENATE ComMITrEE ON APPRO-

PRIATIONS, ComMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1568 (Feb. 28, 1994) (Policy Vote: 10-0); SENATE
COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 167 (Feb. 28, 1994) (Policy
Vote: 8-2).
119 See generally Hecht, supra note 92, at Al; Jon Matthews, Wison Still PitchingFor Three
Strikes Law, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 1994, at Al.
120 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrIFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1568, at 3 (Jan.
6, 1994) (indicating that the California District Attorneys' Association and the California
State Sheriffs' Association supported the Rainey measure).
121 See generally SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrIEE ANALYSIS OF AB 971, at 10-11
(Feb. 17, 1994); GREENwOOD Er AL., supra note 22, at 26-27.

122 Crime was a hot issue for the 1994 California Gubernatorial race with 27% of Californians saying it was the election's most important issue. Bill Stall, GovernorBrown Ads Target
Job Losses, Crime Politics,LA. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A3.
Fiscal responsibility was another theme of the gubernatorial race. Governor Wilson,
regretting giving consent for a $7 billion tax increase in his first year as governor, sought to
portray himself in the campaign as a defender against tax increases. Both candidates, Wilson and Kathleen Brown, proposed various solutions to the state's debt, such as a one-time
issuance of bonds (Brown) and a demand of reimbursement from the federal government
for the expenses California incurred in incarcerating illegal aliens (Wilson). Special Guide
to California'sElections: Governors Race-The Issues, LA TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at W2. Both
candidates treaded cautiously on the economic issue, which 36% of Californian voters considered to be the most important issue of the election. Stall, GOP PinsHopes on Crime Issue
to Re-elect Wilson, LA TIMES, Feb. 28, 1994, at A3.
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argued that the economic concerns of opponents of Three Strikes
were overstated. 123 Had Wilson distanced himself from Reynolds or
had Reynolds been willing to work with Rainey, better legislation
24
might have been approved.'
Despite the overwhelming support for AB 971 when the legislature ultimately voted on AB 971,125 it passed in an atmosphere of
political distrust. Reynolds would neither compromise nor work with
Rainey on an alternative bill. 126 In reaction to what he saw as the unsavory nature of the political process and fearful that the legislature
might later weaken AB 971, Reynolds pursued the initiative process
despite an earlier promise to the contrary. 127 Few in the legislature
were willing to take on Reynolds or Wilson who would have portrayed
opponents as soft on crime, a tough label to wear in 1994.
Wilson, involved in a tough gubernatorial race, used crime as a
campaign issue.' 2 8 He was able to mute the economic concerns about
AB 971 by emphasizing projected savings generated by the law. After
Governor Wilson signed AB 971 into law, Wilson's Chief Economist,
Philip Romero, issued a report arguing that Three Strikes would save
California billions of dollars.' 2 9 The report contended that the public
debate over the cost of Three Strikes was one sided. Romero claimed
to balance the debate by fully discussing the benefits that would be
generated by Three Strikes.' 30
In September, 1994, the RAND Corporation issued a report concerning the fiscal impact and crime prevention efficiency of Three
Strikes. 13 1 The report might have brought rationality to the discussion of crime prevention. But given its timing, after alternatives like
123 Governor Wilson balked at any suggestion that the Three Strikes bills would not be
economically feasible: "There's really no dispute that these reforms will require considerable additional expense .... That is an expense, I submit, that the public is willing to pay
.... We cannot afford not to pay." Matthews, supra note 119, at Al. Wilson stated, "We're
producing... capital improvements for future generations, and they rightly can be called
upon to help pay for it." Daniel M. Weintraub, '3 Strikes' Law Goes Into Effect LA TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1994, at Al.
124 Brown stated, "If the three-strikes sponsors would come to the reality of the defects
in their measure, they probably would embrace the Rainey measure and that would reach
the governor's desk." Richardson, supra note 100, at A4.
125 The Assembly passed AB 971 by a 63-9 margin on January 31, 1994. The Senate
passed it by a 29-7 margin on March 3, 1994. ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, supra note 107, at
260.
126 See Hecht, supra note 92, at Al (reporting Reynolds' refusal to allow amendments).
127 See Wilkie, supra note 88, at Al.

128 See Weintraub, supra note 123, at A3.
129 PHILIPJ. ROMERO, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLAN. AND RES., How INCARCERATING MORE
FELONS WILL BENEFIT CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY (Mar. 31, 1994).
130 Id. at 2.
131 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 22.
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the Rainey bill had been tabled and the initiative process was in full
swing, and given the fact that Pete Wilson had tied his election cam13 2
paign to Three Strikes, the RAND report was too little, too late.
The RAND report constructed models to predict the relative efficiency and cost of five sentencing enhancement proposals.' 3 3 The report estimated the crime reduction from AB 971 to be between 22 and
34 percent.13 4 The legislation would generate minor savings in several
areas, including costs of police, adjudication and jail operation. Any
savings would be "overwhelmed by a large difference in prison operating costs and a twelve-fold increase in the annual cost of prison construction." 35 The cost of implementing Three Strikes was estimated
36
to be $5.5 billion annually.
Three Strikes would achieve the greatest reduction in crime, but
was by far the most expensive. 137 The alternative with the most promise was the Guaranteed Full Term proposal which would have given
California almost as much reduction in crime. The report singled out
GFT because it would reduce costs by "incapacitating offenders early
132 The stated goals of the RAND Corporation in compiling its study were: 1) to inform
the public debate over Proposition 184 on the November 1994 ballot; 2) to discuss alternative versions of Three Strikes the public may have considered if the Proposition failed; and

3) to inform other states that were considering implementation of "three strikes" laws. Id.
at iii. The authors remarked that "[c]itizens are not getting much information on [the
cost of Three Strikes] from the law itself, the media, or their elected representatives." Id.
at 2. The study concluded that California would benefit from crime rate reduction if
Three Strikes were fully implemented, but it would come at substantial costs. Id. at 18.
RAND demonstrated that a considerable reduction in crime could be achieved at a substantially lower cost than with Three Strikes. Id. at 25-36.
133 RAND examined the effects of the following alternatives to Three Strikes: "Jones
Second-Strike Only;" "JonesViolent Only;" "Rainey Three Strikes;" and a variant they constructed entitled "Guaranteed Full Term." The "Jones Second-Strike Only" would be triggered by a conviction for any felony with a prior serious/violent felony, and the "third
strike" provision was eliminated. TheJones Violent Only alternative would apply only to a
defendant with a current conviction for a violent felony and a prior conviction for a serious/violent felony. Rainey Three Strikes was identical to the Rainey bill that was proposed
in the legislature. Finally, the "Guaranteed Full Term" (GFT) proposal would require a
prison term for all serious or violent felonies even if the defendant had no priors. GFT
would not allow good time for serious/violent felons, and it would cut costs by not incarcerating half of the people convicted of minor offenses. Id. at 8-9.
134 Id. at xii. RAND projected that the number of serious and violent crimes prevented
would increase quickly over the first ten years, and more slowly thereafter. Id. at 22.
135 Id. at 19-20.
136 Id. at 18.
137 Id. at 25-30. RAND projected that the crime reduction for Three Strikes would come
at a cost of a 120% increase in the prison budget. Jones Second-Strike Only would have
yielded 85% of Three Strikes' crime reduction with a 90% increase in the prison budget.
Rainey Three Strikes was about as effective and costly asJones Second Strike. Jones Violent
Only would yield two-thirds of the crime reduction of Three Strikes, but it would increase
the prison budget by 57%. GFT matched the crime reduction effectiveness of Three
Strikes with only a 97% increase in prison budget. Id.

MICHAEL VITLLO[o

[Vol. 87

in their criminal careers." 13 8
The RAND report made projections similar to those made by the
Department of Corrections. 3 9 But the report went further and analyzed how the state was likely to fund the increased costs. 14° It argued
that a tax increase was unlikely and that the electorate was unlikely to
approve prison bond issues. 14' It then explored how the prison expansion could be paid for from the General Fund. The report concluded that the most probable result, if Three Strikes was to be
funded, would be that Three Strikes will compete directly with higher
14 2
education for funds.
When confronted with challenges to the Romero study, Wilson
and the Three Strikes You're Out Committee stuck by its claims. 143
Despite legal challenges, the Three Strikes You're Out Committee succeeded in including its claimed savings in the ballot pamphlet. 4 4
29.
Id. at 18.
14o Id. at 31-36.
141 Id. at 32. Passage of bond issues used to be a virtual certainty in California but that
changed in the past few elections as California's voters became more conscious of increasing the state's debt. Twelve out of 14 bond measures were rejected by California voters in
1990. These measures would have provided funds for the purchase of ancient forests, the
expansion of the university system, and prison construction. See Virginia Ellis, Bond Measures/Backers Fear Voters' Aversion to New Deb LA TIMEs, May 31, 1994, at A3.
The reluctance to issue bonds does not bode well for California's Department of Corrections. The Department has requested $6 billion in bonds to finance the construction of
25 new prisons it estimates it will need over the next five years to handle the predicted
prisoner increase as a result of Three Strikes. Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, Tobacco Industry
Power May Go Up in Smoke, Foes Say, L.A- TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at A3.
142 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 33-34. Faced with the unfavorable predictions
from the RAND study, supporters of Three Strikes attacked its validity. They claimed that
the report failed to consider the economic benefits of the measure, specifically deterrence
and lower insurance rates. Ben Wildavsky, '3 Strikes' CouldDrain College Money, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 22, 1994, at A21. Bill Jones assailed the study for unfairly depicting it as competing
with education and other state funded programs. PamelaJ. Podger, '3 Strikes' Could Bust
State, Study Says, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 22, 1994, at Al. BillJones further disparaged the report
by saying, "The beauty of a report for someone sitting in academia... is they don't have to
get tough laws through the Assembly Public Safety Committee." Id.
The solution to allocation of scarce resources may ultimately be the decision by prosecutors to use Three Strikes selectively. See Susan Freinkel, Strike Zone, AMERICAN LAWYER,
July/Aug. 1995, at 61 (reporting that prosecutors are enforcing three strikes according to
voter support in their constituencies for the initiative).
143 For example, Wilson defended the report and stated that the report "underscores
the costs all of us bear when crimes are committed: higher medical costs, higher insurance
premiums, business flight, and the loss of choice about where to work [sic] live or shop
because of fear of crime." Dana Wilkie, Three-Strikes Law Seen as an Economic Boon: Wdson
138 Xd at
'39

Team Envisions $23 Billion in Benefits, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Apr. 7, 1994, at A3.

144 Superior CourtJudge James T. Ford ruled that the claim of savings of $23 billion by
the year 2000 could stay on the ballot. See Peter Hecht, 3 Strikes'FightRages Inside, Outside
Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 1994, at Bi; Three Strikes And You're Out Committee,
Judge Rules '3 Strikes Saves $23 Billion' is O.K.for Ballot Pamphle Aug. 15, 1994 (press release
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Three Strikes proponents relied heavily on the Romero report in
campaigning for the ballot initiative.' 45
After passage of AB 971, the Senate flirted briefly with reviving
the Rainey measure and placing it on the ballot.' 4 6 Wilson vehemently opposed the alternative measure on the grounds that it would
mislead the voters and because he had touted the virtues of the original bill as a primary issue in his gubernatorial campaign. 147 He
threatened to veto the alternative proposal.'48 In light of the
threatened veto, Rainey refused to champion the bill despite broad
support from various law enforcement groups, including the California District Attorneys' Association; 49 officials, including state sheriffs
and police chiefs; and private citizens, including Polly Klaas's father
and grandfather. Wilson's opposition effectively killed the chances of
an alternative appearing on the ballot.'5 0
Without an alternative proposition and without significant funding, opponents of Proposition 184 could not get out their message.
Left unchecked, proponents of Three Strikes were able to engage in a
major propaganda campaign. 15 1 The initiative passed by an overon file with author).
145 See Three Strikes And You're Out Committee, supra note 144; See also CAiFORNiA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 1, at 36.
146

Hallye Jordan, Alternative "3Strike'Bill Pushed, LA DAMYJ., June 10, 1994, at 3.

147 George Skelton, CapitolJournak Pete (Give 'em Hell) Wilson Strikes Back, LA TIMES,

Mar. 21, 1994, at A3.
148 Wilson Says He Will Block Try to Weaken "Three Strikes, "S.F. CHRON., June 10, 1994, at

D3.

149 The support from the CDAA became unstable when Rainey refused to back the bill.
Gil Garcetti went public with his plea for the Rainey alternative. Garcetti was joined in his
public campaign by San Mateo County District AttorneyJames Fox in urging the legislature
to pass the alternative bill. Specifically, Garcetti predicted, "there's not going to be justice
for those citizens who rely on the civil court process for relief and justice." Michael D.
Harris, Garcetti Callsfor New 3-Strikes Law, LA DAiLuJ.,June 9, 1994, at 2. Garcetti reported
that in just three months, his office had filed 400 three-strike cases and 1100 second-strike
cases. He further reported that "none of those cases are settling and that they all are going
to trial." Id.
Garcetti and DAs supporting him were made to look somewhat of an enemy. Chuck
Cavalier, a consultant with the Three Strikes You're Out Committee, accused Garcetti and
like-minded DA's of only being concerned with plea bargaining and clearing caseloads.
He said, "They simply don't like the fact that they will be held accountable." Peter Hecht,
Case MAerits "Three Strikes"? Depends on the DA, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al. This
accusation did not comport with the fact that, despite his personal opposition, Garcetti was
prosecuting every possible third strike case coming through his office. Id.
150 The bill died in the Assembly Public Safety Committee on June 21, 1994. Hallye
Jordan, Alternative to '3 Strikes'Killed, LA DAMLyJ., June 22, 1994, at 3.
151 In the published argument for Proposition 184, proponents stated that the measure
would "keep rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where they belong." CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 1, at 5. They repeated the chimerical savings argument, that "3 Strikes saves lives and taxpayer dollars!" Id. The literature answered three
main counter-arguments: 1) in response to a claim that the prison system would be full of
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whelming majority. 152
III.

FLAWED PREMISES AND OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THREE STRIKES

Three Strikes reflects two decades of dramatic change in American penal philosophy. A glimpse of that sea change is provided by the
following statement made by the New York City Correction Commissioner in 1972: "All men are redeemable. Every man can be rehabilitated, and it's up to us in the community and in the field of criminal
justice to see that this is done." 153 During the 1970s,15 4 judges and
scholars' 55 abandoned the rehabilitative ideal. A broad political coalition forced a return to a retributivist model of punishment. 156 Less
obvious in the debate about Three Strikes is that it represents another
dramatic shift in penal philosophy. Three strikes has abandoned retributivist theory in favor of incapacitation and deterrence.
This section argues that Three Strikes is quite distinctly not retributivist. 15 7 Three Strikes is premised on factual, utilitarian benefits.
Next, this section examines a number of flawed assumptions that led
to its passage. Proponents of Three Strikes and incapacitation generally overstate the benefits gained from long terms of imprisonment by
overestimating the amount of crime prevented and the social savings
of crime prevention. 158 But even assuming accurate data, proponents
non-violent offenders, it claimed that "3 Strikes targets only career criminals-those with a
history of committing serious/violent crimes;" 2) in response to the claim that taxes would
be increased, it stated that taxpayers would save money because Californians "will no
longer have to pay the outrageous costs of running career criminals through the judicial
system's revolving door time and again;" and 3) it rebutted the claim that essential services
would have to be cut, again, by citing the savings created by the initiative. Id. at 37.
In order to illustrate how taxpayer dollars would be saved, the pamphlet reported that
"3 Strikes Saves $23 Billion over five years." Relying on Romero's report, the committee
further explained that "[e~very repeat felon returned to our streets costs nearly $200,000
annually in direct losses to victims and the enormous expense of running the same
criminals through police stations, courts, and prisons time and again." Id. at 36. Opponents of the measure strongly objected to the use of Romero's study in the "Pro" argument
because it had been disparaged by its sources, notably the RAND Corporation. Id. The
opponents filed suit, but failed to enjoin supporters of the initiative from disseminating
Romero's study as if it were fact. Three Strikes And You're Out Committee, supranote 144.
152 Proposition 184 was approved by 71.85% of the electorate. STATEMENT OF VOTE,
GENERAL ELCrIONS, Nov. 8, 1994, at 107.
153 Tolchin Malcolm, A Black Named Correction Chiefby Mayor,N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 20, 1972, at
1, reprinted in MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 91 (1973).
154 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 153, at 86-102.
155 See generallyJOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALrrY AND DESERT (1979); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).

156 See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TULANE L. REV. 1011, 1014-15
(1991).
157 See infra notes 177-215 and accompanying text.
158 See infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
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of incapacitation fail to compare the cost of incapacitation schemes
like Three Strikes with other equivalent and less expensive schemes
that might provide similar reductions in crime. 159 Under Three
Strikes sentences may be far longer than necessary to achieve similar
results. At a minimum, incapacitating older prisoners makes little
sense if we recognize that prison resources are finite. 160 Like the return to retributivism, the current preference for incapacitation is partially grounded in the belief that less expensive rehabilitative
programs do not work. Commentators and policy makers have begun
to reexamine that assumption.' 61 Few would assert today that all men
are redeemable, but some men and women are capable of rehabilitation at a cost significantly less than the cost of warehousing them.
A.

FROM REHABILITATION TO RETRIBUTION

California once led the nation in the use of indeterminate sentencing, a sentencing scheme premised -on the rehabilitative
model. 162 Sentences were not fixed; instead, the offender was released from prison, in effect, when he was cured of his criminality. 16
Criticism of the rehabilitative model dominated the discussion about
the criminal justice system during the 1970s.164
An "explosion of criticism" 165 of the rehabilitative model led to
sentencing reform in states like California. As argued elsewhere, the
change in public discourse about punishment was not simply a shift
supranote 2, at 142.
See infra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
161 See, e.g., James Bonta & Laurence L.Motiuk, The Diversion of Incarcerated Offenders to
CorrectionalHafivay Houses, 24J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 302 (1987); Robert Martinson, New
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L.REv. 243,
254-58 (1979);James Q. Wilson, "What Works?"Revisited: New Findingson CriminalRehabilitation, 61 PUB. INTEREST 3, 3-10 (1980); see also THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, SUPra note 2, at 5558 (advocating that punishment which is less expensive and more effective at curtailing
recidivism should be employed [e.g., probation, intensive probation, day reporting centers, halfway houses, boot camps, fines and restitution, community service, home detention, and drug treatment)); FEDERAL CITY COUNCIL, CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS, PRISONS AND PUBLIC SAFETY 5 (Mar. 1996) (reporting that a pilot drug court program, which intimately intervened in the lives and rehabilitation of convicted drug-dependent persons, appears to be highly cost-effective [including in
terms of recidivism] when compared to traditional methods of incarceration).
162 FRANEL, supra note 153, at 89.
165 Id.
164 See generally FEINBERG, supra note 155; NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
(1974); SINGER, supranote 155; THE TWENI'nm' CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIM. SENTENc IN, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
165 WAYN R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissanceof Retribuion-An Examination of DoingJustice 1976
Wis. L. Rnv. 781).
159 ZIMRING & HAWKINS,
160
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towards conservativism.' 66 Liberals and radicals joined the persistent
16 7
attack on the rehabilitative model.
As observed by Dean Francis Allen, "[t]he objects of this attack
[were] sentencing discretion, the indeterminate sentence, the parole
function, the uses of probation in cases of serious criminality, and
even allowances of 'good time' credit in the prisons." 168 A significant
amount of literature endorsed a retributive, just-deserts model of punishment and argued that the rehabilitative ideal was largely incompatible with a deserts based theory of punishment. 69
The reformers were successful in replacing rehabilitation as a primary goal of punishment. Legislatures abandoned indeterminate sentencing. 170 Sentencing guidelines narrowed judicial discretion and
demonstrated efforts to lessen the discriminatory aspects of sentencing.1 7 ' These reforms demonstrated the reemergence of retribution
72
as the primary justification for imprisonment
Many liberal reformers argued that prison sentences should be
relatively short. 7 3 In many jurisdictions, the return to retributivism
led to longer terms of imprisonment. 7 4 That trend was advanced in
166 Vitiello, supra note 156, at 1014-15.
167 In their introduction to Doingjustice,Willard Gaylin and DavidJ. Rothman observe
that the rehabilitative model has "always [been] under attack from the conservative community, to which it had appeared as a mollycoddling, bleeding-heart outrage, and now we
[prominent liberals] find ourselves, for different reasons, with different motives, joining
the argument for its abandonment." Willard Gaylin & David J. Rothman, Introduction in
VON HIRSCH, supranote 155, at xxxvii.
168 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 8 (1981).
169 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 155.
170 Franklin E. Zimring, Sentencing Refom in the Stata, Lesons from the 1970s, in REFoRM
AND PUNISHMENT 101-12 (Michael Tonry & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1983) (discussing
rapid change from indeterminate to determinate sentencing).
171 For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines recognize "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (6) (1994). See also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsrTRA L.
REV. 1 (1988) (providing an overview of the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and its intended goals).
172 Vitiello, supra note 156, at 1027-32. I do not want to oversimplify the debate. Retributivists have various philosophical disagreements among themselves (e.g., whether retributivism implies only a moral obligation to punish or whether it also implies a limitation
on punishment, limited to an actor's just deserts). Retributivists also disagree about how
much punishment is deserved. Many liberals, for example, were disappointed when "retributivist" reform led to longer terms of imprisonment. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra
note 2, at 10.
173 See VON HIRSCH, supra note 155, at 113-14.
174 Utilizing the notion of crime prevention as the primaryjustification for incarceration
led to longer prison terms and larger prison populations. ZIMRING & HAwKiNS, supra note
2, at 25-38. California represents an interesting situation. For many substantive crimes,
maximum sentences are quite low by comparison to other jurisdictions. See CAL. PENAL.
CODE §§ 461 and 213 (West 1988) (setting forth, respectively, the maximum sentence for
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jurisdictions that adopted mandatory minimum sentences' 75 and
176
abandoned parole.
B.

THREE STRIKES: ABANDONMENT OF RETRIBUTION

The abandonment of rehabilitation and renewed retributivist
sentiment coincided with the doubling of the nation's prison population. 177 Intuitively, a wholesale increase in the prison population
should lower the crime rate. 178 In the 1990s, despite the burgeoning
prison population and some evidence that crime rates were declining,1 79 crime has continued as a hot political issue. 180 In that regard,
reaction to the Polly Klaas murder is a symbol of a broader public
concern for more severe sanctions.
Three Strikes represents a change in penological philosophy
from the retributivistjustification for punishment. Habitual offender
legislation is simply not retributivist. Proponents sometimes speak as
if Three Strikes is retributive, a judgment of an offender's entire recburglary and for robbery at six years); but see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 810.02(3) (West Supp.
1996) and 812.13(2) (c) (West 1994) (making the maximum sentence for both burglary
and robbery 15 years imprisonment); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 and 168-40 (1994) (mandating the maximum sentence for both burglary and robbery at 20 years). At the same
time, California's sentencing reform in the early 1980s led to adoption of a stringent sentence enhancement provision, leading to long sentences. C. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West
1988); seeDubber, supranote 2, at 197-98 (detailing the history of the enactment of section
667(a) of the California Penal Code, and noting that Proposition 8, passed by the voters in
1982 as a reaction to public frustration with a seemingly ineffective criminal justice system,
established much harsher penalties for repeat offenders).
175 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31(b) (1) (Supp. 1995) (mandating that any person
who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers or possesses four grams or more of heroin shall
be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of five years imprisonment). See also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 790.235 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a mandatory minimum sentence of 15
years imprisonment for any violent career criminal who owns or has in his or her possession, care, custody or control any firearm or carries a concealed weapon).
176 In an effort to ensure the certainty of an offender's sentence, the Sentencing Reform
Act, enacted by Congress in 1984, abandoned the rehabilitative ideology, adopted determinate sentencing, and eliminated parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)-(b) (1985) (asserting that
a prisoner must complete his or her sentence, reduced only by limited "good" time).
177 Over the 12 year period from 1974 to 1986, the population of state prisons increased
21/2 times nationally. Children and Families at Risk in DeterioratingCommunities: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Ways & Means Comm., 103d Cong. 59
(1993) (testimony ofJohn Hagan, Professor at University of Toronto School of Law). Further, in the last decade, the national incarceration rate of residents has also doubled to 373
residents per 100,000 serving sentences of one year or more. Stan C. Proband, PrisonPopulationExceeds One Million, OvEtcowDnD TIMES, Dec. 1994, at 4.
178 ZIMRING & HAWKrNS, supranote 2, at vi. Despite the strong appeal of the proposition,
studies come to wildly different conclusions about actual impact on crime rates. Id. at 7999.
179 Id. at 100-127 (concluding that evidence of crime reduction caused by restraint is
"more equivocal than first appeared").
180 See supra notes 82-152 and accompanying text.
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ord. 1a8 For example, in a recent and thorough news article on Three
Strikes, the author quotes one prosecutor as follows: "'You can't just
look at the current offense,' ... 'These people are being punished for
18 2
being recidivists, not just the current offense.''
If a judge is punishing the offender for other offenses upon
which he has already been sentenced, such legislation would violate
double jeopardy. An offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
in the language of retributivists, must pay his debt to society.' 83 His
debt is measured by the term of imprisonment. Completion of the
term of imprisonment pays that debt. When the offender commits
another offense and the earlier conviction becomes a prior strike to
increase his term of imprisonment, that increase cannot be additional
punishment for the earlier crime. To punish the offender again for
the same conduct would violate double jeopardy18 4 Insofar as Three
Strikes considers felonies committed before its effective date, punishing for that past conduct would also violate the prohibition against ex
185
post facto laws.
181 In a recent appellate court decision, a defendant convicted for possession of 0.13
grams of cocaine was sentenced to 25 years to life under California's Three Strikes Law.
People v. Super. Ct. (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd in part
and remanded, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). The court of appeal stressed that the defendant

Romero was subject to 25 years to life imprisonment not because he possessed 0.13 grams
of cocaine, but because of his recidivist behavior. Id.
For at least the last 15 years, Romero has continually preyed upon society. He has
spent much of his adult life in county jail or prison with no apparent impact upon his
behavior upon release. He is an addict who finances his habit by theft and burglary.
He dropped out of school and has never maintained steady employment.
Id.
Similarly, the deputy district attorney who prosecuted the "pizza thief" said, "[He] is a
habitual offender and that is what we are sentencing. The people of California are sick of
revolving door justice, they're sick ofjudges who are soft on crime. It is wrong to focus on
the last offense." OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THREE
STRIKES, YoU'RE OUT: Two YEARS LATER 7 (1996).

In the same vein, retributivist sentiment is high among victims of crime. In a notable
news article interviewing several victims of Three Strike law offenders, one victim, previously threatened with a brick and held up on an Oakland street, stated that "[the offender]
doesn't follow the rules of civilization. If you can't follow them after three tries, you deserve to be gone." Andy Furillo, The Victims: It's Hightime, They Say, That Justice Was Done,
SACRAMENTO BFE, Mar. 31, 1996, at A21.
182 Andy Furillo, Three Strikes: The Verdict's In, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, at Al. A

similar argument was made by another prosecutor. One county district attorney was
quoted as saying, "The current offense may not be serious, but they have a criminal history
that really spells danger. We're saving a lot of risk for the future, and we're making them pay
for theirpast." Id. (emphasis added).
183 See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976).

184 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

185 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 2 and 10, cl. 1. Nonetheless, the California Supreme
Court held in People v.Jackson that "increased penalties for subsequent offenses are attributable to the defendant's status as a repeat offender and arise as an incident of the subsequent offense rather than constituting a penalty for the prior offense." People v.Jackson,
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Habitual offender statutes are not retributive for another reason:
under many such statutes, long sentences are imposed without regard
to the culpability of the offender or degree of social harm caused by
the offender's behavior. Instead, the length of the offender's record
triggers the heightened punishment. 18 6 The concern is that multiple
187
offenders cause a great deal of harm because they are incorrigible.
But the term of imprisonment, often life in prison, has little to do with
the gravity of the offenses. 188
Andrew von Hirsch has advanced an argument that consideration
of a felon's prior convictions under certain circumstances may be consistent with retributivist justice.1 8 9 First, he argues that repetition of
694 P.2d 736, 739 (Cal. 1985); accordPeoplev. Mills, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 310, 315 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); People v. Sweet, 254 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573 (Cal. CL App. 1989).
186 For example, Three Strikes' severe penalties are triggered by any felony. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996). As widely publicized cases demonstrate, that felony may be quite trivial. See supranote 8.
Unlike California, every other state that has enacted an habitual offender statute requires the triggering felony to be one of an enumerated list of felonies. See infraAppendix
A. New Mexico, for example, requires the current felony conviction to be one of any of
the following "violent" offenses: murder in the first degree; murder in the second degree;
shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm; kidnapping resulting in
great bodily harm inflicted upon the victim by the captor;, and robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie Supp. 1994).
187 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
188 Rummel demonstrates that habitual offender statutes have little to do with retributivism. There, a repeat offender was sentenced to life in prison under Texas' habitual offender statute. As recounted by the Supreme Court, Rummel's various offenses that led to
his sentencing under the habitual offender statute consisted of fraudulent use of a credit
card to obtain $80 worth of goods in 1964; passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36
in 1969; and finally, obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses in 1973. 445 U.S. at 265-66.
Rummel might have been incorrigible on the assumption that he would continue to
commit petty offenses and, therefore, the only way to protect society is to segregate Rummel in prison. The life sentence has little to do with his culpability. By comparison, under
Texas law, in a murder prosecution, a defendant who convinces the jury that he committed
the murder in an immediate and sudden passion is guilty of a second degree felony and
subject to a term of imprisonment of only 2 to 20 years. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(d) (West 1994) (defining the offense of second degree murder); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.33 (West 1994) (setting the term for a second degree felony). An offender convicted of non-capital murder is guilty of a first degree felony and subject to a term of
imprisonment of life in prison or a term of years from 5 to 99 years. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.02(c) (West 1994) (defining the offense of first degree murder); TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.32 (West 1994) (setting the term for a first degree felony). Practical
problems exist in comparing culpability, but one can say with confidence that a murderer
is far more culpable and, retributivists would argue, deserves far greater punishment than a
person who steals. And a man who steals trivial sums no doubt is less culpable than one
who steals greater sums.
189 VON HmscH, supra note 155, at 84-88. See also Andrew von Hirsch, Desertand Previous
Convictions in Sentecing, 65 MINN. L REv. 591 (1981). Von Hirsch was not arguing in favor
of habitual offender statutes; he was arguing simply for proper consideration of prior criminal conduct in ajust deserts model. But his arguments are the most plausible that habitual offender statutes may be consistent with retributive justice.
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criminal activity is more culpable because it persists after forceful censure in the form of prior punishment: "In assessing a first offender's
culpability, it ought to be borne in mind that he was, at the time he
committed the crime, only one of a large audience to whom the law
impersonally addressed its prohibitions." 90 A second offense is more
culpable, according to von Hirsch, because the offender persists in his
criminal behavior after society has made its displeasure clear.
Second, the increased sanction for repeat offenders is similar to
the "progressive loss of mitigation."' 9 ' In that view, the offender's sentence for the first trespass may be mitigated by his plea that the action
is uncharacteristic of his previous behavior. 9 2 The actor is claiming,
in effect, although his act is wrong, "he should be the object of less
obloquy, because his behavior on this particular occasion is uncharacteristic of his past behavior." 93 This plea is most compelling
upon the first offense and becomes progressively less persuasive with
recidivists
repetition of criminality. Thus, the increased sentences for
94
are actually the result of a loss of the mitigating factor.'
There are a number of problems applying von Hirsch's theory to
multiple offender statutes. The first problem is that proponents seldom attempt to justify habitual offender statutes in terms of culpability. The rhetoric is almost always forward looking; the statutes are
justified by a need to protect society from future criminality and
deterrence.'95
190 VON HIRSCH,

supra note 155, at 85.

191 Martin Wasik, Desert and the Role of Previous Convictions, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 233,

236 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).
192 von Hirsch, supra note 189, at 597.
193 Id. at 599.
194 Id. at 602-04.

195 For example, the president of the California Police Chiefs' Association wrote, "By
depriving these recent offenders of a future life of crime, we have helped create a brighter
future for law-abiding residents." Ronald E. Lowenberg, Orange County Voices, "3 Strikes"
Costs Money but Pays Off,LA TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, at B9. "Three Strikes is not aimed solely
at those who have already committed violent or heinous crimes," wrote California State
Senator Phil Wyman. "The primary purpose of [the law] is not simply to punish serious or
violent felons, but also to deter other such felons from committing future crimes." Wyman
& Schmidt, supra note 14, at 257.
One deputy district attorney's description of Three Strikes defendants is that "[t]here
are just some people who are... never going to change and society shouldn't have to wait
until they kill someone or hurt someone badly to lock them up. By the time they've been
convicted of two felonies, they've probably gotten away with 100 more." OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CAL. DEP'T OF CORREGrIONS, supra note 181, at 6.
At a 1995 University of West Los Angeles Symposium on the Three Strikes law, Governor Pete Wilson stated that "[Three Strikes] is not only emotionally attractive, but it is also
ajudicially sound policy for the simple reason that the repeat, violent offenders, targeted
by the legislation, have shown that they are beyond reform and that they will only continue
to bring terror to our citizens." Governor Pete Wilson,justice Demands and CaliforniaNeeds
"Three Strikes, "26 U. WEST LA L. REv. 239, 240 (1995). At the same symposium, California

1997]

THREE STRTKES: RETURN TO RATIONALITY?

Second, his argument that an offender's second act is more culpable because society has "dramatically and personally"' 96 called his
attention to his criminality also fails in the context of multiple offender statutes. The argument seems to suggest that an offender
might be uncertain whether his conduct really is criminal, the familiar
problem relating to ignorance. of the law.19 7 But in most cases of
crimes mala in se,19 8 one cannot seriously contend that the actor is
unaware that society condemns the conduct. That is the context in
which the historic maxim ignorantia legis neminem excusat makes
sense. 199 A person who commits robbery cannot plausibly claim that
he was confused or uncertain that society takes that kind of behavior
seriously.
Another problem with von Hirsch's argument, if applied to habitual offender statutes, relates to the common structure of repeat offender statutes. Even if one were confused about the criminality of his
conduct, habitual offender statutes are not triggered only if the second offense is of the same nature as the first offense.2 0 0 Hence, the
argument might make sense if an offender committed rape under the
belief that a woman means yes when she says no. One might justify a
lesser punishment for his first offense on the view that his mistake was
Secretary of State Bill Jones stated that "'Three Strikes' is an anti-crime law, not just an
anti-violent crime law. It was our intent in enacting 'Three Strikes,' not only to keep dangerous repeat felons in prison (that is why the third strike can be any felony), but also to
begin moving toward the concept of zero tolerance for crime." Jones, supranote 19, at 245
(emphasis in original).
An article addressing concerns regarding the type of offenders being caught in the
wide net of California's Three Strikes law reported that "[i]f the past [criminal record] is a
prologue, then the statute is removing hundreds of offenders who mgst predictably would
commit more felonies if they weren't in prison." Furillo, supra note 182, at A20. This
reasoning, however, is not without criticism. A county assistant public defender stated, "I
don't see much difference between that and just running a record check on the people
that have two strikes and going off and arresting them and sending them to prison. Why
go through the process of waiting until they commit a minor offense?" Id.
See also Andy Furillo, Wrdson Praises 3-Strikes Law, SAcRAmEro BEE,Mar. 7, 1996, at Al
(reporting Governor Wilson's claim that Three Strikes is responsible for California's decreasing crime rate); Dan Morain, 'Three Strike' A SteamroUerDrivenby One Man 's
Pain,LA.
TiMEs, Oct. 17, 1994, at A3 (similar claim from Three Strikes author Mike Reynolds);
Nicholas Riccardi, Statewide CimeRatelsDown in FirstHalfof '94, LA. TIMES, Aug. 31,1994,
at A3 (reporting Attorney General Dan Lungren's assertion that Three Strikes is having a
deterrent effect).
196 VON HIRscH,supra note 155, at 85.
197 JOSHuA DRESSLE, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 13.01 (2d ed. 1995).

198 Mala in se crimes are defined as "[w]rongs in themselves; acts morally wrong; offenses against conscience." BLACK'S LAW DicxrioNARY 956 (6th ed. 1990).
199 See DRESStER, supra note 197, at § 13.01 [B] [1].
200 See, e.g., CAI. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (third strike may be any
felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42 (West Supp. 1996) (multiple offender statute ap-

plies to any felony).
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negligent but that he did not act with the necessary willfulness to justify the full sanction of the law.2 0 1 Upon a second conviction for rape,

he could no longer make that claim. By contrast, if his second crime
were theft (where he was confused about the victim's consent), it is
hard to see how the first penalty put him on notice that society was
serious about theft.
Third, in most habitual offender statutes, the penalty for the final
strike typically is not graded according to the seriousness of that offense. If a statute merely provided that a thief received probation for
her first offense, three months in jail for her second offense, and one
year in prison for her third offense, his theory is plausible. But that is
not how habitual offender statutes work: instead, as with Three
Strikes,2 0 2 the first offense may be robbery, the second rape. The offender may have received and served the maximum term for both
prior offenses (hence, he has not been accorded any mitigation at all
for the earlier offenses) or may have received the minimum sentence
for both. Upon conviction of the third strike, the punishment is the
same. In addition, the third strike may be any felony, not a serious or
violent felony.2 03 Hence, even though the hypothetical offender may
have become a non-violent felon after serving time for robbery and
rape, the long sentence accorded the habitual offender would be a
blossoming of the sentence to full magnitude even though the actual
term (twenty five to life) may far exceed the sentence ordinarily im20 4
posed for the felony that serves as the third strike.
Although some of the arguments surrounding Three Strikes focused on the culpability of the repeat offender, most of the debate was
about predicted future harm.20 5 Indeed, that is often the benefit
promised by those advocating such laws.2 06 The lowered crime rates
201 In typical American jurisdictions, a defendant's mistake about a woman's consent
must be reasonable. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-45 (Cal. 1975); State
v. Oliver, 627 A.2d 144, 152 (NJ. 1993). Some courts have held that even a reasonable
mistake as to consent is not a defense to a rape charge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. AscolilIo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984).
202 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp.
1996).
203 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (2)
(West Supp. 1996).
204 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West Supp. 1996) (maximum term of imprisonment for grand theft is three years).
205 See supra text accompanying note 195.
206 For example, in the introductory memo of The Case for More Incarceration, a study
conducted by the Department ofJustice in 1992, former Attorney General William P. Barr
stated, "[T]here is no better way to reduce crime than to identify, target, and incapacitate
those hardened criminals who commit staggering numbers of violent crimes whenever they
are on the streets." OFrioE oF Poucy DEv., U.S. DEP'T OFJusTIcE, THE CASE FOR MORE
INCARCERATION ii (1992). Supported by findings that offenders placed on probation com-
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promised by Three Strikes proponents result from placing incorrigible offenders behind bars where they cannot commit crimes against
20 7
the rest of us and from deterring others from committing crimes.
Its proponents focus on future benefits, not on repayment for past
harms. Three Strikes is a form of incapacitation and looks forward to
20 8
promised benefits, specifically, the reduction in crime.
The morality of incapacitation has been the focal point of active
debate. 20 9 The justification for the increased length of the offender's
sentence is the prediction of future criminal behavior. That is, punishment is not based on what a person has done. 210 The retributivist
justifies punishment because it is earned and the appropriate punishment is measured by the harm or unfair advantage gained by the offender.2 11 There is little room in that scheme for setting punishment
according to some future harm. In other words, one gives an eye for
an eye taken, not for one that may be taken at some uncertain time in
2 12
the future.
The moral questions about incapacitation, where the primary justification of the increased sentence is a prediction about future dan213
gerousness, should not be dismissed without serious consideration.
mit new crimes while on probation and offenders who are released early commit new
crimes during the period when they would otherwise have been incarcerated, the study
concluded that "[flailure to incarcerate convicted criminals will lead to additional crimes."
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
In accord with this theory is California's Attorney General, Dan Lungren, who recently
wrote the following: "A criminal in prison cannot commit crimes. Criminals are not all
stupid; if the state promises tougher punishments for their criminal behavior and then
delivers on the promise, they will find the price of doing business here too high." Dan
Lungren, Falling Crime Rates Signal Heartening Trends, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TiB., May 19,
1996, at G1.
207 See OmcE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 181,

at 9 (noting that Attorney General Dan Lungren attributes California's recent 8.5% decrease in crime to the deterrent value of Three Strikes); see alsojones, supranote 19, at 245
(stating that "[i]t was our intent in enacting 'Three Strikes,' not only to keep dangerous
repeat felons in prison... but also to begin moving toward the concept of zero tolerance
for crime").
208 See supranote 195.
209 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 42-75 (reviewing the debate surrounding
incapacitation); see also ANDREW VON HIpSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMEs: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNMESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985) (arguing that prospective con-

siderations are incompatible with a theory of desert);Jacqueline Cohen, Selective Incapacitation: An Assessment, 1984 U. ILu. L REv. 253 (same).
210 See generally ZIMRING & HAWKiNs, supranote 2, at 156-57; Cohen, supra note 209.
211 MoRuus, supra note 183, at 33-34.
212 VON HRsasc, supranote 189, at 592 ("[p]enalties must, as a matter ofjustice, depend
on the offender's deserts: that is, they must be commensurate with the degree of blameworthiness of the offender's past criminal conduct"). See alsoVON HmscaH, supra note 155,
at 66-76, 132-40.
213 Franklin Ziming and Gordon Hawkins make a similar argument that the difference
between general and selective incapacitation has been overstated: selective incapacitation
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However, this article considers more pragmatic concerns. Attention is
better spent on factual assertions made by proponents of Three
Strikes. As with other utilitarian arguments, proponents of Three
Strikes rely on factual arguments to support the efficacy of the law.
Proponents also justify Three Strikes by its deterrent effect. 214 The

deterrence question is discussed later in the article. 2 15
C.

THREE STRIKES AND FALSE PROMISES

That incapacitation does have an effect on the crime rate has
strong intuitive appeal. 21 6 The argument is straightforward: "Unlike
probation and parole, incarceration makes it physically impossible for
offenders to victimize the public with new crimes for as long as they
21 7
are locked up."
The intuitive appeal of this argument derives from the fact that
most felons will continue to commit crimes upon their release from
involves obvious problems of false positives. If the court sentences X to an extra five years
of imprisonment based on an incorrect prediction that X will be dangerous, that imprisonment will be unjust. But so too, if the legislature enacts a policy of general incapacitation,
for example, for all thieves: "[i]s
this not a wholesale prediction of dangerousness for an
entire class of offenders? And will it not produce 'false positives' in the same way as does
individualized prediction since some of the offenders sentenced to imprisonment would
not have reoffended if they had remained in the community?" ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra

note 2, at 68.
214 After the release of the 1995 California Crime Index-reporting an 8.5% decrease in
crime from 1994 to 1995-Governor Pete Wilson declared that "[c]learly three strikes has
been an integral reason why we're winning the war against crime." Furillo, supranote 195,
at Al.
Mike Reynolds stated-in rebuttal to disapproving cost/benefits studies conducted regarding Three Strikes-that "[the deterrence factor] is the one thing that's never been
figured into the equation. A law that is a deterrent is the best kind of law in the world. It's
one that doesn't have to be implemented. There is no cost of incarceration, no cost of
prosecution, no cost to victims." Andy Furillo, "Three Strikes"Law Snares PersistentLawbreakers, Study Finds, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 8, 1996, at Al.
215 See infra notes 263-301 and accompanying text.
216 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 2, at 16, 27.
217 OFFICE OF POLICY DEV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 206, at 1. Proponents have
stated that Three Strikes has lowered crime rates. See Edgar Sanchez, CrimeFals in State's
Big Cities-Lungren Cites '3 Strikes' As Major Offenses Drop 8.5 %, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13,
1996, at B1 (commenting on the release of the 1995 California Crime Index-which reported an 8.5% decrease in crime from 1994 to 1995). If that is the case, it must be because
of the law's deterrent effect, not from the enhanced prison sentences. That is so because
offenders imprisoned under Three Strikes have yet to begin serving the enhanced term of
years. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DisTRcr ATr'y, COUNTY OF KERN, RUMINATIONS ON "THREE
STRuKES:" A REPORT TO THE KERN CouNTy BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ON THE LOCAL IMPACr OF
AB 971 AND PROPOSITION 184, at 3 (July 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter RUMINATIONS ON "THREE STRIKES"] (explaining that any reduction in the crime rate of Kern
County may not be attributed to Three Strikes' incapacitation of offenders because every

"third strike" defendant presently incarcerated would have been incarcerated under prior
law at this point in time anyway).
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prison at least if their release comes during their younger years. 2 18

Therefore, incarcerating those offenders means that they will not be
in the population committing criminal offenses, and therefore, the
crime rate will go down.
Efforts at empirical verification are more difficult. While acknowledging that incapacitation through incarceration may reduce
crime, Professor Franklin Zimring and Dr. Gordon Hawkins offer
some sobering observations in an important new book, Incapacitation:
Penal Confinement and the Restraint of Crime.219 Well before passage of

Three Strikes, California began incarcerating large numbers of felons.
The crime rate in California did drop. 220 Examining the data causes
doubt about the causal link between incarceration and the crime rate.
In the California study, the crime rate showed a measurable decline.
But the rate for most crimes, including homicide, robbery, and auto
theft, declined only slightly.2 21 A large decline occurred in burglary

and larceny. But even there, the increase in incarceration came
among adult offenders and the decline occurred among juvenile offenders. 222 As observed by Zimring and Hawkins, "[a] t a minimum,
then, these data should inspire substantial caution about the role of
additional incarceration as the major explanation for decreasing offenses in California in the 1980s."223

Other problems exist with the cost-benefit analysis advanced by
proponents of incapacitation. The cost benefit analysis purports to
identify offenders' rate of crime, the cost of the crime prevented, and
then multiplies one by the other to determine the benefits of incarcerating the offenders. The analysis then compares those benefits with
the projected cost of future incarceration. 224 But measurement of
both crimes prevented and cost of crime is problematic.
Estimates of crime rates are notoriously imprecise. The range of
disagreement in various studies that have attempted to measure how
many crimes would be prevented for each year of incarceration demonstrates profound methodological difficulties in attempting meaningful quantification. Studies have varied in estimates of the number
of crimes prevented per year from 3 to 187 crimes per offender.2 25
That kind of disparity should reduce one's confidence in relying on
218 See OFFICE OF Poucy DEV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 206, at 5-9; ZIMRING &
HAw1UNs, supra note 2, at 33-34.
219 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2.

220 Id. at 100-02.
221 Id. at 100-01.
222 Id. at 101.

223 Id. at 125.
224 Id. at 136.
225 Id. at 38, 50, 145.
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any of the existing studies.
The wide array may be explained by the different methodologies
relied on to arrive at those results. For example, one study focused on
self reporting by incarcerated individuals.2 2 6 Such a technique involves a number of pitfalls; for example, motive and memory raise
questions.2 27 Further, such studies may involve offenders at the
height of their criminal career when they presumably were most active.228 Any measurement flaws become grossly exaggerated when
such numbers are projected over a significant term of years.
Any study that relies on measuring individual crime rates, rather
than on community impact, 229 may overstate the benefits of incarcera-

tion.23 0 Studies attempting to measure crime prevention by establishing individual crime rates typically ignore the fact that offenders often
commit crimes in groups and that incarceration of one member of a
group may have little effect on the crime rate.2 3 ' A group member
may readily be replaced;2 3 2 indeed, once he returns to the street, not
only may he return to committing crime, but his group may have enlisted another new offender.2 33 Hence, the impact of incarceration
may be to increase the number of offenses. For example, if three burglars will commit twenty burglaries a year, but only one is incarcerated
while his two associates remain on the street, the crime rate will not
decline if his associates remain active.
Grime rates are affected by additional considerations. Opportu2
nities to commit crime may be "unlimited and undifferentiated." 34
For example, drug interdiction has failed because other suppliers simply fill the void left upon the arrest of a drug seller.2 3 5 Incarcerating

one person for selling drugs does not reduce the crime rate if five
other sellers are available. By contrast, reducing demand, for example, by treating or incarcerating one drug user may have a measurable
226 Id. at 81 (discussing PETER W. GREENwOOD, SELECTrVE INCAPACITATION: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE (1982)).

227 Id. at 82.
228 Id. at 83.
229 Id. at 43 (community impact is defined as the net effect of the absence of criminal
activity in the community setting).
230 Id. at 53.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 53-54.
233 Id. at 54.
234 Id. at 56.
235 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 1, at 116 (commenting that despite the war
on drugs' increase in arrests and harsher sentences, dealers were not forced off the
streets-instead, most drug dealing remained steady or increased in the affected
communities).
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effect on the crime rate. 236
Incapacitationargued for new and more careful studies of crime
rates, focusing both on offender rates and community effect of incarceration.23 7 Recognizing the inadequacies of existing studies, Zimring
and Hawkins nonetheless estimated that the drop in the crime rate
during a period of dramatic increased incarceration in California produced a drop of only about 3.5 crimes per offender per year of incarceration, 23 8 far less than the "conservative" estimate of twenty crimes
per year relied on by Three Strikes' proponents.23 9 Elsewhere, Professor Zimring has argued that if the estimate used by the Governor's
Chief Economist, Philip Romero, was accurate, given California's incarceration increases during the 1980s, the crime rate should already
2
have dropped to zero. 4
Similar doubts exist concerning Romero's estimated savings resulting from each crime prevented. He determined the cost of crime
by adding out-of-pocket expenses, monetary value of pain and suffering, and costs of crime prevention.2 4 1 Acknowledging that society's
expenditures for crime prevention would not be reduced in equal
proportion to a reduction in crime, Romero hypothesized the actual
cost reduction if crimes were prevented by the increased incapacitation of habitual offenders. He calculated the savings that would result
if society did not spend either twenty-five or seventy-five percent of the
costs attributable to each crime avoided. Hence, using the figure of
twenty crimes per year prevented by a year of incarceration, a figure
286 One commentator argues that "[i] t's profit that drives the drug trade. And the way to
reduce the profitability of drugs is not by stemming supply, but by dampening demand."
Joseph Perkins, America's War on DrugsHas Accomplished Little. It is Time to... Legalize Drugs?
No Let's Work on CuttingDemand, ATLANTAJ. & CoNsr., May 19, 1993, at All (proposing a
means by which to reduce the demand and advocating Attorney General Janet Reno's
"carrot-and-stick approach" to decreasing illegal drug use: "The carrot should be treatment
on demand for those who need help to beat their self-destructive habit. The stick should
be swift and sure punishment for those who refuse treatment and get caught buying or
doing drugs."). An example of such a policy at work can be seen in Miami and Baltimore.
These cities implemented a program which requires nonviolent offenders to undergo
mandatory, periodic drug testing in addition to substance abuse treatment-penalties are
also mandatory if satisfactory progress is not displayed. SeeJanet Reno, Fighting Youth Vwlence: TheFutureis Now, CruM.JusT., Summer 1996, at 33. The success of such a program is
demonstrated by a drop in recidivism-Miami had a 33% drop in recidivists and Baltimore
decreased its expected re-arrests by 50 percent. Id.
237 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 79.
238 Id. at 114-17 (concluding, based on four different methods, that increased incarceration of an additional 115,000 people led to a reduction of 3.5 offenses per individual per
year).
239 RoMaRo, supra note 129, at 3.
240 Franklin E. Zimring, The Voodoo Economies of California Crime, OVERCROWDED TIMES,
Oct. 1994, at 3.
241 RoMERo, supra note 129, at 2.
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not reduced over time to recognize that an offender commits fewer
crimes as he ages, Romero estimated that a year of incarceration saves
between $137,000 and $248,000, far in excess of the cost of incarceration. Further, Romero estimated that if 150 crimes were prevented,
the savings would jump to between $302,000 and $515,000.242
Small overestimates in either number of crimes or cost per crime
produce dramatic results. Hence, as RAND study author Peter Greenwood has argued, if we rely on out-of-pocket expenses of between
$1,000 and $2,000 per crime, even using Romero's twenty crimes per
offender figure, the savings amount to only $20,000-$40,000 per
242 Id. at 3. Romero's estimated savings from crime prevention measures is a good example of why those savings are almost certainly overstated. Those expenditures are driven
by public fear about crime, rather than by the reality of those risks. See generally THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting a vast difference between the public perception of crime and the reality of crime rates in the United States-the reality being that
crime rates have remained stable for several years), id. at 61-98 (exploring the prevailing
criminal policies and attributing their failure to having been implemented as reactions to
public fear of crime, rather than crime itself). But Three Strikes is a case study of how
politicians use fear of crime and ignore the reality-here that the crime rates were going
down-for political advantage. See John Vasconcellos, Three Strikes and You're Out: No,
DOCKET: SACRAMENTO COUNTRY BAR ASS'N, Mar. 1994, at 11 (criticizing such politicians).
Politicians have an incentive as well as the desire to appear tough on crime. The
"Prison-Industrial Complex," consisting of people who benefit economically from construction and maintenance of prisons, gives large campaign contributions and has become a
powerful lobbying group. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supranote 1, at 89, 96-97 (asserting
that the founders of the Corrections Corporation of America, the largest private prison
company, consists of several individuals who have major political influence among both
Democrats and Republicans). Donzinger also notes that the California Correctional Peace
Officers Association (CCPOA), the most powerful prison guards' union, is the second largest campaign donor in the state. The CCPOA donated the second-highest amount in support of Proposition 184, the Three Strikes initiative-spending approximately $1 million
during each campaign cycle to support candidates who promote prison expansion. This
included an expenditure of over $1 million toward Governor Pete Wilson's 1994 campaign. Id.
The CCPOA has become one of the most powerful lobby groups in Sacramento during the tenure of its 15-year president, Don Novey. Between 1985 and 1990, the number of
California prison guards nearly doubled, from about 7,500 to 14,249. JohnJacobs, California's Growth Industry, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 1994, at B8. By 1994, that figure had risen
to 22,547. Not only has there been a drastic increase in jobs for prison guards, but Novey
has helped to make them lucrative as well. A California prison guard with a high school
diploma and six years on the job now makes $45,000 annually. Almost 65 percent of the
Department of Corrections budget in 1994 went to prison guard salaries. Id. The financial
implications of Three Strikes on CCPOA members is obvious. Don Novey has been able to
influence lawmakers to favor his union through strategic alliances. The CCPOA contributed $1.4 million to Pete Wilson's 1990 and 1994 gubernatorial campaigns. Bill Ainsworth,
A Marriage of Convenience; Powerful Vitims' Right Groups Have Found a FinancialBacker That
Also Wants More People Behind Bars-PrisonGuards,RECORDER, Nov. 30, 1994, at 1. After the
CCPOA contributed nearly $1 million to Wilson's 1990 campaign, Wilson launched the
most expensive prison construction plan that any state has ever undertaken. W. John
Moore, Locked In, 26 NAT'LJ. 1784 (Jul. 30, 1994).
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year.24 3 A cost-benefit analysis looks different if that figure is com-

pared to the cost of incarcerating an offender for a year. Zimring and
Hawkins' estimated reduction of only 3.5 crimes per year would further reduce the savings to about $3,500 to $7,000.
Because of serious methodological flaws in Romero's study,
Three Strikes will not be able to deliver the benefits promised by its
proponents. As developed below, while Three Strikes may reduce
crime, California may have been able to realize similar benefits for far
less.244
D.

THREE STRIKES AND OLDER PRISONERS

Another result of Three Strikes is that it creates an aging prison
population. Older prisoners are more expensive to care for than their
younger counterparts. 245 For example, one report estimates that the
cost of incarcerating a geriatric prisoner is three times that of maintaining a regular inmate.2 46
The added cost of maintaining older prisoners cannot be justified
by risk of recidivism if those prisoners were released to the general
population. The NewYork State Department of Correctional Services,
for example, has maintained statistics correlating age and recidivism.
The Department reported the following rates for various age groups:
the rate for offenders between 45 and 49, 26.6%; for those between 50
and 64, 22.1%; for those 65 and over, 7.4%. By contrast, the recidivism rate for those 16 to 18 years old was over 70%.247 The New York
findings are hardly surprising. One of the widely recognized facts
about criminality is that it diminishes with age. As Judge Posner has
248
observed, crime is a young man's game.

Three Strikes will undoubtedly lead to an older prison popula243 See Dan Morain, Widson Adviser Says '3 Strikes' Will Save Money, L,. TI ES, Apr. 7, 1994,

at A3.

244 See infra notes 307-19 and accompanying text; see supranotes 134-39 and accompanying
text.
2 4
5 JoHNATHAN TURLEY ET AL., Pops: THE PROJECT FOR OLDER PRISONERS, REPORT TO THE

(discussing the Geriatric and Older Prisoner's Act of 1994)
[hereinafter Pops].
246 Id. at 7.
247 Id. at 13.
248 We know that criminal careers taper off with age, although with the aging population and the improvements in the health of the aged the fraction of crimes committed
by the elderly is rising. Crimes that involve a risk of physical injury to the criminal are
especially a young man's game. In 1986 more than 62 percent of all persons arrested
for robbery... were below the age of 25, and only 3.4 percent were 60 years old or
older ....
United States v.Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,J. concurring) (citations omitted). See aso JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERtsSrEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
STATE OF NEv YORK 11 (1994)

NATURE 126-41 (1985).
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tion if only because the mandatory minimum sentence is longer than
the statutory maximum for many underlying criminal offenses. 24 9
Two proponents of Three Strikes have argued that the suggestion that
2 50
prisons will turn into "geriatric wards" is "erroneous, if not warped."
1
State Senator Wyman, described in the article as the "point man"25
for Three Strikes in the Senate, and his co-author argue that "[i]f
these so-called nonviolent prisoners have reached the point where
they are unlikely to commit another crime, they will most likely be
2 52
paroled when they reach eligibility."
Their point is important, but tells only part of the story. Violent
crime is a young man's game.2 5 3 While Three Strike offenders face a
249 For example, the statutory maximum sentence for a conviction of grand theft without the Three Strikes law normally is one year unless it involves theft of a firearm in which
case the sentence can be up to three years, CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West Supp. 1996),
possession of marijuana is one year, CAL HEALTm & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1991), and
burglary is six years, CAL. PENAL CODE § 461 (West 1988). The burgeoning effect of Three
Strikes' sentencing provisions is most evident when a criminal defendant is convicted of a
third strike. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth the
sentencing requirements for criminal defendants with two prior serious or violent felony
convictions and a current felony conviction which need not be serious or violent); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996). Under the Three Strikes law the offender must serve a minimum of 25 years to life even if his or her third felony conviction is
for theft, possession of marijuana, burglary, or any other minor, non-violent offense. Id.
250 Wyman & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 252. State Senator Wyman premised this argument on the assumption that "[i]f so-called nonviolent prisoners have reached the point
where they are unlikely to commit another crime, they will most likely be paroled when
they reach eligibility." Id. at n.18. The provisions of the Three Strikes law, however, do not
permit parole-the only provision allowing an offender to serve less than the mandatory
sentence is found in section 667(c) (5). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (5) (West Supp.
1996) (permitting the accrual of good time credits for a maximum of one-fifth the total
term of the imposed sentence-making the minimum sentence for a third strike 20 years);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (5) (West Supp. 1996). In light of this, a repeat nonviolent
offender who commits his or her third strike at the age of 34 would, contrary to Senator
Wyman's proposition, continue to be incarcerated long after the point he or she is likely to
commit another crime-there is a strong argument to be made that a 54 year-old offender
is unlikely to commit another crime. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 17 (1994) (reporting that most criminal offenses are committed by persons between
the ages of 11 and 24, and after the 30th birthday, criminal activity for most offenders
significantly decreases). Therefore, the only way Senator Wyman's statement can hold
water is if the third strike offender is in his or her younger years-say, 20 years old, which
even then would lead to incarceration of the offender for approximately 10 years above
and beyond an age where he or she may pose a danger to society.
251 Wyman & Schmidt, supra note 14, at 253.
252 Id. at 252 n.18.
253 Offenders within the 20-34 age group comprise a total of 66.59% of all second and
third strike defendants. CAL. DEP'T OF CORREcrioNs, IMPA"r OF "THREE STRmEs" LAw ON
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CoRuR-IcoNs 20 chart 8 (Feb. 1996). The 20-24 year-old
defendants are at the top of the scale with 24.18%, closely followed by those 25-29 years-old
at 22.24%, and the 30-34 year-old offenders at 20.17%. Id. Criminal defendants under the
age of 20 comprise 7.26% of all second and third strike defendants, while those over the
age of 35 constitute 26.15%, and those 50 and older place at the lowest end of the scale
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possible term of life in prison, many will be released in only twenty
years. 2 4 For example, if a Three Strikes offender is twenty-five years
old when he is sentenced under § 667(e), and earns all available good
time credit, he will be only forty-five years old at the time, of his release
from prison. For some offenders, the mandatory minimum will be
longer than twenty-five years, but only in cases in which the term of
imprisonment for the third strike, multiplied by three, is in excess of
255
twenty-five years. Those offenses are relatively few.
The senator and his co-author ignore part of the problem. There
will be a measurable number of offenders who will become geriatric
prisoners. Because the statute includes no wash-out period, older offenders who may have committed serious or violent offenses as
younger adults may commit non-violent third strikes. 256 Incarcerating
with 1.87%. Id.
254 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(c) (5) and 667(e) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1996) (providing, respectively, that the total amount of credits awarded toward reduction of a sentence
under the Three Strikes law shall not exceed one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment
imposed, which has a mandatory minimum of 25 years); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1170.12(a) (5) and 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1996) (same).
255 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 208 (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth that a defendant
shall be sentenced for up to 11 years if convicted of kidnapping a person under the age of
14); CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that a defendant convicted of
carjacking shall be sentenced for a maximum of nine years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West
Supp. 1996) (determining that a defendant convicted of arson resulting in great bodily
injury shall be sentenced for up to nine years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West Supp. 1996)
(establishing that a defendant shall serve up to nine years if convicted of first degree robbery of an inhabited dwelling). But see CAu PENAL CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring a maximum sentence of only eight years for any defendant convicted of rape); see also,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 461 (West 1988) (setting the maximum imprisonment for a defendant
convicted of first degree burglary at six years).
In determining the mandatory minimum sentence for a third strike, a question arises
concerning offenders who have two prior strikes and are subsequently convicted of multiple, current felonies not committed on the same occasion and not arising from the same
set of operative facts. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (6) (West Supp. 1996) ("If there is a
current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion,
and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e)."); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(a)(6) (West Supp. 1996). The appellate courts have consistently held that the
defendant must be consecutively sentenced for each count See People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 351 (Cal. C. App. 1995); People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995); People v. Hendrix, No. F023420, 1996 WL 376318 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 1996); cf.
People v. Jenkins, 893 P.2d 1224 (1995) (en banc). For a detailed analysis of the threestrikes law see AL MENASrER & ALEx RiccIARuLr~u, 3 STmS MANUAL (1996). See infranote

57 and accompanying text for a comparison of the second strike sentencing scheme.
See also People v. Nelson, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 917
P.2d 624 (1996). In Nelson, the appellate court held that Three Strikes mandates imposition of consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences when multiple crimes occur on the same occasion
and arise out of the same set of operativefacts. This issue is currently being reviewed by the
California Supreme Court. 7
256 CAL. PENAL CODE § 66 (c) (3) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (3)
(West Supp. 1996).
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an older drug addict or shoplifter who commits a third strike at fortyfive years old until he is seventy years old is hard to justify as necessary
for public protection. At least in the short run, the population almost
certainly includes a significant number of older offenders who no
257
longer commit crimes of violence but do commit lesser felonies.
For example, an older offender who is currently charged with possession of narcotics does not represent a threat to public safety sufficient
to warrant a term of imprisonment for a minimum of twenty years.
Unless the prosecutor or court strikes prior felonies, those older offenders are subject to Three Strikes' sentence enhancement.
Some proponents of Three Strikes have argued that those offenders are doing "life on the installment plan."2 58 In other words, some

offenders who may not represent a serious threat of physical harm
may nonetheless serve numerous short sentences of imprisonment for
lesser crimes, like drug violations and related crimes to feed drug
addiction.
This group of offenders, older offenders who may no longer be
violent, but who frequently commit minor felonies, will end up as geriatric prisoners. Warehousing them poses a significant problem.
Their care is expensive. 259 Three Strikes mandates that they do prison
time in a state correctional facility, 260 filling prison space with less un257 See, e.g., People v. Reese, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), review granted,
No. S052695, 1996 WL 346368 (Cal.Jun. 12, 1996) (a 41 year-old offender earned his third
strike upon a conviction for burglarizing a residence, stealing a videocassette recorder and
three screw drivers. Prior to his third strike, the defendant had 14 previous felony and
misdemeanor convictions: possession of drugs in 1992 and 1979, driving under the influence in 1992 and 1977, attempted robbery in 1988, ex-felon in possession of a firearm in
1985, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and battery in 1983, aggravated assault in
1982 and 1977, possession of drugs for sale in 1979, robbery in 1972, burglary in 1972 and
possession of an illegal weapon and throwing rocks at a vehicle in 1965); see also People v.
Super. Ct. (Romero), 44 Cal. App. 4th 1073, 1082 (at the age of 32, the time of his last
offense, Jesus Romero was convicted of a third strike and sentenced to 25 years to life for
possession of 0.13 grams of rock cocaine. Prior to his third strike, Romero had previously
been convicted of five non-violent felonies: burglary in the second degree in 1980, attempted burglary in the first degree in 1984, burglary in the first degree in 1986, and
possession of a controlled substance in 1992 and 1993).
One effect of the California Supreme Court's recent holding in Peoplev. Superior Court
is that it may limit the use of Three Strikes in such cases. See People v. Superior Ct., 917
P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996) (guiding the lower courts in the exercise of their discretion to
strike prior convictions, and noting that any dismissal must be "in furtherance ofjustice" as
proscribed by section 1385(a) of the California Penal Code).
258 "We're getting some very bad people," said a Ventura County deputy district attorney, "and instead of them doing life on the installment plan, they're just going away."
Andy Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long CiminalHistories,SAcRAMsxro BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, at
Al.
259 See Pops, supranote 245, at 11.
260 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (4) (West Supp. 1996); CL PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(a) (4) (West Supp. 1996).
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ruly inmates, leaving less space for younger more violent offenders.
On the realistic assumption that prison space will be finite,26 1 Three
Strikes makes a bad choice by requiring incarceration of inmates past
the years of their active criminal careers. Three Strikes prevents con262
sideration of less expensive alternatives to incarceration.
E.

THREE STRIKES AND DETERRENCE

California has experienced a reduction in its crime rate since the
effective date of Three Strikes. Its proponents claim that the law is a
2 63
powerful deterrent that explains the downturn in the crime rate.
For example, one news reporter observed, "[a]ccording to the FBI,
major crime in California dropped 4.9 percent in 1994-the first year
of 'three strikes'-compared to 2 percent nationwide. The disparity
was even more pronounced in the first six months of 1995-a 7 percent reduction in California compared with 1 percent for the nation." 264 Beyond anecdotal evidence, establishing that Three Strikes is
responsible for all or even most of that reduction is certainly open to
question.
Deterrence arguments are notoriously difficult to assess, in large
part because society is not set up to allow carefully controlled experiments. A claim that the threat of severe sanctions will deter crime has
more intuitive appeal than factual support. Over 200 years ago,
Cesare Beccaria argued that certainty of punishment has greater deterrent effect than does severity of punishment. 2 65 Subsequent studies
support that conclusion. 2 66 One California study, for example, concluded that increased severity had no effect on the crime rate. 267 But
261 See infra note 272 and accompanying text.

262 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (4) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that all Three Strikes
defendants must be committed to the state prison, and expressly prohibiting eligibility for
commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center).
263 In the first six months of 1994, the rate of violent crimes in California, including
homicides, dropped 7.7% from the rate a year before. Riccardi, supranote 195, at A3. The
rate of murders in the state dropped almost 12%. Id. Attorney General Dan Lungren was
quick to link the decreases to the deterrent effects of the Three Strikes law. Id. Governor
Wilson credited the Three Strikes law as the reason behind the drop in the crime rate
during the two-year-period, 1994-1995. Furillo, supranote 195, at Al. However, other experts believe that the drop in the crime rate can be attributed to the improvement in the
state's economy during this time as well as a change in the state's demographics. Id. atA3.
264 Furillo, supra note 7, at A8.
265 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENr 58 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Mer-

rill 1963).
266 A number of these studies are summarized in George Antunes & A. Lee Hunt, The
Deterrent Impact of CriminalSanctions:Some Implicationsfor CriminalJusticePolicy, 51 J. URBAN
LAw 145 (1973), and Charles R. Tittle, Punishment & Deterrence of Deviance, in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMmr 85 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1973).
267 CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMrrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROGRESS REPORT, DETER-
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the lack of good empirical evidence leaves other scholars less
2 68
certain.
Certainty of punishment does seem to be more important than
severity of the sentence imposed.2 69 The leading criminal law textbook cites anecdotal examples in support of that conclusion, for example, instances in which law enforcement was weak or nonexistent,
due to a police strike or, as occurred during World War II, the arrest
2 70
of the Copenhagen police.
If certainty of punishment and criminals' perception of that fact
do create general deterrence, 27 ' and if severity of punishment is a less
important factor in the deterrence equation, Three Strikes takes the
wrong approach to maximizing the deterrence benefit of our resources. Resources are finite.2 72 One possibility is that the legislature
will be forced to allocate resources away from law enforcement to
prison construction and maintenance.2 73 But if that is the case, fewer
street officers will lead to fewer arrests and less certainty of punishment. On the plausible assumption that resource allocation will be
necessary, Three Strikes may mean longer terms of imprisonment for
offenders who will grow old (and less dangerous) in prison while
younger offenders will face less chance of being caught, and even
when they are, they will face shorter terms of imprisonment until they
run afoul of Three Strikes. The net result is that we may extend the
career of younger felons while warehousing older felons.
To underscore the point about resource allocation, consider
three separate offenders: one, an older offender who commits his
RENT EFFEcr OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 7 (May 1968) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT], cited in
KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 117.

268 VON HIRSCH, supranote 155, at 40-41.
269 Id. at 37-44; Antunes & Hunt, supra note 266; Tittle, supra note 266.

270 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 117.
271 See PROGRESS REPORT, supranote 267. There is a good deal of irony in recent efforts
by politicians to use the fear of crime for political advantage. Despite the recent decline in
crime rates-perhaps a result of the increase in the prison population in the 1980sclaims by politicians that crime goes unpunished may undercut the deterrent effect of the
criminal law by making would-be offenders believe that the possibility of criminal sanctions
is remote.

See GREENwOOD ET AL., supranote 22, at 34; Schiraldi, supranote 22, at 7.
273 While California has had a dramatic decline in its crime rate, so has New York, where
272

no three strikes law is in effect. See FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T oFJusrICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995 PRELIMINARY ANNuAL RELEASE tbl.4 (May 5, 1996) (not-

ing that crime in NewYork City fell approximately 14.5% from 1994 to 1995). In NewYork
City, the police now make arrests for minor offenses, a strategy that is credited with reducing the crime rate. The strategy has been suggested by a number of criminologists. See,
e.g., George L. Kelling &James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982,
at 29 (arguing that tolerance of petty offenses leads to increased crime rates). That approach has numerous and obvious advantages over California's; not the least significant is
that it comes at a lower cost.
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third felony and receives a minimum term of twenty five years; two, a
young violent offender who commits his third felony and receives a
minimum term of twenty five years; third, a young violent offender
who commits his first felony. The chances of the older felon committing violent crimes is quite low; 274 but Three Strikes mandates that he
serves his time in a state prison and that his sentence can be reduced
only by 20% by good time credits. 2 75 It is hard to see an argument
that favors incarcerating him rather than the third offender. But the
reality that prison space will remain limited means that the judge who
sentences the third felon is less likely to give that offender a sentence
commensurate with the violent nature of the offense. Three Strikes
276
makes more probable a lighter sentence in such cases.
The choice between the second and third felons is harder. But
the choice to imprison the second felon for a minimum of twenty
years, again with the result that prison space may not be available for
the third felon (e.g. resulting in a short jail term), is shortsighted.
The second felon will grow old in prison, almost certainly past the
point where social protection requires his imprisonment. Using limited prison resources for felons as they graduate from violent careers
leaves fewer resources to be spent on young criminals at the point
when they represent their greatest threat to society.
What then of the statistical data quoted by Three Strikes proponents? For example, in a thorough series of articles in the Sacramento
Bee,277 the author cited Three Strikes' proponents who relied not just
on anecdotal evidence, like reported cases of parolees leaving the
state, but also on data compiled by the F.B.I., indicating a significant
274 See .supranotes 24647 and accompanying text.
275 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (5) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL

CODE § 1170.12(a) (5)
(West Supp. 1996).
276 "If [the jail population] continues to grow," said Merced County Sheriff and chairman of a statewide panel examining the effect of Three Strikes on countyjails, "the easiest
way to get out ofjail is going to be to get sentenced." Three Strikes After One Year, CA. J.,
Oct. 1, 1995 (reporting that the influx of Three Strikes prisoners awaiting trial has forced
manyjails to refuse to accept suspects charged with misdemeanors, and further noting that
many jails must release virtually anyone who is not a violent felon while others have resorted to instructing the police to forego arresting low-level offenders).
277 See Andy Furillo, "Three Strikes" Law Snares Peristent Lawbreakers, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Apr. 8, 1996, at Al; Andy Furillo, "Three Strikes" Collides With California'sBurstingProns,
SAcRAM wro BEE, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al; Andy Furillo, Prosecutors,SAcRAMFsero BEE, Apr. 2,
1996, atAll; Andy Furillo, SentencingDiscretionMay Return to Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr.
2, 1996, at A10; Andy Furillo, Future of "Three Strikes" Hinges on Issue of Deterrene,SACRAMF. o BEE, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al; Andy Furillo, The Race Issu SAcRAmENTO BEE, Mar. 31,
1996, at A19; Andy Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long Criminal Histories,SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 31, 1996, atAl; Andy Furillo, L.A. Story, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, atA19; Andy
Furillo, The Victims, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, at A21; Andy Furillo, The Convicts,
SAcRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1996, at A20; Andy Furillo, Wilson Praises3-Strikes Law, SACRAMENTo BEE, Mar. 7, 1996, at Al.
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drop in California's crime rate.2 78
Specifically, "there were nearly 500 fewer homicide victims statewide in 1995 compared with 1993."279 California experienced a 4.9%
drop in major crime in the first year of Three Strikes, "compared with
2 percent nationwide." 280 Further support for the deterrent effect of
the law, according to the article, is found in a RAND study, "comparing the reduction in crime in selected California cities with non-California cities over the past three years." The California cities "showed
bigger reductions in homicide .... robbery.... and burglary.. ." than
their counterparts. 28 ' If Three Strikes is responsible for those results,
it may be a cause for celebration. As Three Strikes' author Mike Reynolds has pointed out, in effect, deterrence comes at a very low price.
Crimes not committed mean no cost to the courts, prisons or
282
victims.
Two questions surface though. The first question relates to what
the numbers actually show. Even the numbers cited by proponents of
Three Strikes suggest that its deterrent effect is not the whole story.
As for the RAND study, going back threeyears, before the effective date
of Three Strikes should actually demonstrate that serious crime rates
had been on the decline for four years running.2 8 3 Likewise, the
F.B.I. study also specifically reported that violent crime decreased consistently since 1993.284
It is doubtful that the sharp decline in homicides is attributable
to Three Strikes. Homicide cases may be Three Strike cases, but penalties available for murder are comparable to or greater than those
available in Three Strikes cases.2 85 The drop in homicide rates might
278 See Furillo, supra note 7, at Al (reporting a remarkable exodus of parolees from
California to other states - in the first eleven months of 1995, there was an average of 286
out-of-state parole requests per month, compared with 249 per month in 1994 and 237 per
month in 1993-and further noting that "[a]ccording to the FBI, major crime in California dropped 4.9 percent in 1994... compared with 2 percent nationwide").
279 Id.

280 Id.

281 Id.
282 Id.
283 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995 PRELIMINARY ANNUAL RELEASE, supra note 273, at tbl.3

(reporting that the crime index dropped 3% from 1991 to 1992; 2% from 1992 to 1993;
1% from 1993 to 1994; and 2% from 1994 to 1995).
284 See id. (noting that from 1992 to 1993, there was no change in violent crime; from
1993 to 1994, violent crime fell by 3%; and from 1994 to 1995, violent crime dropped by
4%).
285 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1996) (indicating that every person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, or 25 years to life; every person convicted of murder in the second
degree shall be sentenced for 15 years to life, or for 20 years to life if the killing was
committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle, or 25 years to life if the
victim was a peace officer).
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be explained by a number of other factors, some of which have nothing to do with the penalty for homicide.2 86 But even assuming that
would-be offenders are deterred by the available criminal sentence,
one might have expected proponents of severe criminal sanctions to
have explained the decline in homicides by the renewed use of the
death penalty in California, but for their advocacy in favor of Three
28 7
Strikes.
Examination of the F.B.I. data suggests that factors other than
multiple offender legislation may explain crime rates. For example,
the three most violent cities nationwide are in states with three or two
strikes legislation in place.2 8 8 Meanwhile, crime in New York City fell
by 14.5%, in a state with no three strikes law, while crime fell by less
2 89
than 4% in Los Angeles.
Three Strikes proponents conveniently ignore the simple fact of
demographics. F.B.I. data indicate that while overall crime rates are
declining, the number of crimes committed by juveniles is increasing.29 0 Young offenders represent the largest group of violent offend286 See Furillo, supra note 7, at Al (exploring a change in demographics as a possible
reason for the decrease in the crime rate and citing the Center on Juvenile and Criminal
Justice findings that "there were 106,851 fewer young men between the ages of 15 to 30, a
traditionally high-crime group, in July 1995 than three years earlier"); see id. (reporting
further that California's economy is improving, as evidenced by the state Employment Development Department's report that 340,000 more Californians were employed in 1995
than in 1993); see also Lori Montgomery, Another Drop in CrimeRate, SACRAMENTO BEE, May
6, 1996, atAl (referring to experts who attribute the drop in crime to other possible causes
such as assertive police stratagem, community policing, an increase in incarceration of
offenders, and stabilization of turf battles between drug dealers). But see Michael Prowse,
PayingForCrime, FINANcIAL TIMES, May 13, 1996, at 18 (warning that the lull in crime rates
is unlikely to continue as the next decade promises to bring a 20% increase in the number
of males aged 14 to 17, resulting in a significant increase among the most crime-prone
minority groups); see also Montgomery, supra (anticipating an increase of violent crime
among teens and quoting one commentator as saying, "[t]his is the calm before the crime
storm. It's great that crime is down now, but if we start celebrating our successes, we may
be blindsided by a bloodbath.").
287 See Bruce Fein, Death Penalty End Game... AndDebate, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at
F1 (reflecting on the execution of Robert Alton Harris-California's first administration of
the death penalty since 1967).
288 The F.B.I.'s annual uniform crime report found that Newark, New Jersey, Atlanta,
Georgia and Miami, Florida, have the highest violent crime rates per 100,000 population.
See Montgomery, supra note 286, at Al (citing FEDERAL BUREAu OF INVESTIGAION, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1995 PRE IMINARY ANNUAL RELEASE tbl.4 (May

5, 1996)). For an abstract of the Three and Two Strikes legislation for these states, see
Appendix A.
289 See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: 1995 PRELIMINARY ANNUAL RELEASE, supra note 273, at
tbl.4.
290 See FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM ANNUAL
CRIME REPORTS 227 (1994); compare FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATIoN, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, UNIFORM ANNUAL CRIME REPORTS 227 (1993); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvEsnGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM ANNUAL CRIME REPORTS 227 (1992); FEDERAL BuREAu OF
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ers. The reason that an increase in juvenile crime has not resulted in
higher crimes rates is that juveniles represent a smaller percentage of
the overall population. 291 Demographics alone may account for the
most significant portion of the declining crime rate.
If Three Strikes has a powerful deterrent effect, it should have
produced a measurable decline in the juvenile crime rate. That is so
because Three Strikes allows felony convictions of juveniles to count
as prior strikes. 292 But the data are to the contrary; California
juveniles, like those elsewhere, continue to commit violent crime at
2 93
increasing rates.
Even if one assumes that Three Strikes deters, a second question
arises: would a more carefully crafted statute have provided similar
deterrent benefits? As indicated above, California's Three Strikes applies to numerous offenders who do not present a grave social
harm.2 94 The outcry that has led to multiple offender statutes is a

reaction to concern about violent crime.2 95 No one seems to have
asked whether a three strikes law aimed at violent offenders might
have the deterrent benefits without the added cost of making Three
Strikes applicable to non-violent offenders.
As currently crafted, Three Strikes is a crude deterrent tool. In
setting criminal sentences, deterrent theorists favor graded offenses,
reserving the most severe sanctions for conduct that society wants to
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM ANNUAL REPORTS 223

(1991) (finding, re-

spectively, that juvenile crime rates increased 4.5% from 1993 to 1994, 6% from 1992 to
1993, and 17% from 1991 to 1992); cf. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JuSTIcE, UNIFORM ANNUAL CRIME REPORTS 174 (1986) (the juvenile crime rate has in-

creased over 74% from 1986 to 1994).
291 Juvenile crime is on the rise and experts do not expect this trend to cease. In fact,
the incessant increase in juvenile crime is expected to skyrocket in the near future. In
1990, there were only 10 million juveniles aged 15 to 17. By the year 2010, however, the
juvenile population is expected to grow to 13.1 million. See Reno, supra note 236, at 30.
Even if the trend in juvenile crime were to stabilize, in the face of 3.1 million more
juveniles by the year 2010, the number of crimes committed by this group will nevertheless
increase by one-third. Id.
292 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (3) (A)-(D) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that a prior
juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction if the juvenile was, among
other requirements, 16 years of age or older at the time she or he committed the prior
offense).
293 For example, in California, juvenile violent offenses increased 4.6% from 1993 to
1994. CAL DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 11 (1994). More
alarming is the fact that from 1985 to 1994,juvenile violent offenses increased 81.9%, while
the juvenile population only increased 13.4% in that same time period. Id.
294 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
295 See Sam Walker, Questions Suiface Over Fairness, Cost of 3-Strikes Laws, CHiuSrTAN SciENCE MONrrOR, Nov. 18, 1994, at 3 (asserting that 74% of Americans support mandatory
life sentences for three-time violent felons).
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deter the most. 296 Relying on the premise that the offender is a ra-

tional actor, even if he is not entirely deterrdd to desist from committing crimes, these theorists believe that the offender may choose to
commit the lesser offense, rather than the greater. 2 97 If the punishment is the same for both offenses, the offender has no reason to
avoid the greater social harm. 298 For example, if an offender shifts
from robbery to theft to feed a drug habit because penalties are harsher for robbery, deterrence theorists would claim that deterrence has
worked properly, if incompletely. 299 Three Strikes gives the felon with
two strikes little incentive to shift from robbery to theft.30 0
296 "[T]he obstacles that deter men from committing crimes," wrote Cesare Beccaria,
"should be stronger in proportion as they are contrary to the public good... [for] [i]f an
equal punishment be ordained for two crimes that do not equally injure society, men will
not be anymore deterred from committing the greater crime .... ." Cesare Beccaria, On
Crimes and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 181-32 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).
"[T]here ought to be a corresponding scale of punishments," he continued, "descending
from the greatest to the least... [b]ut it is enough for the wise legislator to mark the
principal points of division without disturbing the order, not assigning to crimes of the first
grade the punishments of the last." Id. at 133.
297 Ted Honderich wrote, "[c]learly the concept of deterrence is based on an assumption that '... we are rational beings, who make careful calculations of possible gain and
losses before deciding upon our actions.'" LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, FEA OF
PUNISHMENT: DETRuRENCE 10 (1976) (quoting TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMEr. THE SUPPOSEDJUSrFICATIONS 56 (1969)). "Criminals who do commit certain offences," proceeded
Honderich, "are restrained from more serious ones because of the threat of greater penalties. They sometimes take self-preserving steps, such as not carrying weapons." Id. at 13.
298 Some law enforcement officials express concern that Three Strikes has made offenders more violent and unmanageable because they have little to lose. For example, one
career burglar expressed, "I might as well get 25-to-life for murder and do 16 than not
shoot you and do 20." Andy Furillo, The Convicts, SACRAMENTO BE, Mar. 31, 1996, at A20.
"I shoot you, I do less time," he continued, "so I might as well shoot you." Id.
An article addressing the need to step-up security to absorb the adverse effects of an
ever increasing number of violent offenders warehoused in countyjails quoted one county
chief deputy sheriff as saying- "We're getting individuals in for their second or third strike
that essentially have nothing to lose. Why should they worry about following internal
rules? They ask, 'What are you going to do, send us to prison for life?'" Three Strikes After
One Year, supranote 277. The Los Angeles superior court recently reported that its county
jails are in crisis. See L.A. SUPER. CT., THE IMPAcT OF "THREE STRIKES" LAW ON THE LOS
ANGELESJUSTICE SySTEM 6 (Feb. 1996) (remarking that "[r]ecent increases in high security
inmates and increased length of stay for Strike inmates [awaiting trial] have created a
system that recently erupted in violent riots"). See also LEGIsLATrE ANALysr's OFICE, IMPACT, supra note 38, at 4 (stating that some county jails have reported an increase in assaults on staff, and that many jails need to increase security measures to compensate for
the increase in second- and third-strike offenders, commonly considered high-risk
offenders).
299 Imposing a lesser punishment for the offense of attempt is justified in order to preserve some incentive for the defendant to avert the threatened harm. Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Attempt in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTIcE 96 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1988). In the same vein, decreased punishment for offenses that result in less social harm
is equally justified.
300 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that the third
strike may be for any felony conviction); see also CAl. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (2) (A)
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Apart from theoretical concerns about Three Strikes, policy makers should ask whether, even assuming a deterrent effect, that same
benefit may be available at a lower cost. That question has simply
been ignored by its proponents who are still trying to justify its sweeping provisions. 3 0 1
F.

REASSESSING REHABILITATION

Three Strikes as well as other recent sentencing reforms are premised, in part, on rejection of rehabilitation. 30 2 When rehabilitation
was under attack during the 1970s, its critics raised important questions about rehabilitation, including concerns about excessive paternalism.30 3 There are serious questions whether the state ought to
attempt to make criminal offenders "flourishing, happy and self-actualizing members of society," especially when "such a paternalistic reform theory allocates scarce societal resources away from other, more
deserving groups that want them... to a group that hardly can be said
to deserve such favored status ....,,104
The critics of rehabilitation forced a reexamination of that form
of excessive paternalism. But unthinkingly, we also abandoned a
more limited role of rehabilitation. As described by Professor Moore,
offenders may become "nondangerous . . .because such offenders

either become 'penitent,' or they are no longer willing to commit
crimes because they are unwilling to risk [incarceration] again." 30 5 If
that is the view of the offender, rather than as a beneficiary of social
largesse, the rehabilitative efforts are justified not by making the offender a happier person, but because such an effort at reform is "a
cost effective means of shortening the expensive incarceration that
would otherwise be necessary to protect us all against crime." 306 But
even the more modest kind of rehabilitation was rejected because of
an almost universal belief that rehabilitation simply does not work.
(West Supp. 1996) (same).
301 Shortly after Three Strikes' second anniversary, Governor Pete Wilson declared that
Three Strikes is an "integral reason why we're winning the war against crime." Fox Butterfield, Tough Law on Sentences isCriticized, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A14.
302 Attorney General Dan Lungren credits the drop in California crime rates to tougher
responses to crime which began in the early 1980s. He further attributes the move toward
social incapacitation policies, "rather than the noble-sounding but failed mission of forced
rehabilitation," as the touchstone of falling crime rates. See Dan Lungren, CaliforniaFalling
Crime Rates Signal Heartening Trends, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB., May 19, 1996, at G1.
303 See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 17-18 (1971).
304 MICHAEL MooRE, LAw & PSYCHIATRY 234-35 (1984) reprinted in SANFoRD H. KADISH &
STEPHENJ. ScHuIuHonit, CRIMINAL I-W AND rrs PROCESSES 123-24 (6th ed. 1995). See also
Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the CriminalLaw, 49 YA.E L. J. 987, 1012-14 (1940).
305 Mootx, supra note 304.
306 Id. at 123.
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That factual premise has had a curious history. Critics of rehabilitation almost all cited Robert Martinson's work as support of the view
30 7
that, when we consider rehabilitation programs, "nothing works."
That was a misstatement of his original research where he concluded,
less dramatically, that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism."3 0 s The "nothing works" refrain became a powerful symbol to attack rehabilitation programs despite Martinson's more
modest conclusions, including his observation that "some treatment
programs have had modest successes .... 09
More significant though was Martinson's retraction of his earlier
conclusions. In 1979, Martinson argued that his earlier work had
used the wrong methodology. 3 10 Martinson specifically denounced
the "nothing works" label attributed to his writings.3 11 He urged sentencing reform based on his new findings and characterized the movement to abandon parole release and supervision as "the most extreme
case of radical tinkering with the system of criminal justice."3 12 He
concluded that "[t]he evidence that parole supervision works ... is
more convincing than the bare assumption that it does not."3 13
A number of other commentators challenged Martinson's original work. 3 14 In addition, there is now a growing body of literature
that suggests that some rehabilitative programs work.3 13 Unlike the
overly optimistic view that all offenders can be rehabilitated, recent
research suggests that careful selection of offenders, based on a variety
of predictive factors in conjunction with close supervision does reduce
3 16
recidivism.
Depending on the program, its costs are likely to be far less than
the costs of long term incarceration. 317 In a related context, we have
307 VON HIRSCH, supra note 155, at 14 n.4; see SINGER, supra note 155, at 7 (discussing
Martinson's works); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,

FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 74 n.16 (1976) (discussing Martinson's conclusion that little
works).
308 Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, 35 PuB.
INTEREST 25 (1974) (emphasis omitted).
309 DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT. A SURVEY
OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 627 (1975).
310 Martinson, supra note 161, at 254.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 257.
313 Id.
314 See generalyWilson, supranote 161; CHARLES A. MURRAY & LOUIS A. COX,JR., BEYOND
PROBATION: JUVENILE CORRECTIONS AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT (1979).

313 See Bonta & Motiuk, supra note 161, at 302-05.

316 See Vitiello, supra note 156, at 1032-37.
317 See CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT IN THE DIsrmcr OF COLUMBIA: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS,

PRISONS AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 161, at 6 (recommending that an efficient commu-
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completed a decade of unsuccessful interdiction programs to stop the
influx of drugs from abroad. Shutting off one supply seems merely to
shift the source of drugs elsewhere.3 18 Even insofar as such programs
can claim success, they have been extremely expensive. By comparison, recent commentators have resumed urging drug treatment of
users as a far less expensive alternative to incarceration.3 1 9
Three Strikes' proponents relied on faulty factual support; as a
result, Three Strikes will yield far fewer benefits than promised. As
important as its faulty factual support was the failure of policy-makers
to compare the Three Strikes' solution with other alternatives. There
is a growing body of literature that suggests that realistic alternatives
are available at considerably less cost.
IV.

THE RETURN OF RATIONALITY

California adopted Three Strikes with little rational discourse
about its promised benefits.3 20 Some legislators sought political advantage by playing the crime issue to the hilt, while others simply got
out of the way.32 1 Three Strikes' advocate Mike Reynolds was uncomnity policing program "can be an effective public safety tool in reducing the numbers of
persons who enter the law enforcement, court and correctional systems as offenders"). See
also THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 55-58 (advocating that punishment which is
less expensive and more effective at curtailing recidivism should be employed [e.g., probation, intensive probation, day reporting centers, halfway houses, boot camps, fines and
restitution, community service, home detention, and drug treatment]); Rand Study and
Crime Problem, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),Jun. 28, 1996, at B6 (reporting that a recent
study released by the RAND Institute found that "dollar for dollar, programs that encourage young people to stay in school and out of trouble prevent five times as many
crimes as stiff penalties imposed on repeat offenders using three-strikes-and-out laws").
318 A 1992 study regarding the impact of the war on drugs and reviewing 20 years of
drug interdiction efforts, concluded that attempts to control drug supply "tend to divert
the supply and to create new sources, rather than stamping out production of the targeted
drugs." FoundationReport Urges New Prioritiesfor Drug War Abroad; Risk of "Real" War, Failure
of Andean Strategy Cited, U.S. NEwswIRE, Feb. 25, 1992.
319 See Reno, supranote 286, at 33 (demonstrating that alternative criminal punishment
programs are highly effective and noting that cities like Miami and Baltimore, which have
implemented programs requiring nonviolent offenders to undergo mandatory drug testing and substance abuse treatment, have experienced a marked decline in recidivismMiami experienced a 33% drop in recidivism and Baltimore decreased its expected rearrests by 50%); see also CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT INTHE DisTucr OF COLUMBIA: INTERMEDIATE
SANCrIONS, PRISONS AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 161, at 5 (reporting that a pilot drug
court program, which intimately intervened in the lives and rehabilitation of convicted
drug-dependent persons, is highly cost-effective [including in terms of recidivism] when
compared to traditional methods of incarceration); id. at 7-8 (noting the success of the
drug court program, as evidenced by hundreds of convicted drug-dependent offenders
who successfully remained in the community under continuing judicial supervision, and
finding that of the offenders who successfully completed another program, more than 70%
of males and 90% of females do not become recidivists).
320 See supra notes 95-152 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
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promising even when his own advisers warned that AB 971 was
flawed. 22 The Governor showed similar rigidity and earned a second
term for his "tough on crime" stance.3 23 Politicians and ultimately the
electorate missed the irony that Polly Klaas' father opposed Three
Strikes. Even his departure from among the ranks of Three Strikes
supporters could not slow its passage.
After the initiative, Three Strikes proponents have argued that
the voters have spoken since the overwhelming vote in favor of the
initiative. But that is not as readily apparent as its advocates assert.3 24
As indicated, the Governor and Three Strikes proponents relied on
the governor's Chief Economist's report that made Three Strikes
sound like a bargain. 32 Promised savings are supposed to dwarf the
substantial costs of prison construction and maintenance. Three
Strikes opponents unsuccessfully challenged the use of those projections as part of the literature that went to the voters.5 26
The passionate rhetoric in support of Three Strikes, inflamed by
the kidnapping and murder of Polly Klaas, muted concerns that many
Three Strikes' defendants would be sentenced to long prison terms
for non-violent offenses, not the kind of offenses involved in the Klaas
case. 32 7 Surveys of voters indicate that Americans want to increase

punishment for violent offenders.5 2 8 The overwhelming majority in
322 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 102-03, 120-31 and accompanying text.
324 In an article confronting California's bursting prison population,Joe Sandoval, sec-

retary of the California Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, stated that "'special interests'
opposed to Three Strikes 'have now found a way to overturn the will of the people' by
'trying to kill the critical prison-construction funding needed to keep repeat offenders and
violent juvenile criminals off the street.'" Andy Furillo, "Three Strikes" Collides With California's Bursting Prisons,SAcRAMENTo BEE, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al. "If you talk to the average
citizen who lives in a crime-ridden community," he continued, "that individual says, 'I will
pay for the prisons.'" Id.
325 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
326 See supra note 144.
327 The emotional and political whirlwind propelled by the Polly Klaas murder engulfed
both politicians and voters. In the face of an election year, political pressure to pass a
stringent anti-crime bill was so high that California politicians apathetically swept AB 971's
flaws under the carpet. Despite the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's analysis of AB
971's many flaws, in addition to its express statements that AB 971 may very well require
imposition of a sentence of 25 years to life for a repeat offender with no prior violent
felonies, AB 971 soared through four committees and two floor votes in 59 days. See generally SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, ComrEE ANALysis OF AB 971 (Feb. 17, 1994). The
proponents of the Three Strikes initiative inundated the electorate with literature assuring
that Three Strikes would keep "rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where
they belong." CAuFORNmA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supranote 1, at 5. Furthermore, in response
to opponents' claim that Three Strikes would fill the prison system with non-violent offenders, supporters of the initiative ardently proclaimed that "3 Strikes targets only career
criminals-those with a history of committing serious/violent crimes." Id. at 37.
328 SeeJoseph W. Queen & William Murphy, Race Doesn't Dictate Politics, NEWSDAY, Apr.
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support of Three Strikes is consistent with that view. Less clear is
whether the electorate would have endorsed Three Strikes had its full
implications been clearly developed during the campaign.
Another reason that the election results are not a resounding endorsement of Three Strikes is that the electorate did not have to vote
on revenue measures to pay for additional prison construction. Public financing through bond issues has lost some of its appeal. For example, in 1990, Californians rejected a proposed bond issue of $450
million for prison construction.3 29 Projections for the costs of Three
Strikes are considerably higher.38 0
As is often the case with anti-crime measures, the invitation to
beat the anti-crime drum is too tempting for politicians because funding the costs associated with the legislation is usually left for the future.3 3 ' Neither AB 971 nor the initiative included a provision to raise
revenue. One could vote for the bill or the initiative without a vote on
how the added costs would be financed. Its proponents were promising that Three Strikes would result in net savings, savings that have
33 2
been misrepresented.
26, 1996, at 29 (reporting that 82% of the overall population favor life imprisonment
sentences imposed under Three Strikes laws for violent criminals convicted of a third violent offense).
329 John Hurst, Full Cells and Empty Pockets, LA. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at Al. See also Matthews, supra note 119, at Al. There has been further evidence that the proposed bond
financing may not work. In the June 1994 primary election, voters rejected a bond measure for earthquake recovery, a proposal to buy parkland, a proposal to improve college
campuses, and one for public school construction. Virginia Ellis, Defeat of Quake Relief
Bonds Adds to Budget Crisis, LA TIMES, June 9, 1994, at Al. Bruce Cain, Professor at UC
Berkeley stated, "The election ... shows that bond measures, which were the panacea of
the '80s for public finance, are not going to be a panacea in the 1990s." Susan Yoachum &
John Wildermuth, Californians Voted Against Spending, Crime, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 1994, at
Al.
330 The California Department of Corrections initially projected that the legislation
would add $5.7 billion per year in operating costs by fiscal year 2027-28 and would require
20 new prisons in addition to the 12 prisons already on the drawing board for fiscal year
2003-04 and the 16 new prisons constructed during the past 10 years. Welch, supra note
21. The total cost of construction would be $21.3 billion. Id.
331 Noting that most states corrections budgets will not feel the immense impact of
Three Strikes until several years from now, Law Professor Ronald F. Wright observed that
"the remoteness in time of the costs of Three Strikes laws gives legislators a powerful reaThe long time frame makes the cost seem politically
son to discount those costs ....
irrelevant and easy to ignore." Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislationand a SinkingFund
Proposa FED. SENTENCING REP., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 80.
332 For example, in order to illustrate how taxpayer dollars would be saved, the California Ballot Pamphlet reported that "3 Strikes Saves $23 Billion over five years." CALFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELEcrnoNs, Nov. 8, 1994, at 37. Relying on Romero's report,
the committee further explained that "[e]very repeat felon returned to our streets costs
nearly $200,000 annually in direct losses to victims and the enormous expense of running
the same criminals through police stations, courts, and prisons time and again." Id.
Opponents of the measure, however, fervently discredited the savings promised by the
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Decisions about funding Three Strikes are still several years away.
Many offenders currently sentenced under Three Strikes would have
received some prison time for the underlying offense, enhanced even
under pre-Three Strikes law.3 33 Creating space for new offenders,
without normal -timely release of those who are now sentenced under
Three Strikes, is a problem for future legislators.
Three Strikes' critics have been strident in underscoring the
enormous costs to give full effect to its provisions. 33 4 But its opponents understate the significance of Three Strikes. Three Strikes was
a reaction to a real social problem.
The shift in sentencing philosophy over the past twenty-five years
has created anomalies in the current sentencing scheme in California.
When the legislature abandoned indeterminate sentences, it put in
place fixed terms of imprisonment 3 3 5 The legislature appears to have
been influenced by prominent commentators advocating both fixed
and fairly short terms of imprisonment 3 3 6 For example, in many jurisdictions, robbery is punishable by a far longer term of imprisonment than California's relatively light sentence of a maximum of nine
years for first degree robbery.3 37 When combined with earned good
Romero study. See, e.g., Dan Morian, Widson Adviser says '3 Strikes' Wzll Save Money, LA
TiMEs, April 7, 1994, at A3.
333 See RuMINATIONS ON "THREE STRIKEs," supranote 217, at 3 (explaining that any reduction in the crime rate of Kern County may not be attributed to Three Strikes' incapacitation of offenders because every "third strike" defendant presently incarcerated would have
been incarcerated under prior law at this point in time anyway).
334 The estimated increase in prison operating costs per year when the statute has maximum effect will be $5.7 billion and the total prison construction costs will be $21.3 billion.
Welch, supra note 21, at 9. In earlyJune of 1996, the RAND Corporation released a study
projecting that the cost to California of expanding the prison system will not only subvert
the university system by 2002, but it will also put the state's entire economy in jeopardy by
2005. Lisa Lynch, "Three Strikes" and Chain Gangs Struck Down in California,INTER PREss
SERVICE, June 26, 1996. John Vasconcellos, Chair of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee and ardent opponent of Three Strikes, wrote the following.
It is essential that we acknowledge and respect the legitimate concern people have for
their safety. But real respect means addressing their fears constructively, not mortgaging the state's future under the pretense that criminals with little to lose will somehow
be scared straight by the prospect of longer prison terms.
Vasconcellos, supra note 242, at 32.
335 Zimring, supranote 170, at 101-12 (discussing the rapid shift during the 1970s from
indeterminate to determinate sentencing).
336 VON HMsRS, supra note 155, at 132-40 (arguing that the use of incarceration should be
restricted to serious offenses and length of sentencing should be kept relatively short-for
example, a sentencing scheme with a high penalty of five years for felonies [excluding
murder] and sparing use of sentences for more than three years).
337 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West Supp. 1996); See also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-40
(1992) (creating a maximum punishment 20 years imprisonment for robbery); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.245 (West 1987) (designating 20 years imprisonment as the maximum
punishment for robbery); NEB.REV.STAT. § 28-324 (1995) (setting the maximum punishment for conviction of robbery at 50 years imprisonment); TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03 (West
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time credits up to 50% of the term of imprisonment, 38 sentences for
serious crimes like robbery and kidnapping may be too short to incapacitate dangerous offenders during their most active years. Three
Strikes is grounded, in part, on the view that sentences are too
short

33 9

Insofar as Three Strikes is a reaction to sentences that are too
short, it is a blunt instrument, taking a wide variety of offenders and
providing extremely long sentences far in excess of the punishment
usually reserved for the substantive offense.3 40 As Marc Klaas has argued, Three Strikes may provide too little for some offenders and too
much for others.3 4 1 A simple comparison makes the point: a defendant who has committed two residential burglaries and is currently
charged with possession of narcotics will be imprisoned for a minimum term of twenty years3 42 while an offender who commits first de-

gree robbery will face a maximum term of nine years. 3 43 That is a
poor use of resources, especially if we are confident that the first of1994) (mandating a maximum term of 99 years imprisonment for any person convicted of
aggravated robbery).
338 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933 (West Supp. 1996) (noting that offenders participating
in a worktime credit qualifying program shall be granted a six-month credit reduction
from his or her term of confinement for every six months of full time performance
completed).
339 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1996) (declaring that the "intent of the
Legislature (is] ... to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those
who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony
offenses").
340 For example, the maximum penalty for a conviction of robbery is nine years. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West Supp. 1996). Under Three Strikes, however, if a robbery
conviction serves as a third strike, the minimum sentence imposed would be 27 years. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (i) (requiring the sentence for a third strike to be three
times the term proscribed for the substantive offense in cases where the punishment would
be greater than 25 years); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (c) (2) (A) (i) (West Supp.
1996). The burgeoning effect of Three Strikes is even more glaring when the third strike is
a conviction of burglary, which normally carries a maximum sentence of six years. See Cu
PENAL CODE § 461 (West 1988). Three Strikes boosts the punishment from six years to 25
years in one fell swoop. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1996); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 1996).
341 Marc Klaas signed a ballot pamphlet opposing the Three Strikes proposal, calling it
"too hard on soft crime and too soft on hard crime." See Daniel M. Weintraub, LoneJustice
LA. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at El (reflecting on Marc Klaas' initial involvement with the
Three Strikes campaign and noting that Marc Klaas' subsequent resolute opposition to the
initiative was nearly lost in the chaos of the crusade). "We really need to focus on the evil,"
stated Klaas, "on those people who are now committing crimes against people." Id.
342 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (5) (West Supp. 1996) (permitting the accrual of good
time credits for a maximum of one-fifth the total term of the imposed sentence-making
the minimum 25 year sentence for a third strike 20 years); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12 (a)(5) (West Supp. 1996); People v. Superior Ct., 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (dealing with a 32 year old defendant with two prior residential burglary convictions and one
current conviction for possession of narcotics).
343 CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 1988).
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fender is nearing the end of his criminal career and the second offender is at the beginning of his career.
This section discusses whether California can avoid the excesses
of Three Strikes. Framed differently, policy makers must consider
whether and how a more rational sentencing scheme might emerge.
The obvious answer is for the legislature to do its job.
Proponents of term limits promised that legislators will exercise
greater independence than their predecessors. 44 A number of constituencies favor a legislative solution to Three Strikes' excesses. Despite that, legislative reform is problematic. The jury is still out on
whether term limits result in greater independence. A number of
prominent proponents of Three Strikes, for example, were at the end
of their legislative careers. AB 971's chief proponent, Bill Jones, is
symptomatic: he was about to run successfully for Secretary of State.3 4
Term limits may exacerbate the problem with legislation like Three
Strikes: the legislators who vote for it may not be the ones who will
have to face the voters when funding its provisions become
controversial. 34
The most obvious constituencies that care about Three Strikes'
excesses are minority communities, where its impact has been disproportionate3 47 If the result of Three Strikes were merely to lengthen
344 In an interview regarding the effects of implementing term limits, Assemblyman
Richard L. Mounjoy, a proponent of the measure, contended that "term limits would give
the people of California more control over the Legislature, and the Legislature would be
less prone to special interest, because legislators would know they are going to be there for
six years and they're out." Xandra Kayden, Term Limits: What Would Be Changed?, LA.
TimES, Oct. 21, 1990, at MI.
345 See Wilkie, supranote 99, at A3 (reporting that most of the legislators who proposed
Three Strikes legislation had an added incentive because of the upcoming election-Bill
Jones, Jim Costa, and Tom Umberg were running for office in 1994).
346 See Wright, supra note 331 (indicating that most states' corrections budgets will not
feel the immense impact of Three Strikes until several years from now).
347 A recent study conducted by the California Department of Corrections reveals that
African-Americans-who represent only 7% of California's population-comprise an
alarming 43% of third strike defendants sentenced to state prison. DAvis ET AL., supranote
20, at 2. On the other hand, whites-who make up 53% of the state's population-constitute only 24.6% of third strike offenders. Id.
Vincent Schiraldi, executive director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
and staunch opponent of Three Strikes stated that "[i]f one were writing a law to deliberately target blacks, one could scarcely have done it more effectively than Three Strikes."
Furillo, supra note 195. "If the average demographic on Three Strikes prisoners was a
white, middle-class kid from the suburbs," said Schiraldi, "there's no way we'd pass 'Three
Strikes' . . We would scratch our heads and wonder what we could do to stop kids from
selling cocaine and [breaking into] cars." Andy Furillo, The Race Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 31, 1996, at A19.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, Attorney Dan Lungren views disproportionate sentences between whites and African-Americans in a different light. Id. "Ifminorities are disproportionately victimized by crime," he stated, "especially in street and violent
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the sentence of violent offenders, one doubts whether the concerns of
minority communities would resonate.3 48 We might argue whether a
sentence ought to be five, ten or twenty years, but some significant
term of imprisonment would be justified in light of culpable behavior
and future danger.
The effect of Three Strikes on the African-American community,
for example, has been devastating because of the inclusion of any felony as a possible third strike.3 49 Drug enforcement underscores the
point. Drug usage is not significantly greater in the black community
than in the white community, but drug enforcement is.35 0 It is not
surprising that African-Americans have been incarcerated under
Three Strikes at 13.3 times the rate as whites.3 5 1
crime, then the drop in violent crime, which is contributed to by 'Three Strikes andYou're
Out,' will benefit those communities more than anybody else." Id.
348 See Furillo, supra note 196 (responding to the contention of prosecutorial racism,

one African-American deputy district attorney stated: "I don't have time to sit around and
say, 'I'll let this white robber go; I'll go after the black robber.' We just go after the
robbers.").
349 One opponent of Three Strikes suggests that the disparity between white and African-American third strike defendants may be attributed to the fact that most poor, minority young men, unable to afford private attorneys, were induced to accept plea bargains
even in circumstances where they may have been innocent of the charges. Furillo, supra
note 196. The history of plea bargaining has created a pool of African-Americans with first
and second strikes-making African-Americans extremely susceptible to triggering the
provisions of Three Strikes. Id.
The San Jose Mercu7y News conducted a comprehensive study on the disparity of plea
bargaining between whites and minorities. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at
111-13 (citing Christopher Schmitt, Plea BargainingFavors Whites as Blacks, Hispanics Pay
PriCe SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWs, Dec. 8, 1991, at Al). The study analyzed approximately
700,000 California criminal cases from 1981 to 1990 and found that whites were more
successful at essentially every stage of pre-trial plea bargaining. Id. at 112. For example,
the study demonstrated that "[o]f 71,668 adults who had no prior record and were
charged with a felony, one third of whites had their charges reduced to a misdemeanor or
less [while] [o)nly a quarter of African-Americans and Hispanics received such reductions." Id.
350 Drug dealing and distribution is significantly different in white and African-American neighborhoods. SeeFurillo, supranote 196. In mostAfrican-American neighborhoods,
the bulk of drug trafficking is conducted on the streets, whereas white communities tend
to use and distribute drugs behind closed doors-hence, the disparity between those who
get caught committing crime. Id.
The National Institute for Drug Abuse found that African-Americans and whites use
cocaine and marijuana at virtually the same rate. THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at
115. Despite this fact, however, African-Americans are arrested five times more often than
their white counterparts. Id. A disturbing example of this disparity was found in the city of
Baltimore. Id. at 117. In 1991, 11,107 of the 12,956 arrests for "drug abuse violations,"
were of African-Americans. Id. Moreover, in that same year, 13 white juveniles were arrested for drug sales, compared to 1,304 African-Americanjuveniles. Id. at 206. In California, the total arrests for narcotics in 1994 was 67,822-of these arrests, whites comprised
12,437, African-Americans 26,274, and Hispanics 27,779. CAL. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note
293, at 61.
351 See DAvis ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.
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The racial disparity creates political incentive for reform. Democrats must take seriously the concerns of loyal democratic constituencies, including African-American voters.35 2 The disparate impact on
minorities, especially in cases in which the final strike is not a violent

offense, becomes apowerful ethical and political argument in favor of

3 53
modification of the law.

The primary difficulty with political reform is that alternative legislation will require a supermajority.354 That was the cost of Reynolds'
decision to renege on a promise not to pursue his initiative if the legislature adopted AB 971. Proponents simply distrusted the legislature
and feared that, absent the requirement of a supermajority, the law
would be gutted over time.355
Events in the legislature suggest that, for better or worse, Three
Strikes proponents were correct that the legislature would frustrate its

drafters. Despite significant increases in prison space during the
1980s and 1990s, California will be out of prison space in 1998. Failing to fund further prison construction or to place prison bond legis-

lation on the ballot will result in prison overcrowding. 356 The threat
of overcrowding and the prospect of 3a57court-ordered release of inmates may force political compromise

Legislative reform may require a significant swing in public sentiment about crime, which is not unheard of.35 8 On the assumption
352 SeeDan Waiters, Three Strikes Alication Varies, SAN DIEGo UNIoN-TRI.,June 20, 1995,
at B6 (reporting that more than 80% of the voters who approved the Three Strikes law
were white, and demonstrating the disparate impact of such voter demographics-AfricanAmericans and Latinos made up 70% of those sentenced in the first year of Three Strikes).
353 See generally DAVIs ET AL., supranote 20 (exposing the biases against African-Americans in the criminal justice system and advocating for immediate change in this sphere of
California's penal law).
354 Three Strikes may not be amended by the legislature except by a two-thirds vote of
both houses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West Supp. 1996).
355 See supra notes 97-101, 125-27 and accompanying text.
356 Furillo, supra note 324 (noting that the State Department of Corrections is currently
operating at 181% of capacity and warning that the prison population is projected to grow
by more than 280,000 by 2001-without new prison construction, "something has to give").
357 Id.
358 Id. Over time, American attitudes about punishment have changed dramatically.
For example, support for the death penalty has grown from under 50% in the early 1960s
to 80% in 1994. Cheryl Russel, True Cime, Am. DEMOoGAPHIcS, Aug. 1994, at 22. Ironically,
use of the initiative process, resulting in a requirement that amendments to Three Strikes
must be by a two-thirds majority of the legislature, has created an opportunity for rational
debate about the law. Efforts to respond to the California Supreme Court's decision in
Romero must be approved by a two-thirds majority. That gives moderates an opportunity to
force some reform of the law's more extreme aspects. See Bi!! to Strengthen "3Strikes" Law
CLears Committee, S.F. EXAMINERJune 27, 1996, at A4 (quoting Senate leader Bill Lockyer as
We need more thoughtful analysis, not a rushed,
saying, "This bill is unnecessary ....
panicky reaction designed to grab tough-guy headlines.").
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that political reform is possible, I offer a few suggestions about the
shape of that reform: one, Three Strikes is an overreaction to a real
problem. It offers too much time too late. Increasing time served by
violent first time offenders is a promising alternative to Three
3 59
Strikes.
Two, we should engage in further research into identification of
the most serious multiple offenders. Habitual offender statutes are
here to stay. Habitual offender statutes are so tempting because a
small number of offenders commit a grossly disproportionate number
of crimes.3 60 Identifying and incapacitating those offenders should result in meaningful reductions in crime.3 6 1 As currently written, habitual offender statutes like Three Strikes make little effort to select
those likely to commit serious offenses in the future 3 62 As argued
above, the long prison term may also come too late in a criminal's
63
career.3
A provocative book published over a decade ago argued persuasively that the criminal justice system underpunishes serious multiple
offenders. Dangerous Offenders assumed that high rate offenders "appear in the system repeatedly" and are given "special attention" by the
criminal justice system.3 64 Despite those assumptions, the authors argued that the system deals with them less harshly than they deserve.
That results from two important facts: first, the crimes committed by
serious offenders, like robbery, "are among the most difficult to
359 See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
360 See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972) (a widely
cited study on offender crime rates, which reviewed records of 9,945 boys from their 10th
through 18th birthdays). While approximately one-third had a record of involvement with
police, 627 boys had five or more arrests during those years. Id. at 88. That small group
committed over one-half of the recorded delinquencies and two thirds of the violent of-

fenses. Id.
361 See MARK H. MOORE, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF JUSTICE 85-87

(1984) (conceding that incapacitation of dangerous recidivist offenders will result in a
reduction of crime, as it may be the only method to deter resolute offenders); see also id. at
38-39 (intimating that a portion of high-rate offenders are so active-committing more
than 50 robberies per year-that incapacitation would be wholly justified based on deterrence, rehabilitative or retributivist theories of punishment). The Wolfgang study concluded that incarcerating high rate offenders could have a significant impact on the crime
rate. See supra note 360. By contrast, Three Strikes incapacitates an offender for a long
period based only on commission of three felonies, one of which may be trivial. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (c)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1996).
362 The most obvious example is § 667(e) (2) (A) (any felony triggers the enhanced penalties). CAL. PENAL CODE §667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
363 See supra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
364 MOORE, supra note 361, at 47.
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solve."3 6 5 Second, when an offender is arrested and prosecuted, the
system has a bias against investigating other potential charges against
the suspect. That is so because, even if the police have probable cause
to believe that the suspect may have committed numerous other robberies, the police have little additional incentive to investigate those
crimes if they are assured a conviction based on the current charge. 3 66
Similar pressures work to limit the prosecutor's incentive to seek
multiple convictions. Even if the prosecutor brings multiple charges,
judges are likely to impose concurrent terms of imprisonment. "Thus
the whole system might ignore the robber's other offenses on the
grounds that it would make little difference to the ultimate outcome
of the case."36 7 The authors found support for their hypothesis in

criminal justice records that led them, to conclude that the system
"tends to dampen rather than exaggerate differences among offenders." 36 8 Habitual offender statutes also make little attempt to distinguish among offenders as long as they are convicted of a certain
number of identified offenses.
Dangerous Offenders presented a set of criteria to improve the system's ability to identify the most serious offenders. 36 9 Narrowing the
scope of laws like Three Strikes would improve the use of resources
likely to be available for incarceration in the state's prisons.
Three, California should put in place a program of selective release of older low risk inmates. 370 Separate from whether other purposes of punishment may be served by imprisonment of older
offenders, warehousing elderly prisoners is not necessary for social
37 1
protection.
365 Id. at 49.
366 See id. at 49-50 (explaining that even if evidence of other crimes committed by the
offender were available, a prosecutor may choose not to introduce it because it may serve
to confuse and weaken a solid case certain to result in conviction).
367 Id. at 50.
368 Id. at 50-51 (stating that a first time offender who commits one or two robberies per
year will be sentenced the same as a robber who commits robberies throughout the year).
369 Id. at 182-94. The premise of the authors' theory is to reserve limited incarceration
capacity for offenders who most deserve punishment and whose incarceration would benefit society by reducing future criminality. Id. The authors propose that the key is to
sharpen the focus on dangerous offenders at each stage of the criminal system and to use a
very narrow definition of "dangerous offenders." Id. at 182-83.
370 Cf Pops, supra note 245. For the selection process, see &d at 23-30. See also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 643B(f) (Supp. 1995) (providing that a defendant sentenced under the
state's Four Strikes law [see Appendix A] may petition for parole after the age of 65 if she
or he has served at least 15 years of the imposed sentence); VA. CODE AN. § 19.2-297.1 (c)
(Michie 1995) (setting forth that a defendant sentenced under the state's Three Strikes
may petition for parole if she has either reached the age of 65 and has served at least five
years of the imposed sentence, or has reached the age of 60 and has served at least 10 years
of the imposed sentence).
371 See supra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
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Four, California should explore methods of limiting freedom less
expensive than incarceration. Electronic monitoring and in-home detention, close parole and probation supervision and halfway houses
are all possible alternatives to incarceration and have proven effective
37 2
for properly selected detainees.
Five, California should reexamine rehabilitation programs and
implement those that have worked. A variety of programs have
proven effective with some offenders and at less cost than
3 73
incarceration.
Related to rehabilitation is our approach towards drug violators.
Our attitude about drug offenses should be reexamined. The policy
of the 1980s, a war aimed at the source of drugs, proved ineffective
and expensive. 3 74 The terms of imprisonment for drug offenses have
also increased, 37 5 creating anomalies where some drug offenders are
incarcerated for longer terms than far more dangerous offenders.
Even if we continue to incarcerate drug dealers, we should reexamine
whether lesser sentences are appropriate when we compare sentences
available for other, more culpable conduct 3 76 At a minimum, re372 See Pops, supra note 245, at 16-18; see generally Gennaro F. Vito, Felony Probationand
Recidivism: Replication and Response, 50 FED. PROBATION 17 (1986).
373 See supra notes 302-19 and accompanying text.
374 In The Real War on Crime, Dozinger exposes the fact that the war on drugs was ineffective and failed to meet its objectives: e.g., the reduction of supply of illicit drugs should
have increased prices-instead, the street value of cocaine dropped; harsher sentences and
an increase in arrests should have had a deterrent effect-instead, drug dealing in most
communities remained constant; drug use was supposed to drop-instead, like crime rates
today, drug use had already been decreasing well before the declaration of the war on
drugs. THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 116. See alsoJim Haner, The War on Drugs:
Unwinnable, Profligate,Conpting "Smoke and Mirrors": The Latest Book Argues PoliticiansWage
the Battle to Serve Their Own Interests, BALTIMORE SUN, May 19, 1996, at 1E (revealing that
since 1981, the U.S. has spent $65 billion on the War on Drugs movement-most of it on
anti-drug law enforcement-"without making so much as a dent in the supply, price or
general availability of illegal drugs"); Pat Hynds, Latin America: Growing Consensus That U.S.
Anti-DrugPolicy is Not Working NOTISuR-LATiN Am. POL. Are., Feb. 9, 1996 (summaries &
analysis) (discussing the failed U.S. war on drugs and noting that drug supplier countries
"insist that as long as the US, the world's largest drug consumer, continues to demand
ever-increasing amounts of illegal drugs, the suppliers will find a way to meet the
demand.").
375 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 2, at 164 (observing that between the years 1985
and 1990, the sanctions for drug offenders expanded more rapidly than any other major
offender group); see also THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 118-19 (remarking that
in 1986, the federal penalties for use of "crack" cocaine became up to 100 times harsher,
making a conviction for possession a felony carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years).
376 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11379.6 (West 1991) (mandating that any
person who offers to manufacture, compound, convert or produce specified controlled
substances shall be sentenced for a minimum of three years); cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 215
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that the minimum sentence for carjacking is three years);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 216 (West Supp. 1996) (setting the minimum sentence for conviction

1997]

THREE STRIKES: RETURN TO RATIONALITY?

sources for drug treatment should be increased as a less expensive
alternative to incarceration.3 7 7 Incarcerating one drug dealers does
little to reduce drug use and availability; treating one user cuts de3 78
mand at less cost
Six, the legislature should follow the lead of other states and establish a sentencing commission.3 79 Passage of Three Strikes demonstrated that politicians cannot resist the appeal of campaigning
against crime and that the general electorate is not likely to follow
debate about rational crime policy.3 8 0 Three Strikes' proponents
staked out two positions: either one was for Three Strikes or for crime.
Reliance on a sentencing commission to propose sentencing reform
increases the possibility for rational discourse out of the glare of the
media. A commission may report its recommendations when politicians are not facing a general election, increasing their willingness to
engage in rational debate. A bipartisan commission may have suffiof robbery in the second degree at two years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1996)
(determining that the offense of rape carries a minimum sentence of three years); CA.
PENAL CODE § 461 (West Supp. 1996) (punishing a defendant convicted of burglary in the
second degree by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding more than one
year).
377 A recent editorial addressing California's love affair with incarceration reported that
the War on Drugs was the catalyst that reversed the 60% to 40% ratio of violent to nonviolent incarcerated offenders to 40% to 60%. Caifornia'sDisastrousIncarcerationFrenzy, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 15, 1996, at A24. The editorial noted that "[i]fjust half of those nonviolent
offenders-some 5,000 of whom are serving sentences for petty theft-were diverted to
community-based, alternative forms of punishment and treatment, state taxpayers would
save $848 million in prison costs." Id. See supra note 318.
378 See Perkins, supra note 286. An example of such a policy at work can be seen in
Miami and Baltimore. See Reno, supra note 236, at 83. These states implemented a program which requires nonviolent offenders to undergo mandatory, periodic drug testing in
addition to substance abuse treatment-penalties are also mandatory if satisfactory progress is not displayed. Id. The success of such a program is demonstrated by a drop in
recidivism-Miami had a 33% drop in recidivists and Baltimore decreased its expected rearrests by 50%. Id.
379 See MICHt. TONRY, Sentencing Guidelinesand TheirEffects in THE SENrENCING COMMISSION AND rrs GUIDELINES 16-43 (Andrew von Hirsch et al., eds. 1987) (reviewing the Sentencing Commissions of Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina and Washington, and concluding that the most successful Sentencing Commissions are those that develop presumptive sentencing guidelines and policies for appellate
sentence review); id. at 19 (expounding on Minnesota's initial success with its Sentencing
Commission and describing its founding policy decisions: (1) the commission was "prescriptive" in that it established its own sentencing priorities rather than imitating existing
sentencing patterns; (2) it de-emphasized imprisonment for non-violent offenders and increased sentencing schemes for violent offenders; (3) the commission narrowed sentencing ranges to strike back at sentencing disparities; (4) the commission elected to premise
its policies on a theory of "just deserts"; (5) it determined that sentencing policies must
reflect available resources; and (6) it prohibited consideration of personal factors [e.g.,
education, employment, marital status] to mitigate sentences as a means to further discourage sentencing disparity).
380 See supra notes 95-152 and accompanying text.
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cient credibility to allow rational discourse about difficult public policy issues.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article does not attempt to disavow the legitimate concern
that gave impetus to Three Strikes. Violent crime is a legitimate public and political concern. Instead, it has focused on the absence of
dispassionate debate about those hard issues that have resulted in
poor allocation of limited public resources.
This article does not advocate Three Strikes' outright repeal. It
does argue for reexamination of the premises that resulted in an excessive habitual offender statute. It urges reexamination of alternatives to that excessive policy, but does so on the assumption that a
state should retain a multiple offender statute aimed at our most culpable and violent offenders.
Recent commentators have begun to warn about the new PrisonIndustrial Complex.3 8 ' Three Strikes demonstrates some of its sway
on local government.8 8 2 But ours is an era in which the electorate has
demanded more for less from government. This article offers several
specific proposals resulting in better use of our resources devoted to
public safety and to punishment of criminal offenders.

381 See generally THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2, at 85-88 (noting that in order to

guarantee a prosperous return on investments, companies geared toward servicing the correctional system need sufficient amounts of raw material, and warning that "the raw material is prisoners, and industry will do what is necessary to guarantee a steady supply").
382 For example, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA)-one
of the most powerful lobby groups in Sacramento and an ardent proponent of "get tough
on crime" legislation-utilizes its powerful financial backing and its association with appealing victims' rights groups as a sledgehammer against politicians who challenge its
agenda. See generally Bill Ainsworth, A Marriageof Convenience; Powerful Vitims'Right Groups

Have Found a FinancialBacker That Also Wants More People Behind Bars-PrisonGuards,THE
RECORDER, Nov. 30, 1994, at 1. The CCPOA flexed its muscle against outspoken opponents
of Three Strikes, as the bill promised to yield more jobs for prison guards than any of the
alternative proposals. Id. When Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti supported
Rainey's Three Strikes bill rather than AB 971, he received a warning from a CCPOA lobbyist. Id. The lobbyist reminded Garcetti that the CCPOA endorsement was crucial to his reelection, and that the CCPOA would oppose him unless he supported Three Strikes. Id.
When Garcetti refused to relent in his support of the Rainey bill, the lobbyist suggested
that Garcetti would suffer. Id. It is not surprising that the CCPOA wanted to silence a high
profile district attorney like Garcetti, as the CCPOA stood to gain 49,218 additional jobs
from Three Strikes over the next 35 years, compared to only 14,391 in the same period
under Rainey's bill. Id.
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A

ABSTRACT OF HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTES ACROSS
THE STATES

4 strikes

3 strikes

2 strikes

2 or 3 strikes

Florida
Maryland

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
New Jersey
New Mexico
N. Carolina
Pennsylvania
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin.

Georgia

Arkansas
California
Montana
S. Carolina
Tennessee

STATE: ARKANSAS
STATUTE:
EFFraCnv:
TRIGGERING EvENTs:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PRovIsIoNs:

Aam CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (Michie Supp. 1995)
Habitual offenders - Sentencingfor felony
June 30, 1995
Two Strikes.
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a serious
felony involving violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior serious
felony involving violence conviction.
Three Striker
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a felony
involving violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
involving violence convictions.
No judicial discretion in sentencing. The State is not
mandated to prosecute under this statute.
Two Strike:
Between 40 - 80 years, or life. Not eligible for parole
or community punishment.
Three Strikes.
If the third conviction is a:
(1) class Y felony: term of not less than life in prison;
(2) class A felony: term of 40 years to life; (3) class B
felony term of 30 - 60 years; (4) class C felony: term
of 25 - 40 years; (5) class D felony: term of 20 - 40
years; (6) unclassified felony punishable by less than
life imprisonment: term of not more than three times
the maximum sentence for the unclassified offense.
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DEFINED:
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Two Strikes.
Murder 1, Murder 2, Kidnapping, Aggravated
robbery, Rape, Terrorist act, Causing a catastrophe.
Three Strikes.
Murder 1, Murder 2, Kidnaping, Aggravated
robbery, Rape, Battery 1, Terroristic act, Unlawful
discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. Felony
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit: Capital
murder, Murder 1, Murder 2, Kidnapping,
Aggravated robbery, Rape, Battery 11, Sexual Abuse
1, Violation of a minor 1.
If the defendant can be sentenced under Two Strikes
and/or Three Strikes, the defendant shall be
sentenced under the Three Strikes provision.
The jury determines guilt first, then determines
whether prior convictions can serve as a strike.
The statute includes several sentence enhancement
provisions for prior felony convictions that fall outside
the Strike provisions.

STATE: COLORADO
STATUTE:
EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIoLENT CmMES

COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (Supp. 1995) Punishment
for habitual criminals
May 31, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Class 1
felony, Class 2 felony or a Class 3 felony that is a Crime of
Violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions that were either a Class 1 felony, Class 2
felony or Class 3 Crime of Violence felony.
Five Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Crime
of Violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Four prior
convictions of any felony.
No judicial discretion. However, sentencing under
the Three Strikes provision is not mandatory for a
Class I felony conviction. The state is not mandated to
prosecute under this statute.
Three Strikes & Five Strikes:
Life imprisonment.
PAROLE EXCEPTION: Those sentenced to life
imprisonment are nonetheless eligible for parole after
40 years.
Crimes of Violence:

DEFINED:

Use or threat of use of a deadly weapon or causing
serious bodily injury to another in the commission or
attempted commission of:
Any crime against an at-risk adult or at-risk juvenile,
Murder, Assault 1' or 2, Kidnapping, Sexual assault,
Aggravated robbery, Arson 1, Escape, Criminal
extortion, Unlawful sexual offense.
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EXCEPTION: First or second degree burglary shall
not count as a prior or current strike for purposes of
the Three Strikes provision.
Governor may issue a pardon or clemency order.

STATE: CONNECTICUT
STATUTE:
EFFEatiVE:
TRiGGERiNG EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:
SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRIMES
DONED:

NOTES:

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West 1994)
Persistent Offenders
1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: One Current
Conviction as defined below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two Prior
Convictions as defined below.
This sentencing provision is mandatory only if the
court is of the opinion that the defendant's history
and character and the nature and circumstances of
the criminal conduct indicate that extended
incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve
the public interest.
Maximum life sentence.
Current Conviction:
Manslaughter, Arson, Kidnapping, Sexual assault 1" or
3, Aggravated sexual assault 1, Sexual assault 3* with
firearm, Robbery 1° or 2 °, or Assault 1.
Prior Convictions:
Any listed under current convictions, Murder or the
attempt to commit any of said crimes of murder, or a
previous sentence to serve more than one year of
imprisonment. Prior to 10/1/75: Sexual assault 3.
Prior to 10/1/71: Assault with intent to kill, Injury to
or impairing morals of a child.
A defendant enjoys an affirmative defense under this
section if a necessary prior conviction includes a
conviction that was pardoned on the ground of
innocence.

STATE: DELAWARE
STATUTE:
EFFECrIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

Dm.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1995)
Habitual crimina4"life sentence.
1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
defined below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
convictions as defined below.

No judicial discretion.
The prosecutor is required to have the defendant
declared an habitual offender if at any time after
conviction and before sentence it appears by reason
of present and prior convictions that the defendant
should be subjected to the sentencing provisions of
this statute. The judge must sentence accordingly.
See DEt.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4215(b) (1995).
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Life sentence without parole.
No Good Time Credits provision.
Felonies are the samefor current conviction and prior
convictions:
Arson 1, Burglary 1 or 2, Murder 1, Murder 2,
Manslaughter, Kidnaping 1 or 2, Assault 1, Rape I*
or 2, Sodomy 1, Robbery 1, Unlawful sexual
penetration 1" or 2, Sexual intercourse 3, Unlawful
sexual intercourse I* or 2, Intent to manufacture,
deliver or possess a narcotic drug or nonnarcotic
controlled substance, Unlawful delivery or attempt to
deliver noncontrolled substance, Trafficking in
marijuana, cocaine, illegal drugs or
methamphetamines.
WASHOUT PROVISION: The Delaware Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute as requiring three
separate felony convictions with some chancefor
rehabilitationafter each sentencing; this means that
only some period of time must have elapsed between
sentencing on earlier conviction and commission of
later felony. Johnson v. Butler, No. 423, 1995 Del.
LEXIS 47, at *1 (Del. Jan. 30, 1995).

STATE: FLORIDA
STATUTE:

EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIOLENT CmMES
DEFINED:

§ 775.084 (West Supp. 1996)
Violent career criminals; habitualfelony offenders and
habitual violent felony offenders.
October 1, 1995
Four Str9i.s:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
defined below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Three prior
felony convictions as defined below.
The court is not mandated to impose a sentence if it
finds that such sentence is not necessary for the
protection of the public.
If the current conviction is a life felony or Felony 1,
the punishment in life imprisonment. If the current
conviction is Felony 2', the punishment is a term of
years not exceeding 40, with a mandatory minimum
term of 30 years imprisonment.
If Felony 3', the punishment is a term of years not
exceeding 15 years, with a mandatory minimum term
of 10 years imprisonment.
A defendant may have his sentence reduced by a
maximum of 15% through "gain-time."
Current and PriorFelony Offenses For Three Strikes
Provision:
Any forcible felony, Aggravated stalking, Aggravated
child abuse, Lewd or lascivious or indecent conduct,
Escape, or Felony violation involving the use or
possession of a firearm.
FLA. STAT. ANN.
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WASHOUT PROVISION: The current conviction
must have been within five years after the conviction
of the last prior enumerated felony conviction OR
within five years after the defendant's release from
confinement imposed as a result of a prior conviction
for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.

STATE: GEORGIA
STATUTE:
EFFECTVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIoLENT CrMES
DEFINED:

NOTES:

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 17-10-7 (Supp. 1995)

Punishment of repeat offenders.
(also known as the Sentence Reform Act of 1994)
January 1, 1995
Two Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a serious
violent feony.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior
conviction of a serious violentfelony.
No judicial discretion.
Imprisonment for life without parole.
No Good Time credits provision.
Serious Violent Felony.
Murder, Felony murder, Armed robbery, Kidnapping,
Rape, Aggravated child molestation, Aggravated
sodomy, or Aggravated sexual battery.
The statute explicitly notes that future amendments
to the Constitution of Georgia may modify the
current sentencing provisions.

STATE: ILLINOIS

SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRIMES

720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3B-1 (West Supp. 1996)
Habitual criminals- Determination- Application of
article
December 15, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
described below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: 2 prior felony
convictions as described below.
No judicial discretion.
Life imprisonment.
Current and PriorFelony Convictions include the following

DEFINED:

offenses:

STATUTE:
EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

NOTES:

Criminal sexual assault, Aggravated kidnapping,
murder 1, or a Class X felony, which includes:
Aggravated criminal sexual assault, Aggravated
vehicular hijacking, Contraband in penal institutions,
Manufacture or delivery of controlled substances,
Drug induced homicide, Home invasion, Indecent
solicitation of an adult, Possession of metal piercing
bullets, and Solicitation of murder.
WASHOUT PROVISION: The third felony conviction
must have been committed within twenty years of the
date that judgment was entered on the first
conviction. Time spent in custody is not counted.
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STATE: INDIANA
STATUTE:

EFFECTIVE:

TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8.5 (West Supp. 1995)
Life imprisonmentwithout parole upon third felony
conviction.
1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: One Current
Conviction as described below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
convictions as described below.
Judicial Discretion: "The court may sentence a person
found to be subject to life imprisonment without
parole under this section, to life imprisonment
without parole." § 35-50-2-8.5(d).
The State may also prosecute a defendant under this
provision.
Life imprisonment without parole.
Current Conviction and Prior Convictions are the same:
Murder, Battery with a deadly weapon, Sexual battery
with a deadly weapon, Kidnapping, Confinement with
a deadly weapon, Rape, Criminal deviate conduct,
Child molesting, Robbery resulting in serious bodily
injury or with a deadly weapon, Arson for hire or
resulting in serious bodily injury, Burglary resulting in
serious bodily injury or with a deadly weapon,
Resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon,
Escape with a deadly weapon, Rioting with a deadly
weapon, Dealing in cocaine, narcotic drug or dealing
in controlled substance over three grams.

STATE: LOUISIANA
STATUTE:
EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

§ 15:529.1 (West Supp. 1996)
Sentences for second and subsequent offenses
1995
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a felony
OR a Crime of Violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
OR Crime of Violence convictions.
Four Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a felony
OR a Crime of Vwlence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
OR Crime of Violence convictions.
The district court has authority to reduce any part of
a mandatory minimum sentence when such a term
would violate a defendant's constitutional protection
against excessive punishment. State v. Pollard, 644 So.
2d 370, 371 (La. 1994).
The state is not mandated to prosecute under this
statute.
Life imprisonment without parole.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Three Strikes & Four Strikes:
If the third felony (or the fourth felony under the
Four Strikes provision) or either of the two prior
felonies (or the three prior felonies under the Four
Strikes provision) is either (1) a felony defined as a
Crime of Violence, (2) a violation of the Uniform
Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by
imprisonment for more than 5 years, or (3) any other
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 12
years, the defendant is to be imprisoned for life
without possibility or parole.
CRIME OF VIOLENCE:
A crime of violence is defined to include: Solicitation
for murder, Murder 1, Murder 2 °% Manslaughter,
Aggravated battery, Battery 2, Aggravated assault,
Mingling harmful substances, Aggravated rape,
Forcible rape, Simple rape, Sexual battery, Aggravated
sexual battery, Oral sexual battery, Aggravated oral
sexual battery, Intentional exposure to AIDS virus,
Aggravated kidnapping, Kidnapping 2, Simple
kidnapping, Aggravated arson, Aggravated criminal
damage to property, Aggravated burglary, Armed
robbery, Robbery 1, Simple robbery, Purse snatching,
Extortion, Assault by drive-by shooting, Aggravated
crime against nature, Carjacking, Illegal use of
weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, or any
attempt thereof.
WASHOUT PROVISION: If more than ten years have
passed since the expiration of the maximum sentence
or sentences of the previous conviction(s) and the
time of the commission of the last felony conviction,
then the Three and Four Strikes provisions do not
apply.

STATE: MARYLAND
STATUTE:
EFFEcnVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (Supp. 1995)
Mandatory sentencesfor crimes of violence.
October 1, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Crime
of V olenca.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions of Crimes of Violence.
Four Strike.
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Crime
of Vzolence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Three prior
convictions of Crimes of Violence.
No judicial discretion.
The state is not mandated to prosecute under this
provision.
Three Strikes:
Minimum of 25 years imprisonment.
FourStrikes:
Life Imprisonment without parole.
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PAROLE EXCEPTION: Under either strike regime,
the defendant may petition for parole after age 65 if
he has served at least 15 years of the sentence
imposed.
Crimes of Violence
Abduction, Arson I, Kidnapping, Manslaughter
(excluding involuntary manslaughter), Mayhem and
maiming, Murder, Rape, Robbery, Robbery with a
deadly weapon, Carjacking or armed carjacking,
Sexual offense 1" or 2, Use of handgun in
commission of a felony or other crime of violence,
Attempt to commit any of the aforesaid, or Assault
with intent to Murder, Rape, Rob, or Commit a 1" or
2" sexual offense.

STATE: MONTANA
STATUTE:
EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

NOTES:

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219 (1995)
Life sentence without possibility of release.
July 1, 1997
Two Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony Conviction as
described below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior felony
conviction as described below.
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
described below
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
convictions as described below.
No judicial discretion.

Two Strikes & Three Strikes: Life imprisonment without
parole.
Entire sentence shall be served in prison. No Good
Time credits provision.
Two Striker. Current conviction and prior conviction must
be one of the following:
Deliberate homicide, Aggravated kidnapping, Sexual
intercourse without consent, Sexual abuse of children,
Ritual abuse of a minor.
Three Strikes.
Current Conviction must be one of the following:
Mitigated deliberate homicide, Aggravated assault,
Kidnapping, Robbery.
Prior Convictionsmust be either one of those
mentioned under Two Strikes, above, or one of those
mentioned under Three Strikes, immediately above.
STRIKES THAT DO NOT COUNT: Juvenile
convictions; when the defendant's mental capacity was
significantly impaired; when the defendant was acting
under unusual or substantial duress; when the
defendant was an accomplice and his participation
was relatively minor. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222
(1995).
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STATE: NEW JERSEY
STATUTE:
ErFETrv'E:
TIocGERING EvENTs:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOns/VIoLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

NOTES:

STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 1995)
Persistent offenders; sentencing
(also known as the Persstent Offenders Accountability Act)
June 22, 1995
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
described below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
convictions as described below.
No judicial discretion.
Life imprisonment without parole.
PAROLE EXCEPTION: If the defendant is at least 70
years old and has served at least 35 years of his/her
sentence, the defendant will be eligible for parole.
Felony Convictions:
Murder, Aggravated manslaughter, Sexual assault,
Kidnapping 1, Robbery, Carjacking.
WASHOUT PROVISION: To count as a strike, the
current conviction must have been committed within
10 years of the date of defendant's last release from
confinement for the commission of any crime, or
within ten years of the date of the commission of the
most recent of the crimes for which the defendant
has a prior conviction.

N.J.

STATE: NEW MEXICO
STATUTE:

ErracrrvT:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie 1996)
Three violent felony convictions; mandatoy life
imprisonment.
July 1, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Violent felony
conviction.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior violent
felony convictions.
No judicial discretion.
Section 31-18-19 of the New Mexico Code requires
the district attorney to charge a defendant as an
habitual offender if his conviction record qualifies
under the statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-19
(Michie 1996). However, in March v. State the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that, despite the
mandatory tone of section 31-18-19, the prosecutor
has discretion not to seek enhanced sentencing.
March v. State, 782 P.2d 82, 83 (N.M. 1989).
Upon a third strike conviction, the defendant is to
serve the punishment imposed by that conviction, in
addition to life imprisonment without parole.
PAROLE EXCEPTION: Defendant is eligible for a
parole hearing after having served thirty years of the
life sentence. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A)
(Michie 1996).
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Violent Felony.

SERIOus/VxoILNT CRIMES
DEFINED:

Murder I, Murder 2, Shooting at or from a motor
vehicle resulting in great bodily harm, Kidnapping
resulting in great bodily harm inflicted upon the
victim by the captor, Robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon resulting in great bodily harm, and
Criminal sexual penetration.
Two Violent Sexual Offenses Provision: This provision
requires current conviction of a violent sexual offense
plus one prior conviction of a violent sexual offense.
The punishment is life in prison, subject to parole
exception as defined above. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1825 (Michie 1996).
ViWlent Sexual Offense is defined as Criminal sexual
penetration 1* or 2. Id.
STRIKES THAT DO NOT COUNT: Juvenile
convictions.

NOTES:

STATE: NORTH CAROLINA
STATUTE:

EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SFRIOus/VOLENT CRIMEs
DEFINED:

NOTES:

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.7 (Supp. 1995)
Persons defined as violent habitualfelons.
(also known as the Crime Control Act)
May 1, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Violentfelony
conviction.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior violent
felony convictions.
No judicial discretion.
The State is not mandated to charge the defendant
under this statute.
Life imprisonment without parole.
Vwolent Felony:
All Class A - E felonies
The jury shall not be made aware of the habitual
felon status until after the decision of guilt or
innocence regarding the principal violent felony.

STATE: PENNSYLVANIA
STATUTE:
EFFEcrIE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9714 (West Supp. 1996)
Sentences for second and subsequent offenses
December, 1995
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Crime
of Violence.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions for a Crime of Violence.
No judicial discretion.
Twenty-five years to life imprisonment without parole
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SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

Crimes of Vw:
Murder 3, Voluntary manslaughter, Aggravated
assault, Rape, Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
Arson, Kidnapping, Burglary of a structure adapted
for overnight accommodation in which at the time of
the offense any person is present, Robbery, Robbery
of a motor vehicle, Criminal attempt, Criminal
conspiracy or criminal solicitation to commit murder
or any of the above listed offenses.

STATE: SOUTH CAROLINA
STATUTE:

EFFEGTIVE:

TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995)
Life sentencefor person convicted three times for certain
crimes; discretion of solicitorto invoke.
January 1, 1996
Two Striker
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Most
Serious offense.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior Most
Serious offense conviction.
Three Striker
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Serious
offense.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions of either a Most Serious offense or a Serious
offense.
Two Strikes
No judicial discretion. Prosecutor required to charge
defendant as an habitual offender.
Three Strikes:
The decision to invoke sentencing is in the discretion
of the "solicitor" (prosecutor).
Two & Three Strikes
Life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
PAROLE EXCEPTION:
If (1) the Department of Probation determines that
due to the defendant's health or age he is no longer
a threat to society, and (2) the defendant has served
at least 30 years of the sentence imposed, and (3) the
defendant is (a) at least 65 years old, or (b) afflicted
with a terminal illness where life expectancy is one
year or less, or (c) "can produce evidence comprising
the most extraordinary circumstances," the defendant
will be eligible for parole. A person who is at least 70
years old, and who has served at least 20 years of his
sentence, is also eligible for parole, so long has he
satisfies the criteria of (1), above.
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Most Serious Offense:
Murder, Killing by poison or by stabbing or thrusting,
Voluntary Manslaughter, Homicide by child abuse,
Aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse,
Lynching 1, Killing in a duel, Assault and battery
with intent to kill, Criminal sexual conduct 1 ° or 2 ° or
with minors if unconsenting, Assault w/intent to
commit criminal sexual conduct I* or 2, Kidnapping,
Conspiracy to commit Kidnapping, Arson 1, Burglary
1, Armed robbery, Attempted armed robbery,
Damaging property by means of explosives, Giving
information respecting national or state defense to
foreign contacts during war, Gathering information
for an enemy, Unlawful removing or damaging of
airport facility or equipment when death results,
interference with traffic-control devices or railroad
signs or signals prohibited when death results from
violation, Obstruction of railroad, death results, or
Accessory or Attempt to commit any of the
aforementioned offenses.
Serious Offense:
Any offense punishable by a maximum term of 30
years or more, Lynching 2', Engaging child for sexual
performance, Acceptance of bribes by officers,
Accepting bribes for purpose of procuring public
office, Burglary 2', Embezzlement of public funds,
Breach of trust with fraudulent intent, Obtaining
signature or property by false pretenses, Insurance
fraud, Trafficking in controlled substances,
Trafficking in ice or crank or crack cocaine,
Distributing, selling, manufacturing, or possessing
controlled substances within proximity of a school,
Causing death by operating vehicle while under
influence of drugs or alcohol, or Accessory before the
fact or Attempt to commit any of the aforementioned
offenses.

STATE: TENNESSEE
STATUTE:
EFECrvE:

TRIGGERING EVENTS:

§ 40-35-120 (Supp. 1995)
Repeat violent offenders - "Three strikes"
Three Striker July 1, 1994
Two Striker
(1994 Version) =July 1, 1994
Two Strikes:.-1995 Version) =July 1, 1995
Three Striker
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction
under (b)(1), listed below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions under (b) (1) or (b) (2), listed below.
Two Strike.
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction
under (c) (1), listed below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior
conviction under (c) (1) or (c) (2), listed below.
TENN. CODE ANN.
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DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:
SxIuOUS/VOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

Two Strikes
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Convicted of a violent
crime on or after July 1, 1995 as described in (d) (1),
listed below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: One prior
conviction under (d) (1) or (d) (2), listed below.
The judge may not accept a plea agreement that fails
to recommend that a defendant with a sufficient
number of prior convictions be sentenced as a repeat
violent offender.
If the judge denies the plea agreement, the district
attorney may still amend the offense to an offense
that is not designated as a violent offense for Three
Strikes of 1994 and Two Strikes of 1994. § 40-35-120(f).
This section does not refer to Two Strikes of 1995.
The district attorney is not required to prosecute
under this statute.
Life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
(b)(1) As applicable to CURRENT conviction under Three
Stike.
Murder 1, Murder 2, Especially aggravated
kidnapping, Especially aggravated robbery, Aggravated
rape, Rape of a child, Aggravated arson. Attempt,
solicitation or facilitation of any of the
aforementioned. Aggravated kidnapping, Aggravated
robbery, Rape, Aggravated sexual battery, Especially
aggravated burglary, Aggravated child abuse,
Aggravated or Especially Aggravated sexual
exploitation of minor.
(b)(2) As applicable to PRIOR convictions under Three
Strikes
Any of the felony offenses listed above in (b) (1), and
all Class A and Class B felonies, listed below, with the
exception of Robbery by use of a deadly weapon.
(c)(1) As applied to 1994 CURRENT conviction under Two
Strike:
Murder 1 (induding attempt, solicitation or
facilitation), Murder 2, Especially aggravated
kidnapping, Especially aggravated robbery, Aggravated
rape, Rape of a child, Aggravated arson.
(c)(2) As applied to 1994 PRIOR convictions under Two
Strike:
Any of the felony offenses listed above in (c) (1), and
Class A felonies, listed below, with the exception of
Robbery by use of a deadly weapon.
(d)(1) As applied to 1995 CURRENT conviction under
Two Strike:
Murder I, Murder 2, Especially aggravated
kidnapping, Especially aggravated robbery, Aggravated
rape, Rape of a child, Aggravated arson, Aggravated
kidnapping, Rape, Aggravated sexual battery,
Especially aggravated burglary, Aggravated child
abuse, Aggravated or Especially aggravated sexual

exploitation of a minor.
(d)(2) As applicable to 1995 PRIOR convictions under Two
Strike:
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Any of the felony offenses listed above in (d) (1), as
well as Class A and Class B felonies, listed below, with
the exception of Robbery by use of a deadly weapon.
JUVENILES: If thedefendant is tried and sentenced
as an adult, the conviction will serve as a prior strike.
THE JURY: Is not made aware of the habitual
offender status when determining guilt or innocence.
GOVERNOR'S POWER TO REDUCE PRISON
OVERCROWDING: Tenessee statute provides that the
governor has a general power to reduce sentences to
reduce prison overcrowding. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4035-201(b) (2) (A)(i) (1995).
Class A Felonies.
Criminal sexual conduct 1, Conspiracy to take a
human life, Assault with intent to commit murder 1,
Murder 1, Murder 2, Aggravated kidnapping,
Prisoners holding hostages, Unlawful representation
to obtain ransom, Aggravated rape, Abduction of
female from parents for purposes of prostitution,
Aggravated arson, Willful injury by explosives,
Treason, Adulteration of foods or liquors or
pharmaceuticals in which death occurs, Obstruction
or damage to railroad tracks resulting in death,
Killing an officer while officer is arresting a person
on a charge of unlawful gaming, Furnishing
intoxicating liquor which results in death (murder
2°). See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-118 (Supp. 1995).
Class B Felonies:
Criminal sexual conduct 2, Conspiracy to sabotage a
nuclear production facility, Conspiracy to commit
illegal act capable of destroying human life by
possession or use of transportation of explosives,
Conspiracy by convicts to kill, assault with intent to
commit or attempt to commit aggravated kidnapping,
Kidnapping child under 16, robbery by use of a
deadly weapon, Bank robbery, Rape, Aggravated
sexual battery, Causing injury to person by use of fire
bomb, Aggravated child abuse, Rebellion by convict
with intent to kill or escape, Adulteration of food
product or drug resulting in injury, Obstruction or
damage to railroad tracks resulting in injury,
Manufacture or delivery or sale or possession with
intent to do same with Schedule I controlled
substance, Manufacture or delivery or sale of certain
amount of controlled substances, Habitual drug
offender, Person over 18 distributing Schedule I
controlled substance to person under 18 who is at
least 3 years his junior, Wounding officer while he is
arresting person on charge of unlawfully gaming,
Using minors for obscene purposes.
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STATE:TEXAS
STATUTE:
Ercr
cv:

TmGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SElous/VioLTr CRIMES
DEFINED:

NOTES:

TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West Supp. 1996)
Penaltiesfor Repeat and HabitualFelony Offenders
January 1, 1996
Three Strikes
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Felony conviction as
defined below under Current Convictions.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior felony
convictions, only one of which need be a Prior
Conviction as defined below.
No judicial discretion.
The state is not mandated to prosecute under this
statute.
Life imprisonment. The statute does not address the
issue of probation or parole.
Current conviction:
Aggravated sexual assault, Aggravated kidnapping
inflicting bodily injury or sexual abuse, Burglary of a
habitation and entry with intent to commit a felony
other than theft including indecency with a child and
sexual assault.
Priorconvictions:
Sexual performance by a child, Possession or
promotion of child pornography, Indecency with a
child, Sexual assault, Aggravated sexual assault,
Prohibited sexual conduct, Aggravated kidnapping
inflicting bodily injury or sexual abuse, Burglary of a
habitation and entry with intent to commit a felony
other than theft including indecency with a child and
sexual assault.
Upon three felony convictions of any felony not
mentioned above (also excluding state-jailfelonies
[non-violent felonies]), a defendant shall be
sentenced to a term of not more than 99 years or less
than 25 years.
OTHER STRIKES THAT DO NOT COUNT: Juvenile
convictions.

STATE: VIRGINIA
STATUTE:

ErrEcnV:
TRImERING EVENTS:

DlSCRETION:

§ 19.2-297.1 (Michie 1995)
Sentence of person turice previously convicted of certain
violentfelonies.
October 13, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of an Act of
Violenca
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
convictions of an Act of Vzolence.
No judicial discretion.
The state is not mandated to prosecute under this
statute.
VA. CODE ANN.
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SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

Life imprisonment without parole.
PAROLE EXCEPTION: Except those offenders
convicted of criminal sexual assault, any defendant
who has reached the age of 65 and who has served at
least five years of the imposed sentence, or who has
reached the age of 60 and has served at least ten
years of the sentence, may petition for parole.
Act of Vioence.
Murder 1, Murder 2, Voluntary manslaughter, Mobrelated felonies, Kidnapping or abduction felony,
Malicious felonious assault or bodily wounding,
Robbery and carjacking, Criminal sexual assault, or
Conspiracy to commit or Accessory before the fact for
any of the aforementioned offenses.

SERIOus/VIOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

STATE: WASHINGTON
STATUTE:
EFFrCVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:
SERIOus/VIOLENT CRIMES
DEFINED:

§ 9.94A.392 (West Supp. 1996)
Findings and intent - 1994 c.1 Initiative Measure No. 593
(also known as the Persistent Offender Accountability Act)
December 2, 1993
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Most
Serious Offense.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior such
convictions of a Most Serious Offense
No judicial discretion.
The prosecutor is not mandated to charge defendant
as an habitual offender.
Life imprisonment without parole.
Most Serious Offense:
Any felony defined under any law as a class A felony
or criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy to
commit a class A felony, Assault 2, Assault of a child
2, Child molestation 2, Controlled substance
homicide, Extortion 1, Incest when committed
against a child under age of 14, Indecent liberties,
Kidnapping 2, Leading organized crime,
Manslaughter 1° or 2, Promoting prostitution 1,
Rape 3, Robbery 2, Sexual exploitation, Vehicular
assault, Vehicular homicide when caused by driving
under influence of liquor or any drugs or by the
operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner, Any
other felony with a deadly weapon, Any class B felony
offense with a finding of sexual motivation, Any other
felony with a deadly weapon verdict, Attempt to
commit any of the aforementioned offenses. See
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030 (West Supp.
1996).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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NOTES:

GOVERNOR'S POWERS: The governor has the
power to grant a pardon or clemency to any offender
on a case-by-case basis. However, "the people
recommend" that the governor not exercise this
power until the defendant is at least 60 years old and
is judged to be no longer a threat to society. The
people further recommend that sex offenders be held
to the utmost scrutiny regardless of age. See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.894 (West Supp. 1996).
ADDITION OF NEW FELONIES: New felonies can
be added to the list of Most Serious Offenses.

STATE: WEST VIRGINIA
STATUTE:
EFFECTIVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTs:

W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (Supp. 1995)
Punishmentfor second or third offense offelony.

1994
Three Striker

TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a felony
as described below.

PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
DISCRETION:
SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

SERIOUS/VIOLENT CRRAES
DEFINED:
NOTES:

convictions for felonies as described below.
No judicial discretion.
Life imprisonment.
Current and Prior Convictions:

Must be a felony punishable by confinement in a
penitentiary.
A defendant currently convicted of Murder 1,
Murder 2* or Sexual assault 1, who has one previous
such conviction, shall be imprisoned for life without
eligibility for parole.

STATE: WISCONSIN
STATUTE:
EFFECrVE:
TRIGGERING EVENTS:

DISCRETION:

SENTENCING PROVISIONS:

§ 939.62 (West 1996)
Increased penaltyfor habitual criminality
June 11, 1994
Three Strikes:
TRIGGERING CONVICTION: Conviction of a Serious
Felony, as described below.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS REQUIRED: Two prior
Serious Felony convictions, as described below.
No judicial discretion.
The state is not mandated to charge defendant under
this statute.
Life imprisonment without parole.
Wis. STAT. ANN.
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DENiNED:

[Vol. 87

Serious Felony.
Murder 1' intentional, Murder 1 reckless, Felony
murder, Murder 2" intentional, Homicide by
intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm, Battery causing
great bodily harm, Mayhem, Sexual assault 1" or 2,
Taking hostages, Kidnapping, Tampering with
household products if it results in death of another,
Manufacture or delivery or possession of controlled
substances, Arson of buildings, Burglary while armed
with a dangerous weapon or with commission of a
battery upon a person lawfully therein, Intentionally
taking a vehicle with a dangerous weapon and/or
causing great bodily harm and/or death, Robbery
with use of dangerous weapon or article that could
reasonably lead victim to believe it was a dangerous
weapon, Assault by prisoners, Sexual assault of a child
I* or 2, Engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault
on the same child, Physical abuse of a child which
intentionally causes great bodily harm or a high
probability of great bodily harm, Sexual exploitation
of a child, Incest with a child, Child enticement,
Soliciting a child for prostitution, Abduction of
another's child for unlawful purposes, Solicitation of
a child to commit a felony, Use of a child to commit
a class A felony.
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TABLE

2

STATE

STATUTE

STATE

STATUTE

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

§ 13A-5-9
§ 12.55.125
§ 13-604

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
NewJersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

§ 558.016
§ 46-18-219
§ 29-2221
§ 207.010
§ 651:6
§§ 2C:43-7.1
§ 31-18-23

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

481

THRME STRTKS: RETURN TO RATIONALITY?

§ 5-4-501
PENAL CODE § 667
§ 16-13-101
§ 53a-40
tit. 11 § 4214
§ 22-104
§ 775.084
§ 17-10-7

§ 706-606.5
§ 19-2514
ch. 720 § 5/33B-1
§ 35-50-2-8.5
§§ 902.8, 902.9

§ 21-4504
§ 532.080
§ 15:529.1
tit. 17-A § 362(3) (B)
art. 27 § 643B
ch. 279 § 25
§ 769.12
None
§ 99-19-83

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
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